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Abstract 
Purpose- The aim of this research is to address the current gap in the disclosure literature by 
investigating risk disclosure in a developing economy (Saudi Arabia). The current study aims to widen the 
understanding of risk disclosure levels, determinants and economic consequences, by firstly examining the 
levels of risk disclosure in the annual reports of both Islamic and non-Islamic listed banks, secondly by 
empirically exploring corporate governance and the demographic traits of top management teams as the 
determinants of voluntary risk disclosure practices in and thirdly by investigating whether the levels of 
voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi listed banks are value-relevant or not.  
Design/Methodology/Approach- The sample consists of all banks listed on Tadawul. All data was 
collected from the annual reports of the sample banks from 2009 to 2013 using manual content analysis. 
Other variables were collected using DataStream and Bloomberg.  This study develops two holistic risk 
disclosure indices to measure the levels of risk disclosure in both Islamic and non-Islamic banks. It also 
uses ordinary least squares regressions analysis to examine the effect of a combination of determinants 
stemming from corporate governance and demographic traits on risk disclosure. Ordinary least squares 
regressions analysis is also used in determining whether the levels of voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi 
listed banks are value-relevant or not. 
Results- The first empirical analysis shows that Islamic banks report less risk information than non-
Islamic banks. However, the analysis also reveals that both Islamic and non-Islamic banks report 
relatively the same amount of risk information regarding the banks’ non-Islamic risk-related items. The 
second empirical analysis shows that Islamic banks report very low levels concerning Islamic risk-related 
items. It also shows that external ownership, audit committee meetings, gender diversity, education levels 
and profitability are primary determinants of risk disclosure practices in Saudi listed banks. Thirdly 
findings also exhibit that there is no association between the levels of voluntary risk disclosure and firm 
value as measured by the market to book value (MTBV). But, the results generated from the accounting 
based measure (ROA) show that there is a positively significant association between the levels of 
voluntary risk disclosure and firm value. 
Potential Contributions- This study contributes to the literature on general accounting disclosure and in 
particular advances and contributes to the literature on risk disclosure in developing economies. It also 
contributes to the understanding of the role of accounting information in relation to the levels, 
determinants and market valuation of a firm. Specifically, this study is significant in that it sheds light on 
the voluntary risk-disclosing practices of banks that operate in an environment that is often considered to 
be opaque. This investigation makes major contributions to the literature and increases the knowledge on 
risk disclosure and reporting practices in the annual reports of all listed Saudi banks, namely Islamic and 
non-Islamic banks. It makes a healthy contribution to the discussion on the levels, determinants, 
economic consequences and risk disclosure in banks annual reports. To the best of the researchers’ 
knowledge, no prior research has been conducted on the levels or the determinants voluntary of risk 
disclosure in Saudi Arabia. Also no prior research has been conducted on the relationship between firm 
value and levels of risk disclosure in general or in emerging markets. Therefore, this is the first study to 
investigate the levels, determinants and economic consequences of risk disclosure in this context. This 
study has also pioneered a novel contribution to the field of disclosure by incorporating the upper 
echelons theory into investigating disclosure. Particularly in this study this theory is extended into 
exploring the determinants of voluntary risk disclosure.  
Implications- The reported results should be useful to accounting and regulatory bodies by providing 
information about the inadequacies of risk reporting in Saudi banking sector. Regulatory institutions 
should be above all concerned about the disclosure needs of users. Therefore, SAMA, SOCOPA and 
CMA are called upon to find solutions to improve the reporting of risk information in the Saudi banking 
industry. The study also provides information for managers to keep investors satisfied about the risk that 
their banks encounter. Investors may use the findings for understanding risk disclosure behaviour of 
listed banks. It also informs regulators and investors about the importance and current levels of risk 
disclosure in all Saudi listed banks as well as informing them of the influence voluntary risk disclosure has 
on the value of the firm. It also calls upon managers who prefer to withhold from offering information to 
shareholder to be more transparent if they prefer to increase their banks market value and entice more 
investment. This can be used to increase the value relevance in the banking sector.  
Keywords- Saudi Arabia, Banks, Risk Disclosure, Upper Echelons Theory, Board Demography, Firm 
Value  
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1  Chapter one: Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the overall structure of this investigation, including the 
research motivations, research objectives, research questions, Saudi context, 
importance of the study, contributions of the study, empirical findings and thesis 
structure 
1.1  Overview  
Over the past few decades, the corporate world has evidenced considerable 
changes fundamentally driven by changes in society, technology and global politics 
(Rajab, 2009). For instance, increased global activities of capital and product, 
development of new country’s regulations and   with the rapid development of new 
industries and markets legal systems have become more complicated and 
competitive, as well as, the increased volatility on a global scale has radically 
influenced the credit markets (Deumes, 2008). For instance, financial products and 
services along with corporate changes and structures have even become more 
complicated. Moreover, the augmented economic and political uncertainty through 
the entire world has developed major corporate concerns. The sudden failures of 
some of the world largest organisations such as Lehman Brothers, Northern Rock 
and Enron to name few have worsened what are already deteriorating and difficult 
economic conditions globally and have traumatised the confidence of regulatory 
bodies, investors and all interested groups (Guest 2009; Al-Bassam, 2014; Habbash 
et al., 2016).       
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Accordingly, public calls and demands for corporate institutions to make even larger 
disclosure of business information of a particular relevance to risks and uncertainties 
have skyrocketed (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012).      
    Therefore, corporate risk reporting has earned substantial attention resulting in a 
tremendous increase of examinations of international accounting disclosures. 
However, majority of the mainstream literature believes that there is limited risk 
information disclosures provided in firms’ annual reports (Schrand and Elliot, 1998, 
ICAEW, 1997; 1999; Lajili and Zeghal, 2005; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Abraham 
and Cox, 2007). Hence, there is a substantial demand for more relevant information 
in annual reports from various user groups in order to better enable them assess the 
risk profile of a firm and make informed decisions (Solomon et al., 2000; ICAEW, 
2002; Linsley and Shrives, 2005). This augmentation in all interested user groups’ 
calls for more information has inspired an ample discussion on the topic by 
governing and regulatory bodies, as well as earning an essential part in the 
contemporary accounting literature. Various proposals have been put forward by 
professional bodies aiming at the enhancement of corporate reporting have called for 
additional related risk information disclosures in firms’ annual reports (ICAEW, 2002; 
ASB, 2003, 2006).  
The catastrophic corporate failures worldwide have supported this argument where   
regulatory institutions had to reconsider the basis of corporate regulations due to the 
global financial crisis. Beltratti and Stulz, (2012); Erkens et al., (2012) argued that 
this event had resulted in momentous concerns regarding risk disclosures. Due to 
this catastrophic corporate failure investors and stakeholders’ attention has been 
drawn to the importance of risk reporting (Linsley et al., 2008). These concern are 
coherent with the arguments put forward by Meier et al., (1995); Schrand and Elliot, 
3 | P a g e  
(1998); Beretta and Bozzolan, (2004); Cabedo and Tirado, (2004); Ahmed et al., 
(2004); Linsley, et al., (2006); Linsley and Shrives, (2006); Abraham and Cox, (2007); 
Linsley and Lawrence, (2007); Hassan (2009) which is that risk disclosure is a 
pivotal element to business risks, where reporting offers a greater transparency and 
enhances investors’ confidence. As evident the global crisis also resulted in a 
deceleration of the global economy and the demand increased for more risk 
reporting, which had led to a number of regulatory reforms for example the birth of 
the International Financial Reporting Standard 7 Financial Instruments and BASEL II 
which includes greater measures on risk transparency and disclosure. It also 
underlines the significance of informative risk disclosure in the banking industry for 
the overall enhancement of market discipline. The disclosure of informative risk 
information in banks has been underlined as a successful instrument for eluding 
banking catastrophes (Financial Stability Board, 2012).   
Over the years a number of theories have been developed in the accounting 
literature to explicate the general phenomena of disclosure and the variation of 
disclosure among firms. For instance such theories include information asymmetry 
theory (Akerlof, 1970), signalling theory (Spence, 1973), agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), legitimacy theory (Carpenter and Feroz, 1992) and Stakeholder 
theory (Freeman, 1994). Based on these theories, previous investigation such as 
Healy and Palepu, (2001); Linsley and Shrives, (2005); Lajili and Zeghal (2005); 
Marshall and Weetman, (2007); Kothari, Li and Short, (2009); Hussainey and Walker, 
(2009); Elzahar and Hussainey, (2012); Allegrini and Greco, (2013); Nekhili et al., 
(2015); Allini et al., (2016) have used them in the provision of explaining different 
factors influencing disclosure and disclosure variations among firms.   
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It also has been established that corporations’ disclosures about risk and methods 
on how such  risks are identified, managed, analysed and evaluated would support 
investors and users of corporate annual reports to understand profiles of risk of firms 
and enables them to form precise valuations of corporations financial conditions and 
performance (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004; Solomon et al., 2000). Therefore, 
institutions would realise and reap the benefits of being of high transparency. For 
instance, augmented disclosure decreases information asymmetry and uncertainty 
(between internal management and external shareholders), thus positively effecting 
the market valuation of the firm (Clarkson et al., 1996; Healy and Palepu, 1993; 
Hassan et al., 2009). Also confident and informed shareholders are a fundamental 
element in attaining and maintaining a precise assessment of a firm’s stock (Deumes, 
2008). Disclosure as a whole is also of great importance of the well-being and 
functioning of capital markets and to a larger extent for the stability of the economy 
(Akerlof, 1970).   
The current study examines the literature on corporate disclosure, risk disclosure 
and further extends it by undertaking empirical investigations into the corporate 
voluntary risk disclosure of all Saudi listed banks. The purpose of this is to obtain 
insights into the amount, type and nature of risk information reported by banks in 
their annual reports. The current study examines the current risk disclosure practices 
and variations over a five-year timespan. Moreover, the link between risk disclosure 
levels and corporate governance and demographic attributes is examined. 
Additionally, the current study examines the effect of risk disclosure on the market 
valuation of banks.     
This study focused on the banking industry since banks have a fundamental role to 
play in the businesses and economics of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Also the 
5 | P a g e  
banking industry is a vastly confronted industry by risk.  Furthermore, this industry is 
established upon trust hence, the banking industry is heavily regulated.  In addition, 
shareholders and all other interested groups will lose confidence if a bank offers a 
bad impression. An example of this situation would be the Northern Rock bank which 
gave a bad impression when they have declared miss-calculations and their 
insolvency leading to a loss of confidence among the market participants.  Moreover, 
banks main concern should be to maintain the loyalty and trust of their customers 
and shareholders, accordingly disclosure is a fundamental aspect of the banking 
industry stability. It is important to note that the disclosure of banks ought to be 
examined independently from other sectors (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Barakat and 
Hussainey, 2013).  
In the following sections of this chapter, motivations of the research are provided 
followed by a discussion of the aims and objectives. This is followed by a Saudi 
focus section. This is then followed by the importance of the research then a 
summary of the main contributions of the study. Finally, the structure of the thesis is 
outlined.  
1.2 Research Motivations 
The area of financial risk reporting has been of great importance to accounting 
investigators as a consequence of the contemporary discussion and requirements of 
it. A wide variety of investigations have examined this area, but the focus of such 
investigations significantly differs. A strand of prior researches have only investigated 
quantity of risk reporting in annual statements and concentrated on certain 
categories of risk (Linsley et al., 2006; Dunne et al., 2007; Deumes and Knechel, 
2008; Amran et al., 2009; Hassan 2009). While others strands  of previous 
researches have attempted a more complete examination of risk information and 
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studied risk disclosure practices in annual reports (Dobler et al., 2011; Elshandidy et 
al., 2013) and in prospectus and interim reports (Papa, 2007; Deumes, 2008; 
Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012). Empirical investigations which have examined risk 
information in this wider perspective still remain limited.  For instance, Lajili and 
Zeghal (2005) explored risk disclosure in annual reports without examining the 
potential determinants of risk disclosure. Whereas Linsley and Shrives (2005) and 
Rajab and Schachler (2009) examined risk disclosure reporting in non-financial UK 
firms. They only examined size, industry leverage and listing status and other 
determinants are not examined particularly corporate governance and demographic 
attributes. However, researches which have investigated risk disclosure 
determinants have yield varies results (i.e. Nitm et al 2013; Elshandidy et al., 2015; 
Elshandidy and Neri, 2015; Allini et al., 2016).  
Prior and present disclosure literature has explored the motives and factors, which 
could influence the degree of the disclosed information made by corporations and to 
what extent do such factors influence the choices of disclosing certain information. 
Whereas a strand of other literature have looked at what risk information is reported 
however more examinations are required to investigate what risk information is 
reported, what are the motivates of such disclosures and explore the potential 
consequences of risk information e.g. the impact of risk disclosure on firm value. The 
empirical literature offers a limited answer about the practices of risk disclosure, its 
determinants and consequences. Also, there are no investigations on the potential 
influences of the levels of risk reporting on firm value. The current study therefore 
fills this gap.    
It has also been debated by previous literature that there is an inadequate amount of 
examinations on corporate risk disclosures in general and in the banking industry in 
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particular (Beasley et al., 2005; Lajili, 2009; Farag et al., 2014). Yet, this scarcity of 
examination is even greater in emerging economies, as all of the risk disclosure 
investigations are restricted to the developed world e.g. German, Dutch and Anglo-
Saxon countries (Linsley, et al., 2006; Lajili, 2009; Elshandidy et al., 2013), Europe 
and Latin America are led by (Madrigal et al., 2012; Miihkinen, 2013; Maffei et al., 
2014). Notwithstanding the work of Amran, et al., (2009), Mokhtar and Mellett (2013), 
Elkelish and Hassan (2014), and Hassan (2009; 2014) very little attention has been 
given to the risk reporting practices of publicly listed companies in emerging 
economies.  
Therefore, little is known about the corporate risk disclosure in the Arab world in 
general and the GCC states in particular, except Hassan (2009); Al-Shammari, 
(2014) who investigated the determinants of the risk disclosure in the UAE and 
Kuwait respectively. The focus of this study is Saudi Arabia in particular since risk 
disclosure has never been examined within the world’s largest rapidly growing 
emerging market; also Saudi Arabia constitutes 25% of the Arab world GDP and 44% 
of the total Arab stock market capitalization. Therefore, risk disclosure is worthy of 
investigation in such environment (Alshehri and Solomon 2012; Albasaam, 2014).  
This literature gap needs to be filled mainly when the examination is on the 
responses of firms to enhancing the quantity and quality of information reported in 
annual financial reports, not only concerning their compliance with rules and 
regulations, but also in meeting the requirements of various interested user groups. 
To this end, it is hoped that the current investigation will answer the various calls and 
demands made for enhancing risk disclosure. 
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It has also been argued that in order to stabilise the banking industry, transparency 
of firm performance is critical. Ntim, et al., (2011) claimed that the global financial 
crisis in 2008 was triggered by low level of risk management capability in banks and 
a lack of transparency in reporting their performance in their annual reports.   
Al-Sahafi et al., (2015) affirmed that poor corporate governance in the banking 
industry played a key part in the financial crises. According to Alghamdi (2012) the 
stock failure in the Saudi Stock Market uncovered a number of serious weaknesses 
not only in the level of compliance of Saudi banks with the corporate governance 
regulations (CGRs) but the absence of disclosure, transparency and accountability 
which have a substantial impact on banks stability, market valuation and severely 
limits risk information disclosure. Al-Turki, (2006) reported in his research that mostly 
all Saudi Arabian corporations including banks have poor corporate governance 
practices.  The current study links voluntary risk disclosure in relation to a number of 
corporate governance determinants to examine whether the levels of voluntary risk 
disclosure are affected by corporate governance or not.  
Moreover, investigations of this kind in Saudi Arabia and in the emerging world are 
scarce (Barth et al., 2001). Even if there are numerous investigations on various 
aspects of corporate governance in the developed world (Abraham and Cox, 2007; 
Nitm et al., 2013; Nitm, Lindop and Thomas, 2013; Elshandidy and Neri, 2015) the 
outcomes of such investigations still cannot be generalized to emerging markets 
owing to numerous differences such as cultural, social and economic between the 
two markets. Also Kouwenberg, (2007) stated that owing to the contextual variations 
between developed and developing markets, such outcomes of such investigations 
linked to the developed world have only limited applicability in the developing 
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markets. Thus it is indispensable to study corporate governance, board demography 
in relation to voluntary risk disclosure in developing economies.  
To the best of the researcher knowledge, there are only few investigations examining 
the determinants of voluntary disclosure in the context of Saudi Arabia; namely 
Alsaeed (2006), Al-Janadi et al. (2013), Al-Sahafi et al., (2015) and Habbash et al., 
(2016). However, this study makes major contributions to the research on voluntary 
risk disclosure in Saudi Arabia; firstly by employing a more recent and longer 
timespan (2009-2013) than Alsaeed (2006) who only covers the period between 
2006-2007, and Al-Janadi et al. (2013) who also only covers a one-year period  from 
2002 to 2003. Also this thesis covers the same timespan as Al-Sahafi et al., (2015) 
and Habbash et al., (2016) but more recent (2009-2013). Al-Sahafi et al., (2015) and 
Habbash et al., (2016) investigated the exact same period (2007-2011). Secondly, 
Alsaeed (2006) in his study mainly examined the impact of firm characteristics on 
voluntary disclosure. Whereas Al-Janadi et al., (2013) investigated the effect of 
corporate governance on voluntary disclosure. While Habbash et al., (2016) studied 
the effect of both firm characteristics and corporate governance on voluntary 
disclosure. Also, Al-Sahafi et al., (2015) examined the influence of both firm 
characteristics and corporate governance on voluntary disclosure, the same as 
Habbash et al., (2016) but in the Saudi banking industry. Furthermore, the 
relationship between corporate governance, demographic traits, firm value and risk 
disclosure has received no consideration at all in Saudi Arabia and in particular in 
the banking sector. However, the purpose of this research is to examine the impact 
of corporate governance determinants and board demographic traits on voluntary 
risk disclosure in all Saudi listed banks. It also seeks to investigate the effect of 
voluntary risk disclosure levels on the market valuation of all Saudi banks.  
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Henceforth, the above-mentioned events and discussion on risk disclosure are a 
motivation for the examination of risk disclosure in annual reports of Saudi listed 
banks with a view to particularly investigate its levels, determinants and its effect on 
firm value. Also further insights are expected to develop concerning corporate risk 
disclosures.    
In brevity, this study is also motivated by call for more investigations on the influence 
of corporate governance determinants on risk disclosure especially in developing 
markets made by Dobler et al., (2011). As well as by the call for more research into 
the relationship between the demographic characteristics and risk disclosure made 
by Abdallah, et al., (2015). Fourthly, this investigation is also motivated by the 
absolute scarcity of risk disclosure investigating the link between risk disclosure and 
firm value. 
1.3  Research Objectives  
There are three main objectives of this investigation and two sub-objectives. The first 
empirical study will endeavour to answer the first objective as well as the two sub-
objective of this research. While the second and third studies will attempt to explore 
one of the two remaining objectives.  
1. To measure the level of risk disclosure in all listed Saudi banks. 
 To show the initial relationships between risk disclosure and frim 
characteristics. 
 To discuss the impact of Islamic values of risk disclosure.  
By identifying the level of voluntary risk disclosure in all listed Saudi banks, this will 
enable this investigation to establish whether annual reports published by the sample 
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banks conveyed risk disclosure information, establishing the degree of transparency 
of these banks and to determine any variations among the sample banks over the 
investigated period.  
This aims at providing a picture of the volume and nature of information reported and 
evaluate if reporting practices show any changing pattern in banks disclosures, and 
draws the attention to any restrictions intrinsic in risk disclosing. Though a number of 
previous risk disclosure investigations have been conducted, no previous 
investigations have examined risk disclosure levels and variations within the Saudi 
context. 
2. To examine the determinants of risk reporting in Saudi listed banks.  
Previous research has shown that some factors have an association with risk 
disclosure, but the results have been different and sometimes contradictory.  
Therefore, it is important to know what factors affect banks’ decision to convey risk 
disclosure in the Saudi Banking industry. 
The relationships between disclosure and corporate governance characteristics and 
demographic attributes have long been of interest to accounting investigators. The 
level of voluntary risk disclosure could be affected by numerous corporate 
governance variables and demographic attributes, for instance ownership structure 
(i.e. Elshandidy et al., 2013) board size (i.e. Nitm et al., 2013) independent directors 
(Abraham and Cox 2007) non-executive directors (Deumes and Knechel, 2008) audit 
committee independence (Oliveira et al., 2011b) audit committee size (Ho and Wong 
2001) audit committee meetings (Allegrini and Greco, 2013) gender of the board 
(Allini et al., 2016) tenure (Chung et al., 2015) education levels (Allini et al., 2016) 
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diversity (Allini et al., 2016). Still, some of the above-mentioned associations are 
weak and not tested in the literature of risk disclosure in emerging economies.  
Thus, such investigations offer a good opening point to advance the examination of 
the links between risk disclosure and its principal determinants. The current study 
links the level of voluntary risk disclosure to all of the above-mentioned variables.  
3. To investigate the economic consequences of reported risk disclosure in 
Saudi listed banks’ annual reports.  
To see whether banks’ annual reports carry potential economic consequences to 
investor or not. This research will explore whether the risk disclosure in the annual 
reports submitted by listed Saudi banks is value relevant for users, and whether it 
provides benefits for stakeholders that are reflected in increased firm value. Such 
risk information disclosures are of great significance to external investors, since the 
more they know, the more correctly they will be capable to determine a firm’s market 
value. No previous investigation is known on the association between risk disclosure 
and firm value. Therefore, this study aims at exploring such relationship.   
1.4 Research Importance 
In recent years there have been a number of high profile corporate failures such as 
Lehman Brothers, Northern Rock and Enron, which have highlighted the importance 
of transparency and the requirement for strong corporate governance. Accounting 
irregularities related to corporations’ such as the above-mentioned have turned the 
attention on corporations’ risks and questioned the reliability of corporations’ 
accounting and financial reporting systems, particularly in annual reports (Linsley 
and Shrives, 2005), and the effectiveness of corporate governance disclosures.  
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The constant changes in business environment make corporations more dependent 
on financial instruments and international transactions, which raise the importance of 
risk disclosure (Dobler, 2008). Thus companies have to satisfy the accounting need 
of users by reporting more information on different risks being faced and the 
sustainability of their operations. Such reported information helps investors to 
evaluate the present and future risks of the firm, which is essential in optimising their 
revenues, by holding well-diversified portfolios (Abraham and Cox, 2007). Solomon 
et al., (2000) exhibited a strong demand for increased risk disclosure from 
institutional investors to enhance their portfolio-investment decision-makings. Risk 
disclosure helps in investors’ investment decisions-making process by assessing the 
information released by companies in order to establish levels of various risks they 
face, their decision will be taken based on expected return and risk considerations.  
Moreover, risk disclosure will lead to a better risk management, as well as improved 
accountability for stewardship, investor protection, and the usefulness of financial 
reporting (ICAEW, 1997). This would help financial reports’ users to identify potential 
managerial problems/opportunities and assess management's effectiveness in 
dealing with such issues (Lajili and Zeghal, 2005).  
Stakeholders, investors notably, as users of annual reports need company risk 
information in order to measure and minimise the risks before they make financial 
decisions. Nevertheless, due to incomplete, scrappy and mutual exclusiveness of 
information in financial reports, users cannot easily interpret risk disclosure (Papa & 
Peters, 2011). The accounting literature also demonstrates that there is a significant 
risk information gap between firms and their stakeholders (i.e. Linsley and Shrives, 
2006) 
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This research is important since it supplies users with an objective evaluation of the 
present levels of risk reporting exercises in all Saudi Listed banks. All users of 
annual reports need to be enabled to perceive and form an opinion of the risks 
possibly influencing banks and the method in which these risks are managed. 
Further, risk disclosure would help users to form an opinion on the amount, timing 
and likelihood of the firm’s future cash flows. Such outcomes have the potential to 
help all interested user groups including standard setters and regulatory bodies (i.e. 
SAMA) when developing the framework and setting new requirements of corporate 
risk disclosure in the Kingdom.   
Also with regard to risk reporting, the empirical literature provides only partial 
answers regarding risk disclosure determinants in emerging capital markets. This 
dearth of risk disclosure prohibited investors from having adequate and appropriate 
information to evaluate corporations risk disclosure. Therefore, this leaves investors 
unable to adequately assess a firm’s risk profile hence fail to ponder on the scale 
and categories of risk in their investment decision making process (Linsley et al., 
2008). This dearth of risk information in annual report points out the importance of 
examining the determinates of risk disclosure in different settings, particularly 
developing markets such as in the case of this study Saudi Arabia. 
The current investigation examines a combination of determinants of voluntary risk 
reporting. This research is of great importance to both investors and regulatory 
bodies since it recognises the main determinants of risk disclosure reported by all 
Saudi. In addition, there is no research on the potential impact of risk disclosure on 
the firm’s market value; investors need transparency and accountability in firm’s 
annual report.  The disclosure within the annual report has value relevance if 
corporations communicate signals and report firm performance more transparently. It 
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is also believed that annual report risk disclosure is beneficial in a way or another to 
shareholder, is only when they are predicted to have a significant link between firm 
value and the level of annual reports risk disclosure. Hence, investors can use such 
information in the annual report for consideration when they make financial decisions. 
This research is expected to shed more light on the relationship.  
1.5 Saudi Arabian Context  
Saudi Arabia was a particular focus of this study because of its unique socio-
economic context. First, it is a developing market that is different from developed 
markets in its religion, social, political regimes, tribal systems and traditions (AMF, 
2013). For instance, such religious principles influence day to day life, trade, law, 
economics and political features of the Saudi community. Second, Saudi Arabia is 
the largest emerging capital market that adopts an open economic philosophy based 
on the market economy and liberalization of trade (AMF, 2013). Third, Saudi 
government has initiated several far-reaching reforms at the Saudi Stock Exchange 
(Tadawul) to mobilize domestic savings and attract foreign capital investment. These 
measures include privatization of state corporations. Fourth, Saudi Arabia has 
become one of the largest emerging economies in the world, having the largest stock 
market in the Middle East (Piesse et al., 2012). Also, the Saudi stock market is now 
the largest in the Arab world as far as capitalization is concerned and is becoming an 
important capital market in the region. Where, it counts for 25% of the total Arab 
GDP and 44% of the total Arab market capitalization (Alshehri and Solomon 2012; 
Albasaam, 2014). Also, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia has one quarter of the world’s 
oil reserves and is the biggest oil producers in OPEC, where it had about 29% of the 
total OPEC production in 2013 (OPEC, 2013). Fifth, the ownership structure in the 
kingdom is divided between family-owned and state-concentrated, where most of the 
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listed companies are family-owned. They count for about 70% of total listed 
companies, While the rest of the listed companies which represent the other 30% are 
state-owned (Baydoun, et al. 2013; Albasaam, 2014). Finally, the Saudi Arabian 
recent regulatory framework incorporates different legislation that requires the 
disclosure of risk related information in corporations’ annual reports. All these 
aspects make investigating the extent of voluntary risk disclosure an important issue 
in Saudi Arabia, an area that remains un-researched. 
1.6 Research Questions 
Following the research objectives, the following three research questions are 
formulated. To answer the first Research Objective, namely to measure the level of 
voluntary risk disclosure in all Saudi listed banks, the following first research 
question is formulated as: 
Q1: What are the levels of voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi banks?  
To answer this research question, the level of risk disclosure is measured by 
counting the number of predetermined words in the annual reports of both sets of 
banks in Saudi based on two risk disclosure indexes, which have been developed 
solely for the purpose of this study. To answer the second research objective, 
namely to examine the determinants of risk disclosure in Saudi banks, the following 
research question is formulated: 
Q2: What are the determinants of risk disclosure in Saudi listed banks?  
To answer this the research question, the determinants of risk disclosure 
incorporated in this research come from a combination of two sets of variables firstly: 
corporate governance attributes which includes ownership structure, board size, 
independent directors, non-executive directors, audit committee independence, audit 
committee size, audit committee meetings. The second set of variables stem from 
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board demographic traits which include education level, tenure, gender diversity of 
the board and diversity based on nationality. Both set of variables are extracted from 
banks annual reports as well as some of the variables being collected from 
DataStream and Bloomberg and the correlation will be tested by ordinary least 
square (OLS) regressions through the use of SPSS program.   
The association between the combination of corporate governance characteristics, 
board demographic traits and the level of voluntary risk disclosure as shown in the 
model of the second empirical study is formulated based on agency and the upper 
echelon theories, and the results of previous studies. To achieve the third research 
objective, namely to investigate the economic consequences of reported risk 
disclosure in Saudi listed banks’ annual reports the following research question 
formulated: 
Q3: What are the economic consequences of risk disclosure practices of Saudi 
listed banks? 
To answer this question, this investigation also uses OLS regression model to 
directly measure how the level of voluntary risk disclosure affects the market value of 
the bank. In the first model of this study the dependent variable for firm value in the 
market based measure which is the natural logarithm of market to book value at end 
of year (MTBV). For the accounting based measure this study proxy for firm value by 
the profitability (ROA). Value relevance is the ability of a firm to send signals and 
detailed firm information that is useful for stakeholders and enables firm value to 
increase. Meanwhile, the association between the dependent variables in both 
models and the level of risk disclosure is interpreted from stakeholder, signalling 
theories and reviewed from previous literatures. 
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1.7  Islamic Financial Techniques: 
Islam, as the religion of the Muslim people, provides the guidelines which direct them 
in their daily life. It is based on two main concepts: the Qur’an1and the Sunnah2. 
There is a third concept, which is used when no relevant answer from the Qur’an or 
the Sunnah can be found, called the Ijma3. This tertiary concept operates by having 
a number of Islamic scholars of a particular age and possessing considerable 
knowledge of the Islamic religion, analyse the text which carries no mention in the 
Qur’an or Sunnah. The opinion of the majority is then taken over individual opinion. 
The reason for using Shari’aa in banking is to avoid any prohibited aspects or 
investments, such as interest rates or the financing of prohibited activities. Funding 
investments in alcohol or casino projects is wholly verboten; in Islam these are 
pronounced to be prohibited and harmful to the society. (Molyneux & Iqbal, 2005).  
From an investor perspective, the risk of such investments could be the involvement 
of their funds through the bank in unlawful activities and the non-disclosure of such 
investments. Deception and dishonesty is prohibits in the religion of Islamic therefore, 
banks have to disclose their position and investment involvement to their investors.  
Since the Shari’aa is involved in the banking system, there are various financial 
techniques and models which perform the functionality of the banking system based 
on Islamic principles thus each mode carry its own risks. These models are defined 
as follow: 
 
 
_______________________________________________________ 
1 Qur’an is the holy book that Muslim follow 
2 Sunnah is the rules or the practice applied to the life of the prophet Mohammed (pbuh) 
3 Ijma means the majority of people agree in a specific point or a situation. 
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1.7.1 Mudarabah: 
 
This is a contract made by two partners, the capital owner (called Rabb Al-Mal) and 
an investment manager (called the Mudarib). The profit is shared between the two 
partners as agreed at the time of the contract; if any loss is accrued it is suffered by 
the capital owner, as the Mudarib does not invest anything and the loss for the 
Mudarib is the cost of his/her labour, which failed to generate any income. However, 
if the Mudarib has been negligent or has operated dishonesty, he then becomes 
liable for the loss caused by his negligence or misconduct. 
 
The capital owner has no right to participate in the management, which is carried out 
by the Mudarib only. On the other hand, the Mudarib cannot commit the investment 
for any sum greater than the capital contributed by the capital owner, as the liability 
of Rabb Al-Mal is limited to the investment and no more. Any expenses of the 
Mudarabah business can be charged to the Mudarabah account. No debt is allowed 
unless the capital owner has granted this to the Mudarib. (Al-Omar & Abdulhaq, 
1996) and (Molyneux & Iqbal, 2005).  
As the capital owner is only limited to the investment and cannot be involved in the 
management of his/her funds. Reporting risk disclosure information becomes a 
priority for him/her since this is the only way that can provide Rabb Al-Mal 
information regarding his/her investment and decisions made by the Mudarib. This is 
an essential part of the Mudarabah contract since the capital owner has the right to 
terminate the contract if he/she feels that the investment manager is no acting in 
their interest.  
20 | P a g e  
1.7.2 Musharakah: 
This is another financing technique, which is similar to the Mudarabah contract but 
contains a number of differences. ‘Musharakah’ is an Arabic world and literally 
means ‘sharing’. In terms of business it means a joint enterprise in which all partners 
share the profit or loss of the joint venture. 
In the case of the Musharakah each partner participates in the capital, is involved in 
the management and shares the profit and loss. Again the profit is shared between 
the partners as has been agreed in the contract; this profit sharing takes into 
consideration the ratios for each partner, as the loss is shared according to the 
distributed share of each in the total capital. The reason the profit sharing ratio is left 
to the agreed contract is because of the difference in the ratio of shares in the 
invested project for the partners in the total capital of the project. It is also because 
the partners share the work of managing the project by a specific, not necessarily 
equal, amount. However, the partners are permitted to charge a fee or wage of any 
management and other labour put into the project. (Al-Omar & Abdulhaq, 1996) and 
(Molyneux & Iqbal, 2005). 
Since some investors may choose not to manage in the project there could be some 
asymmetry gap between active members and non-active members in the 
management of the project. Thus, the disclosure of risk information is a vital element 
in informing the non-active members about the riskiness of their investment and 
decisions made since they can choose to activate their role as a partner and help 
reduce the gap between both members.  
1.7.3 Murabahah:  
This is a contract agreed between the client and the bank which takes place when 
the client wishes to purchase equipment or property. At this point the client requests 
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his/her bank to purchase the item so as to sell it to him/her against deferred payment 
plus a profit mark-up; this is also known as ‘Bai Mu’ajjal’. In this method, the bank will 
sell the product to the client at a higher price due to the extra profit but the client will 
pay the amount of money in installments based on an agreed contract with a fixed 
mark-up profit at certain times. 
The bank here will have two contracts to agree on. The first is a purchase contract, 
which is made between the bank and the supplier of the item, and the second is a 
sale contract which is concluded between the bank and the client. Some banks 
prefer to appoint the client named as the person placing the order and the bank as 
its agent to receive the item purchased. The point of this is to avoid the ‘riba’ 
(interests and usury), as Islam allows trade (sale, purchase) and yet forbids interest. 
(Al-Omar & Abdulhaq, 1996) and (Molyneux & Iqbal, 2005). 
The bank needs to disclose its position on the purchased item/ property since the 
risk here is that the bank may disregard or choose not to initiate the first contract 
which is made between the bank and the supplier of the item/ property but instead 
buy the item and sell it to the client at a deterred payment. The disclosure of such 
risk is important since both contracts have to be initiated.  
1.7.4 Ijarah: (leasing) 
‘Ijarah’ is an Arabic world that means ‘to rent out something’. This kind of rent is used 
in two different cases. The first type is by hiring human services. The person who 
pays for the service is called ‘Musta’jir’, the person who offers the services is called 
an ‘Ajir’ and the money or the wage paid is called ‘Ujrah’. The second type is the rent 
of usufruct of assets or properties to another person. This type of Ijarah is known in 
English as ‘leasing’.  
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Islamic banks use the mode of leasing as a financing technique, where a lease 
contract is presented. The bank may buy the asset and rent it to the client. During 
the term of leasing, the assets remain in the lessor’s name and all the risks, which 
prevent the use of the rented equipment, are borne by the lessor. 
However, the lessee might take on some of the responsibility if this is agreed in the 
contract, such as day-to-day maintenance. (Al-Omar & Abdulhaq, 1996) and 
(Molyneux & Iqbal, 2005). The lease contract is for short-term periods and can be 
renewed by the consent of both parties.  
From an investor perspective, as bank shareholders the risk of such Ijarah is that 
their funds may be used in an unlawful activities and the non-disclosure of such 
investments is important to the investors. Also another risk of the Ijarah is that the 
lessee may not carry out the terms and conditions set out in the contract such as the 
maintenance of the leased machinery/ property. Thus the disclosure of such risk is 
vital in the decision making process.   
1.7.5 Qard Hasan: 
The word ‘Qard’ is taken from Arabic, meaning ‘to cut’. In economic terms it means 
taking a portion of the lender’s property by giving it as a loan to the borrower. ‘Hasan’ 
is also an Arabic word, derived from the word ‘Ihsan’ meaning ‘kindness to others’. 
So as the Shari’aa does not permit interest, this loan is given to the borrower 
gratuitously, interest free. (Hossain, 2004). There are two types of Qard Hasan loans; 
the first is ‘Ariya’, which is a loan for the use of the usufruct of property temporarily 
and gratuitously, requiring both the owner of the property and the borrower to sign a 
contract. The loan can be terminated at will. 
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The second type is called ‘Qard’, which is the most known version; it is the loan of 
currency or other standard of exchange. If there is any charge to the lender as a 
result of the provision of this loan, it must be added to the loan and the borrower has 
to pay it; the Shari’aa allows this as long as it is not interest. The loan has to be 
returned at an agreed future date. (Al-Omar & Abdulhaq, 1996) 
The disclosure of information and risk disclosure of such loans provides 
investors/shareholder a wider picture on the magnitude of cash loaned out as Qard 
Hassan and any underlying risks in terms of repayment.  
1.7.6 Al-Istisna: 
This is another type of Islamic financial technique. It is a modern form of Islamic 
finance; a contract applied to finance construction and manufacturing projects. It is 
based on an agreement between two parties, where one party makes an order for a 
commodity to be manufactured and the other makes and delivers this at a future 
date for a specific price.   
This type of technique, as explained by Al-Omar & Abdulhaq, (1996), allows cash 
payment in advance and future delivery; it also permits future payment and future 
delivery. Furthermore, Molyneux & Iqbal, (2005) show that there are two types of Al-
Istinsa contracts. The first is a contract in which the beneficiary and the bank agree 
that the payment is payable by the purchaser in the future in installments and the 
bank will take responsibility for delivering the requested manufactured commodity at 
an agreed time. The second type is a subcontract between the contractor and the 
bank to manufacture the product in respect to the agreed specifications. 
The bank needs to disclose its position on such contracts since the risk here is that 
the bank may choose not to report about contracts with third parties. Also investors 
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need to know the risk of unpaid or unmet contracts between the banks and the party 
making the order or between the bank any the supplier. The disclosure of such risk is 
important since both contracts have to be honoured. 
1.7.7 Salam: 
This form of financing is a forward sale contract in which the payment is made in 
advance at the time of contracting and the delivery of the products is made at a 
future date. The contract involves the bank, the client and the supplier. 
The client has the right to investigate the products and might reject them if they do 
not match the specifications agreed to at the time of contracting (this would only 
apply to fungible products). The bank can make two Salam contracts; the first is that 
the bank will buy the product by making an advance payment to the seller at a future 
delivery date desired by the client. The bank then sells the product to the client on an 
installments sale basis. The second contract is for the delivery of the product as it is 
specified in the first Salam contract. (Al-Omar & Abdulhaq, 1996) and (Molyneux & 
Iqbal, 2005)   
The bank needs to disclose its position on such contracts since the risk here is that 
the bank may choose not to report about contracts with third parties. Also investors 
need to know the risk of unpaid or unmet contracts between the banks and the party 
making the order or between the bank any the supplier.  
1.7.8 Wakalah: 
This is an Arabic word that means ‘on behalf’, and is an official term used for a 
contract in which somebody gives the authority to someone else to act on his/her 
behalf for a specific mission or task. In English terms, it can be described as an 
‘agentship’ where in the Islamic banking system the client gives funds to the bank 
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that serves as his/her investment manager, and the loss and the profit is passed to 
the client; the bank only cuts fees for its managerial service (Molyneux & Iqbal, 2005). 
Since, the investor is only limited to the investment and cannot be involved in the 
management of his/her funds. Reporting risk disclosure information becomes a 
priority for him/her since this is the only way that can provide investors information 
about his/her investment and decisions made by the agent (bank). This is an 
essential part of the wakalah contract since the investor needs know that the agent is 
acting in their interest and their money is no misused or involved in unlawful activities. 
1.7.9 Sukuk: 
Sukuk commonly refers to the Islamic equivalent of bonds. However, as opposed to 
conventional bonds, which merely confer ownership of a debt, Sukuk grants the 
investor a share of an asset, along with the commensurate cash flows and risk. As 
such, Sukuk securities adhere to Islamic laws (Shari’aa principles), which prohibit the 
charging or payment of interest (Riba). 
The emergence of Sukuk has been one of the most significant developments in 
Islamic capital markets in recent years. Sukuk instruments act as a bridge. They link 
their issuers, primarily sovereigns and corporations with a wide pool of investors, 
many of whom are seeking to diversify their holdings beyond traditional asset 
classes. (Islamic Development bank, 2010). 
Sukuk are exposed to different types of risks. The most important is Shari’aa 
compliance risk. And the challenge for Sukuk issuing entities becomes to devise an 
effective risk management strategy congruent to Shari’aa principles. Thus, investors 
choosing to invest in Sukuk are normally looking for investments which comply with 
Islamic laws so as to avoid any unlawful investments. Hence, the risk of such 
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investments could be the non-compliance with Islamic laws and the investment of 
their Sukuk in unlawful activities. Therefore, risk disclosure is an important element 
in the process of decision making for investors since they need to know of the 
compliance of their Sukuk with the Shari’ah principles.    
1.8 Research Methodology  
The current study is descriptive and empirical in scope. A detailed description of 
research methodology used (selection of research methods, sample selection, 
research model and statistical tests) is provided in each of the three empirical 
studies below. For the purpose of the first study, this thesis examines the levels of 
voluntary risk disclosure in both sets of banks listed in Saudi based on two risk 
disclosure indexes, which are checklists of different disclosure items included in 
banks’ annual reports (Arvidsson, 2003). Thereafter, two risk disclosure indices were 
developed (Islamic and non-Islamic) solely for the purpose of measuring the level of 
voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi listed banks. The current method used in exploring 
the first objective is descriptive in scope. A content analysis technique was required, 
which is categorising a written piece of work, words, phrases and sentences against 
a certain schema of interest based on the selection criteria, (Bowman, 1984; Weber, 
1988). In this study the level and nature of voluntary risk disclosure was measured 
according to the number of words disclosed in annual reports and variations were 
considered over a five-year period.  
Secondly, this study uses an ordinary least square (OLS) regression model to 
examine the relationship between voluntary risk disclosure in the annual reports of 
all Saudi listed banks and a combination of corporate governance and demographic 
traits.   In this model, the dependent variable was the risk disclosure score generated 
through the use of a content analysis, this is in line with (Elzahar and Hussainey, 
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2012; Abdullah et al., 2015) and is the totality of the scores attained from the risk 
disclosure index. Whereas, the independent variables are corporate governance and 
demographic traits, which were collected from the annual reports with some of the 
variables being collected from DataStream and Bloomberg.  (See Table 9), which 
summarizes the measurement and definition of those variables. The current model 
used in investigating these relationships is empirical in scope.  
Finally, this investigation also uses OLS regression model to directly measure how 
the level of voluntary risk disclosure affects the market value of the bank. In this 
model the dependent variable for firm value in the market based measure is the 
natural logarithm of market to book value at end of year (MTBV). For the accounting 
based measure this study proxy for firm value by the profitability (ROA). Two 
measures examinations have different theoretical implications (Hillman and Keim, 
2001).  These models measure how the level of voluntary risk disclosure affects the 
market value of the bank. It has been argued that increased levels of disclosure 
positively influence the market value of the firm. Both models are empirical in its 
scope. 
The fundamental reason for electing annual reports as the key source of information 
of this study is because they are the fundamental mean that organisations’ employ to 
communicate and convey messages to their investors (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; 
Holland, 1998). Moreover, Gray, Kouhy and lavers (1995a; 1995b) affirm that 
constitutional regulations mandate corporations to publish their annual reports 
periodically, due to their significance and the provision of their consistent historical 
image of a corporation. Campbell (2000) presents two more grounds to back the 
employment of annual reports. Firstly, annual reports are broadly distributed of all 
other documents made public of a corporation. Secondly, the corporation 
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management has a complete editorial power of the voluntary disclosure of 
information in the published annual reports. Tay and Parker (1990) confirm that 
genuine disclosure practices could be measured more accurately from annual 
reports.  Also most of the accounting rules and codes of corporate governance are 
aimed at the disclosures in the annual reports. 
The current study will provide an in-depth investigation of risk disclosure in all listed 
banks by investigating Saudi Arabia banking Industry on its own. This approach does 
not provide explicit comparisons between countries, but under certain circumstances 
it is possible to draw implicit conclusions from such studies regarding the way 
institutions provide risk information which can influence other individual institutions or 
“countries” (Del Boca, 1998).  This can be done either by contrasting the unique 
characteristics of one single country with a more generalised case (Del Boca, 1998).     
“...a single-country study is considered comparative if it uses concepts that are applicable to 
other countries, and/or seeks to make larger inferences that stretch beyond the original 
country used in the study” (Lor, 2012, p.28). 
 
 
Moreover, there will always be great single country studies. Those are particularly 
effective in capitalizing on their explanatory leverage by exploiting the availability of 
comparable units of analysis, whether over time, space, or some other organisational 
dimension of variation (Culpepper, 2005). This is particularly important in the case of 
this study since it compares the reporting variations among the sample banks over 
the examined period which evidently has revealed interesting and insightful results 
which carry some potentially importing implications for regulatory institutions and 
investors in Saudi Arabia.  
The main advantage of this research strategy is that it provides comprehensive 
analysis of the examined phenomena in order to tap cross-bank variations, explicitly 
identify what drives risk reporting and demonstrate what are the aftermath of this 
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practices a feature that is impossible when analyses involve many countries (Van del 
Lippe and Van Dijk, 2002). Because of variations in culture (Gray 1988), religion 
(Guiso et al. 2003), political institutions (La Porta et al. 1997), and legal environment 
(Salter and Doupnik 1992), all of which influence the levels, determinants and 
consequences of disclosure and the applicability of accounting standards (Doupnik 
and Salter,1995). Such challenges are not present in a single setting study. 
Most importantly, a single country research allows researcher to provide in-depth 
insights into the research phenomena and provide new insights of the accounting 
methods and choices of disclosure practices. This fact can strengthen the 
contribution of the researched phenomena (Gordon et al., 2013). Further, single 
country accounting research can provide a comprehensive and detailed 
understanding of the disclosure activities in a capital market that is regarded as the 
biggest and most rapidly developing emerging market. Such study could determine 
any changes which can affect the demand for accounting information, and banks 
need to meet the demands by changing or implementing new accounting and 
disclosure policies (Gordon et al., 2013). Also, a single country study provides an 
excellent mechanism for confirming or infirming theories and provides insights for 
refining it (Landman, 2008).  
1.9 Contributions  
This study will bridge a gap between the three broad strands related to existing body of 
literature on risk disclosure (measures the levels of risk disclosure; explores the 
determinants and investigates the consequences of risk disclosure). To the first strand, to 
the best of the researcher knowledge, there is not a single study examining the levels of 
voluntary risk disclosure in the context of Saudi Arabia in general or in both type of banking 
systems namely Islamic and non-Islamic. This investigation employs two comprehensive risk 
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disclosure indices which were developed solely for the purpose of measuring the level of 
voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi listed banks (see appendix).  
The current study is also of great significance since it differs from Mousa and Elamir (2013); 
Mokhtar and Mellett, (2013) and Abdallah, et al., (2015), who studied a single attribute of 
corporate governance characteristics. And differs from Amran et al., (2009); Hassan, (2009); 
Abdallah and Hassan, (2013); Al-Shammari, (2014) who did not explore corporate 
governance nor demographic attributes by comprehensively examining corporate risk 
disclosure and exploring demographic characteristics. Additionally, not a single study has 
examined corporate governance as a determinant of risk disclosure in the Saudi context. 
Also, not a single study of the above-mentioned has investigated the demographic traits of 
the top team management in emerging markets. This study differs from all of the above-
mentioned studies by examining the demographic characteristics of the top board of 
directors as well as incorporating the upper echelon theory into the field of risk disclosure 
practices in the banking industry.  
Furthermore, this research differs from (Amran et al., 2009; Hassan, 2009; Abdallah and 
Hassan, 2013; Mousa and Elamir, 2013; Mokhtar and Mellett, (2013); Al-Shammari, 2014; 
Abdallah et al., 2015) by being the first study to examine risk disclosure over a period of five 
years in developing economies.  
To the third strand, previous studies focused on the impacts of increased disclosure on the 
cost of capital (Elzahar et al., 2015); analysts’ forecasts (Wang et al., 2013); financial 
performance (Wang et al., 2008); and share price anticipation of earnings (Hussainey and 
Walker, 2009). This stream of literature is focused mainly on the international firms and 
conventional banks in developed countries such as the UK (Elzahar et al., 2015). There 
have been very few studies that measured the association between disclosure and firm 
value (Uyar and Kilic, 2012). Risk disclosure investigations in relation to firm value are still 
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missing. Exploring this form of economic consequences on risk disclosure has not yet been 
examined in general or in Saudi.  
This study also differs from all previous risk disclosure studies (Rajab and Schachler, 2009; 
Elshandidy et al., 2015; Abdallah et al., 2015; Hassan et al., 2009; Konishi and Ali, 2007) by 
being the first study to examine the level of voluntary risk disclosure in relation to firm value. 
Also, the current research differs from all of the above-mentioned studies by being the first 
study to examine voluntary risk disclosure in relation to firm value in listed banks over a five-
year period.  
In brevity, this investigation makes a major contribution to the literature, knowledge on risk 
disclosure and reporting practices in the annual reports of all listed Saudi banks, namely 
Islamic and non-Islamic banks. It also makes a healthy contribution to the discussion on the 
levels, type, determinants, economic consequences and risk disclosure in banks annual 
reports. Augmentations in risk reporting in the annual reports could be seen as evidence of 
the international effort to regulate risk reporting in banks. 
1.10 Empirical Findings  
The outcomes of the research established that the amount of voluntary risk 
disclosure tended to increase over the period, reflecting the increasing pressure from 
regulators and users during this time. There were variations in the reporting practices 
across the sample banks in terms of the total voluntary risk disclosure scores. This 
could be attributed to the absence of any kind of comprehensive standards or 
particular regulations regarding risk reporting and management in Saudi Arabia. 
Some banks did not report risk information as such but rather reported it as a part of 
their regular financial disclosure requirement. They were thus not completely 
following appropriate risk reporting procedures. This research used a content 
analysis approach that incorporated a checklist of items as a means of capturing the 
level of voluntary risk disclosure. 
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In particular, the empirical findings of this study show that Islamic banks report less 
risk information than non-Islamic banks. However, the analysis reveals that both 
types of banks report approximately the same amount of risk information regarding 
the banks’ non-Islamic risk related items. Further, the empirical analysis shows that 
Islamic banks report very little concerning Islamic risk related disclosure items. 
Based on this, the following conclusion can be made: Islamic banks disclose less 
risk information than their non-Islamic counterparties. This outcome could be a 
reflection of the inherently conservative nature of the principles that guide Islamic 
financial institutions, which provide financial products that aim to serve the interests 
of society more broadly than do non-Islamic banks, which are more likely to focus 
upon profit maximization.  
The empirical findings also show that banks of high outsider ownership, high 
profitability, high regularity of audit committee meetings and a mixture of gender 
diversity on the board are more likely to demonstrate higher levels of voluntary risk 
disclosure. Contrastingly, voluntary risk disclosure is negatively affected by the levels 
of education of board members. As can be seen from the empirical findings, external 
ownership, audit committee meetings, gender diversity, education levels, profitability 
are primary determinants of voluntary risk disclosure practices in Saudi listed banks, 
while the rest of the independent variables of both corporate governance 
mechanisms and demographic traits are insignificantly correlated with the levels of 
voluntary risk disclosure practices in Saudi.  
Additionally, the findings also show no association between voluntary risk disclosure 
levels and firm value as measured by the market to book value at the end of the year 
(MTBV). However, based on the accounting based measure (ROA) the findings 
demonstrated a positively significant association between the levels of voluntary risk 
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disclosure and firm value. In terms of the control variables in the MTBV model, the 
findings indicate that CHS, BSIZE, PROF and DIVID are statistically significant and 
positively associated to FV, while EDUC is statistically significant and negatively 
correlated to FV. While, the findings in the second model control variables show that 
board independence, audit committee independence, diversity and type of bank 
(Islamic vs non-Islamic) have positively significant association with FV. Where, 
external ownership reported a negatively significant link with FV. However, the rest 
of the control variables are split between two groups, the first group being negatively 
insignificant and the second group being insignificantly associated with firm value for 
both models.   
These findings indicate that the association between voluntary risk disclosure and all 
of the variables (governance characteristics, demographic traits and firm-specific 
attributes as control variables) cannot be the same in all capital markets since it 
relies on a number of factors: first, theoretical justification, where different 
investigations use different theories and a set of different hypothesis; second, the 
measure, where some variables can be measured using different measures; third, 
sample size, for example, small vs. large; and fourth, sector, for example financial vs. 
non-financial. It can accordingly be concluded that the association between risk 
disclosure and all of the variables remains worthy of investigation. This conclusion is 
supported by the mixed outcomes of previous researches.     
1.11 Structure of the study 
This section outlines the structure of the thesis, which contains seven chapters. Each 
empirical study contains a review of the relevant literature. Hence, there is no need 
for an additional chapter for a literature review. Where chapter one provided an 
introduction to this thesis and outlined the key aims and findings of the research. 
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Chapter Two provides an overview of the Saudi context and financial reporting as 
well as regulations of the Saudi capital. In this chapter the unique characteristics of 
Saudi Arabia are highlighted; these include the legal system, capital market structure 
and culture.  It also provides an overview of the Saudi Banking system in order to 
understand factors which might influence Saudi banks’ risk disclosure practices.   
Chapter Three discusses the theoretical framework of the study, where relevant 
disclosure theories are discussed to explain the motives and the extent of corporate 
risk disclosure practices. 
Chapter Four focuses on measuring the voluntary risk disclosure levels in both set 
of banks namely Islamic and conventional.  
Chapter Five measures the determinants of voluntary risk disclosure. It investigates 
whether or not corporate governance attributes and board demographic traits have 
any influence on the levels of voluntary risk disclosure.  
Chapter Six measures the economic consequences of risk disclosure. It examines 
the effect of the level of voluntary risk disclosure on firm value.    
Chapter Seven provides the concluding remarks of this thesis. It provides a 
summary of this study’s overview. It also presents a summary of the key findings of 
the research and discusses their implications. It includes a summary of possible 
limitations of the study and highlights several avenues of potential future research. 
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2 Chapter Two: Overview of Saudi Arabia, Banking History and 
Regulations  
 
This chapter presents an overview of Saudi Arabia in order to reveal insights into the 
country’s background, legal system, banking history, regulating and supervising 
institutions, accounting and auditing profession, SAMA, listing rules and disclosure 
regulations and reporting. An understanding of the fundamental underlying issues in 
Saudi Arabia helps with the employment of some measurements to obtain an 
understanding of risk disclosure practices in listed banks.  
2.1 Overview 
Saudi Arabia has recently pursued comprehensive monitory reforms by (1) 
establishing the Capital Market Authority (CMA) in 2003; and (2) releasing the Saudi 
Corporate Governance Code (SCGC) in 2006. The Saudi government is also 
working to re-organise and strengthen the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul). 
Generally, such reforms are often pursued with the aim of improving the methods by 
which listed corporations are governed through encouraging greater board 
accountability, discipline, fairness, independence, responsibility, transparency and 
disclosure of information (Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009; Samaha et al., 2012). 
Financial reporting regulations in Saudi Arabia are formed and managed by the 
government. It focuses on protecting investors and other users of financial reports. 
The main institutions issuing rules are the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, The 
Capital Market Authority (CMA), The Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul), The Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) and The Saudi Organisation for Certified Public 
Accountants (SOCPA).  They are all considered to be the main governmental 
institutions monitoring publicly traded Saudi companies. Regulating, supervising and 
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registering are some of the most important responsibilities of the all above-
mentioned bodies, which ensure that Saudi companies comply with national 
regulations. Moreover, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry indirectly performs a 
supervisory role to many monitoring devices, such as the Saudi Capital Market 
Authority (CMA), the Saudi Stock Exchange and the Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency (SAMA).  
Furthermore, the role of the CMA is to regulate and develop Saudi companies by 
providing appropriate rules and regulations that contribute to increasing investment 
and enhancing transparency and disclosure standards as well as protecting 
investors and dealers from illegal activities in the market (CMA, 2007). Transparency 
and disclosure is one of the most important areas to be dealt with by the Capital 
Market Authority. Saudi Arabia has become one of the largest emerging economies 
in the world, and it has the largest stock market in the Middle East (Piesse et al., 
2012). Also, the Saudi stock market is now the largest in the Arab world as far as 
capitalization is concerned, and Saudi Capital Market growth between 1996 and 
2005 was high, with a huge increase in the number of transactions, volume and 
value trading. For example, listed firms increased in number from 77 firms in 2005 to 
145 firms in December 2010. Today, there are 171 listed firms in Saudi with a market 
capitalization of about $564bn, representing nearly half of the total Arab stock market 
capitalisation (SFG, 2009; Hearn et al., 2011; Tadawul, 2015). Accordingly, the 
Saudi market may not be active in corporate risk disclosure and may suffer from 
greater information deficits in comparison with established markets, such as the US, 
the UK and Europe. Although the Saudi stock market is very large compared to the 
markets of other developing countries, recent studies have found that, like those of 
most developing countries, it is not efficient (Dahel, 1999; Onour, 2004). 
37 | P a g e  
2.2 Islamic Banks  
Islamic banking and finance have emerged due to the Islamic commands associated 
with everyday dealings in terms of the economy, business, trade and finance. The 
term of Islamic banking means that conduct of banking operations is in line with the 
guidance of Sharia law (Islamic jurisprudence laws). Sharia law which governs the 
operations of Islamic banks originates from four sources, namely the Quran (holy 
book), Sunnah (teachings of the prophet Mohammed PUH), Ijma’ (scholars 
agreements and consensus). While the Quran and Sunnah are the primary source of 
Sharia, ijma’ is considered secondary and only applied when no solution on the 
matter in question neither found in the Quran nor Sunnah. There are many verses in 
Quran indicating the principles used as guidance for Islamic banks in their 
operational affairs (Haron and Shanmugam, 1997). The crucial prohibition in Islamic 
banking is payment and receipt of riba (interest/usury) at a fixed or predetermined 
rate, maysir (gambling), gharar (speculation), fraud, exploitation and extortion 
(Damak et al., 2009). Hence, the restriction of certain sources of earnings is 
particularly a distinctive plank that distinguished the Islamic economic system from 
the conventional financial system (Asutay, 2010).  
The prohibition of usury in the Islamic banking system is only one part of the Islamic 
economic principles. As an Islamic business institution, all Islamic banks not only 
have to run their business to achieve their goal of making profit, but at the same time, 
they are expected to adhere to the rules and laws of Sharia. The Quranic position, 
hence, is that it is compulsory for Muslims and they are strongly advised not to deal 
in riba. Islamic moral economy has implications for the nature of business and 
financial transactions, as certain sectors and economic activities are not considered 
lawful; such as companies producing tobacco, alcohol, drugs, weapon, or engaged 
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in the business of gambling, casinos, nightclubs and prostitution are also not allowed. 
These transactions are considered haram (unlawful) because they can affect human 
health and instigate moral problems. Beside of the prohibition of riba, the Islamic 
financial system encourages risk sharing, equity based transaction, and stake-taking 
economic system (Asutay, 2010). Muslim jurists have recommended various 
principles to be adopted by Islamic banks in delivering their product and services. 
These principles are broadly divided into four categories namely, profit-loss sharing, 
fees or charges based, free service and ancillary principles.  
2.3 Growth of Muslim population and Islamic finances   
The importance of this research emerges from the continues growth of the Islamic 
banking and estimations for its investments around the world as well as the growth 
the number of Muslims around the world. The world’s Muslim population 0F1 is expected 
to increase by about 35% in the next 20 years as presented in Figure 2-1, rising from 
1.6 billion in 2010 to 2.2 billion by 2030, according to new population projections by 
the Pew Research Centre’s Forum on Religion & Public Life. If current trends 
continue, Muslims will make up 26.4% of the world’s total projected population of 8.3 
billion in 2030, up from 23.4% of the estimated 2010 world population of 6.9 billion. 
This growing has a reflection on increasing demand for Islamic banking’s services 
which support them in finding ways to invest their money in compliance with Sharia 
laws.    
 
 
                                               
1 In a religious sense, the Islamic Ummah refers to those who adhere to the teachings of Islam, 
referred to as Muslims. As of 2012, over 1.6 billion or about 23.4% of the world population are 
Muslims. By the percentage of the total population in a region considering themselves Muslim, 24.8% 
in Asia-Oceania do, 91.2% in the Middle East-North Africa, 29.6% in Sub-Saharan Africa, around 6.0% 
in Europe, and 0.6% in the Americas (Pew Research, 2015).  
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Figure 2-1: Growth of Muslim Population (Pew Research centre, 2015) 
 
 
 
Normally synonymous with ‘interest-free’ banking, Islamic Banking has become a 
growing force in global financial circles over the past three decades, with Islamic 
banks found in over 70 countries worldwide (Warde, 2000). The Islamic finance 
industry has expanded rapidly over the past decade, growing at 10-12% annually 
(World Bank, 2015). Today, Sharia-compliant financial assets are estimated at a 
$2.1 Trillion, with a compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 17.3% between 2009 
and 2014 covering bank and non-bank financial institutions, capital markets, money 
markets and insurance (Takaful) (World Bank, 2015). In many majority Muslim 
countries, Islamic banking assets have been growing faster than conventional 
banking assets. There has also been a surge of interest in Islamic finance from non-
Muslim countries such as the UK, Luxembourg, South Africa, and Hong Kong (World 
Bank, 2015). Ernst & Young estimates that Islamic banking assets grew at an annual 
rate of 17.6% between 2009 and 2014, and will grow by an average of 19.7% a year 
to 2018 (Economist, 2015).  
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2.4 Background of Saudi Arabia 
It is essential to provide a general background on various elements (politics, 
economics and culture) in Saudi Arabia so as to study its business environment. This 
section will briefly discuss the most important elements of the Saudi business 
environment in relation to this study. Saudi Arabia is one of the most rapidly 
emerging countries in the Asian continent, and Riyadh is its capital city. The modern 
state of Saudi Arabia dates back to 1932 when King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud (1880-
1953) announced the foundation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Al-Angari, 2004; 
Al-Turaiqi, 2008). Saudi Arabia is the largest Arab country in the Middle East in 
terms of area. However, the country is 95% desert (Ministry of Economy and 
Planning, 2007).  
Furthermore, the Kingdom is ruled by a monarchy, which is restricted to the male 
descendants of King Ibn Saud. The monarchy ruling system in Saudi is centralised, 
which means that the ruling King has wide reaching authorities, encompassing the 
governing and management of internal and external affairs. Sensitive political and 
defence positions i.e. internal affairs, foreign affairs and defence minister are also 
restricted to the male descendants of King Abdul Aziz. In 1991, Saudi Arabia 
founded the Consultative Council, which plays a limited role in the legislative system 
in the Kingdom. The Consultative Council acts as an advisory body to the King and 
any decisions are solely implemented once the final approval has been issued by the 
King (Alghamdi, 2012). 
Prior to 1937, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was a very poor country that primarily 
depended on farming.  However, in 1937, a huge amount of oil was discovered, and 
nowadays, Saudi is the world’s leading producer and exporter of crude oil. This 
massive exploration of oil has brought about steady changes to Saudi Arabia’s 
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societal and economic life as well as to the political position of the Kingdom in the 
Middle East and worldwide. Today the Kingdom’s economy is mainly based on 
petroleum exports, which are regarded as the prime source of national income, 
which makes up approximately 90-95% of the total national income and 35-40% of 
gross domestic product (GDP). Furthermore, the Ministry of Economy and Planning 
(2007) stated that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is believed to have roughly 1 quarter 
of the world’s confirmed petroleum reserves. Also, it is believed that it will continue to 
be the world’s biggest producer of crude oil for the foreseeable future (Falagi, 2008). 
Moreover, as shown in Figure 2-2, the Kingdom controls a huge percentage of oil 
production amongst OPEC members, with 29% of the total output, which means it 
plays an important role in influencing oil prices in the whole world (OPEC, 2013). 
Also, according to the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, the Kingdom 
has massive reserves of crude oil, which will enable the country to produce and 
export oil for the next 100 years. The reserves are estimated to be approximately 
266,578 billion barrels (Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2015). 
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Figure 2-2:OPEC Production Breakdown (2013) 
 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has witnessed many reforms to it systems, including 
its social, business, legal and political systems. For instance, in 2005, after 
implementing various regulations, especially to its legal system, Saudi Arabia 
became a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry, 2006). Furthermore, due to these numerous reforms, the Saudi Arabia 
General Investment Authority was founded. This organisation’s main objective is to 
improve the investment environment in the country and entice local and foreign 
investors by removing impediments and tackling deficiencies (Falgi, 2009). Also, it 
has been announced that the largest Arab stock market, which is called the Tadawul 
and is worth more than $564 billion, is opening to foreigner investors in a bid to 
internationalise the stock activities. Generally, the country’s business environment 
has observed a number of gradual developments that have contributed to the 
reinforcement of the country economy, such as the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul), 
SAMA and the accounting and auditing profession. However, many consider the 
reforms to be very slow and believe it cannot cope with the changes being observed 
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in the international business environment (Saudi Journal of Accountancy, 2009, 
p.13). 
2.5 The Legal System  
The legal system of a country plays a significant part in the creation of its regulations 
and practices. The constitution of Saudi Arabia is based on the Holy Quran, the 
Traditions of the Prophet Mohammed PUH (Sunnah) and Islamic law (Shariah), 
which is the code of conduct or religious law. Thus, in terms of its legal system and 
in general terms, Saudi Arabia is an Islamic state, and it abides by Islamic 
regulations (Al-Harkan, 2005). Saudi Arabia is of foremost importance among Arabic 
and Islamic countries because it is home to the holiest of Muslim sites, Mecca (the 
direction of prayer and a place of pilgrimage for over one billion Muslims) and 
Medina, where the Prophet Mohammed (PUH) was buried (Falgi, 2009). Islam 
influences all areas of life in Saudi Arabia, including the constitution and social 
behaviour. It has a significant effect on businesses, emphasising high ethical 
standards, strong beliefs and human equality (Moustafa, 1985). Therefore, Saudi 
Arabia tries to ensure that any standards or practices it adopts, such as accounting 
and auditing standards, corporate governance practices or disclosure and 
transparency practices, are in compliance with the Saudi environment and Islamic 
law (Al-Harkan, 2005).  
As a result of Saudi Arabia’s strong historical relationship with the US and Britain, 
the local business environment has been affected by the legislation of those 
countries in terms of accounting practices, for example, company law systems, 
accounting standards, auditing standards and auditor independence standards (Al- 
Angari, 2004). All banks and financial companies must comply with international 
accounting standards; however, those listed on the Saudi Stock Market must also 
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follow and use the national accounting standards (IFRSs, 2011). King Saud 
University has played a key role in the evolution of accounting standards via hosting 
a series of symposiums on accounting methods in Saudi Arabia in order that any 
obstacles can be overcome. Moreover, it formed an Academic Board in order to 
exchange ideas on accountancy, carry out research and generally progress the area.  
Overall, the areas of the Saudi legal system that relate to the business environment 
are a combination of rules and regulations from the legislation of America, Britain 
and other countries that must comply with Islamic regulations and the character of 
the Saudi environment. 
2.6 Banking History in Saudi Arabia  
There were no banks during the pre-oil period in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The 
Ottoman Bank, a Franco-British institution which had expanded throughout the Arab 
world in the late nineteenth century and established a branch in Alexandria, Egypt in 
1867, did not see it as worthwhile to expand its branch network to the Heijaz or al-
Hasa, the major centres of Ottoman commerce in the west and the east of the 
Arabian peninsula. Barter and cash transactions were widespread and prevailed, but 
supplier credits were normal in trade and money changers often provided loans on 
an unofficial basis. The latter were an established part of the souk (Market) economy, 
particularly in the cities of the Heijaz area, Jeddah, Makkah and Medina, where there 
was much demand from pilgrims performing Hajj to change coins and valuable 
metals, primarily gold, into Saudi Arabian silver riyals (Al-Salamah et al. 2004). 
The Kingdom's founder (King Abdul-Aziz), was doubtful of banks and saw little need 
for such institutions, and the Sharia (Islamic jurisprudence law) scholars were both 
aware of the prohibition of riba (usury) and hostile to the notion of foreign institutions 
serving local Muslims. By the early twentieth century there was in any case an 
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expansion in the number of money changers in the Heijaz with an increasing volume 
of pilgrims visiting Makkah and Medina as transportation by road, rail and sea 
became easier and cheaper. Most money changers operated from a single company, 
but some - remarkably the Mahfouz and Musa Kaki families - had several outlets in 
different geographical locations. Like many of the money changers and traders in the 
Heijaz, they originated from Yemen (Wilson, Al-Salamah et al. 2004). 
The first foreign banking institution in Saudi Arabia was Dutch and opened in 1928 
largely to provide money-changing facilities for pilgrims setting out from Java in the 
then Dutch East Indies, it was referred to as a trading company - the Netherlands 
Trading Society - rather than a bank as the King objected to that designation, 
because of its riba connotations, though it actually performed a range of banking 
functions including trade-financing facilities. The financing of imports from Britain 
was handled from the Jeddah office of the trading firm of Gellatly Hankey, which 
from the 1920s acted as agent for the British overseas banks. In 1936 Bank Misr of 
Egypt applied for permission to open a bank in Jeddah to serve both Egyptian 
pilgrims and Red Sea trade, however its request was rejected due to suspicions 
among the ruling family regarding Egyptian intentions; it was felt that if a banking 
licence was to be granted for a substantial operation this should be to Saudi Arabian 
nationals (Wilson, Al-Salamah et al. 2004). 
The Mahfouz and Musa Kaki families petitioned the King for permission to establish 
the first locally owned bank in 1937, with the result that the following year the Kaki 
Salih Company (later renamed the National Commercial Bank) opened for business 
in Jeddah, with 51.5 per cent of its capital owned by Bin Mahfouz and the remaining 
share by the Musa Kaki family, in many respects the new institution was similar to 
the traditional money changers with whom it competed, but as a formal bank it was 
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able to issue letters of credit on behalf of Saudi Arabian merchants which 
represented guarantees to Western exporters that payments would be made, either 
by the importers or by the bank itself in case of default. Although the bank was 
unregulated, foreign banks, knowing it had the King's support, were prepared to 
accept its letters of credit on behalf of their exporting clients (Al-Salamah et al. 2004). 
The government of Saudi Arabia itself conducted much of its foreign exchange 
business through the Netherlands Trading Company, mainly because it was able to 
secure longer deferred payments terms, as in the early years of oil production 
revenues were not large. However, oil revenues increased noticeably in the late 
1940s, and although some payments were received in the form of silver and gold 
there was an increasing supply of dollar notes. The French Banque de l'Indochine, 
which had extensive dealings in precious metals in South-East Asia, offered to 
exchange the dollar notes for gold sovereigns and silver riyals at favourable rates of 
exchange for the King. The bank already had offices in Djibouti on the African side of 
the Red Sea, as well as in Lebanon and Syria, and in 1947 the King gave his 
permission- to its representative, Christian Delaby - to open a branch in Jeddah the 
following year (Wilson, Al-Salamah et al. 2004; SAMA, 2015). 
King Abdul-Aziz’s Finance Minister (Sheikh Abdullah Sulayman) gradually realised 
that this random approach of relying on foreign banks for the government's own 
financing needs was insufficient, but there was also a disinclination to favour one 
group of local financiers such as the Bin Mahfous family, over others. The main 
problem facing the government was the variation in the price of silver, on which the 
riyal was based, and gold, on which the Saudi sovereign was based. Britain's 
ambassador advocated the setting up of a currency board similar to those existing in 
many British colonies, and a treasury official was dispatched from Whitehall to make 
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the case for a Saudi dinar, to be a parity with the British pound, with the Kingdom - 
like its neighbours, Iraq and Egypt - as part of the sterling area (Wilson, Al-Salamah 
et al. 2004; SAMA, 2015). 
The King distrusted the British, and was not keen about either paper money or links 
to the sterling area that would have curtailed convertibility. He, therefore, turned to 
the Americans for advice as they provided much of the oil revenue and was already 
heavily involved in the Kingdom. The financial expert from California (Mr. Arthur 
Young) arrived Saudi Arabia in 1951 to head a mission on currency reform. Based 
on the reports of Mr. Young and after consultations with HR Prince Saud, who later 
became King Saud Bin Abdul-Aziz, to define the suggested institution, a name was 
selected for the desired financial institution in addition to specifying its functions and 
objectives. Consequently, the two Royal Decrees No (30/4/1/1046) and (30/4/1/1047) 
dated 25/7/1371H (20/4/1952G) were issued ordering the creation of the Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), and establishing its Statute to confirm its 
important role in the stabilization of the value of the Saudi currency, strengthening 
this currency domestically and abroad, supporting the Ministry of Finance by 
centralizing the reservation of government’s revenues, providing necessary 
consultation to the Government on matters related to coinage and circulation of 
currency, supervising commercial banking system and money exchangers dealing in 
foreign exchange. Under the Statute, SAMA was not allowed to give advances to 
government or private parties nor to issue paper currency. The Statute included 
other further items as stated by the two Royal Decrees. He also recommended that 
the Saudi Riyal, to be linked to the dollar and hence directly to gold. This proved 
much more attractive to the King and Sheikh Abdullah Sulayman than the British 
plan as sterling was not linked to gold and sterling had just been devalued (from 4 
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dollars to 2.8 dollars to the pound). The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) 
opened in 1952 and functioned successfully along the lines envisaged by Young 
(Wilson, Al-Salamah et al. 2004; SAMA, 2015). 
It is clear from these developments that the King was mainly concerned with not 
being exploited by foreign colonial interests, but also that a degree of practicality was 
involved when it came to securing deals with Dutch and French institutions plus a 
willingness to listen to American advice. Nevertheless, Islamic rules on the haram or 
unlawful nature of interest transactions were respected, and there was much debate 
on how the new monetary agency advocated by Young should be designated. 
Sheikh Sulayman indicated to Young that the King would need to be assured that the 
new agency would not deal in interest, and that the designation 'bank' could not be 
used. Young suggested the term 'financial agency' but the King rejected this 
proposal, and in the end 'monetary agency' was agreed upon. Under Article 3.7 of 
the new agency's charter all paying or receiving of interest was prohibited as was the 
issue of currency notes, though the latter was subsequently dropped (Wilson, Al-
Salamah et al. 2004; SAMA, 2015). 
2.7 Financial and Accounting Monitoring Bodies in Saudi Arabia   
Five major bodies regulate, supervise and monitor listed companies in Saudi Arabia: 
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Saudi Organization for Chartered Public 
Accountants, the Capital Market Authority, the Saudi Stock Exchanges (Tadawul), 
and SAMA (Central Bank), all of which are described below.  
2.7.1 The Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) 
The Ministry of Commerce and Industry is the main body monitoring Saudi 
companies. It regulates and supervises the industry to ensure that Saudi companies 
comply with national regulations. Moreover, the Ministry indirectly supervises many 
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monitoring devices, such as the Saudi Capital Market Authority, the Saudi Stock 
Exchange and the Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants.  
2.7.2 The Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) 
The Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) is a professional 
organization that was created in 1991 by the Ministry of Commerce. Its members are 
responsible for promoting and improving the practices of the accounting and auditing 
profession, developing the profession and upgrading its status. The responsibilities 
of the SOCPA are as follows: 
 “Reviewing and developing accounting and auditing standards. 
 Monitoring the performance of certified public accountants to ensure 
compliance with CPA regulations and standards. 
 Preparing and establishing SOCPA fellowship examination rules and 
managing CPE courses. 
 Undertaking research in relation to the accounting and auditing profession. 
 Organizing accounting conferences and attracting professional expertise and 
academics. 
 Encouraging accounting researchers to conduct studies in the accounting and 
auditing profession by offering funding or reward incentives. 
 Publishing accounting and auditing standards and current topics through the 
release of journals and books” (SOCPA, 2006). 
2.7.3 The Saudi Capital Market Authority (CMA) 
The Capital Market Authority, which reports directly to the Prime Minister, began as 
an unofficial organization in the 1950s and performed successfully until the Saudi 
government created its basic regulations in the 1980s (CMA, 2007). It came into 
existence officially in 2004, when it became fully independent. The CMA’s role is to 
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regulate and develop Saudi companies by equipping them with appropriate rules and 
regulations that promote increased investment and enhanced transparency and 
disclosure standards. In addition, it aims to protect investors and dealers from illegal 
activities in the market (CMA, 2007). The CMA is managed by a board with five 
members, who are appointed by the Prime Minister. These members are not 
permitted to take part in any commercial activities or be involved in any profitable 
projects. Corporate governance practice is one of the most significant regulations the 
Capital Market Authority has issued. It started as a recommended regulation in 2006 
and was transformed into a compulsory regulation in 2010. 
The CMA is in charge of issuing regulations and instructions and making sure that 
these are implemented correctly. The following are the duties of the CMA: 
 “To progress and regulate the Saudi Stock Market (Tadawul) and improve 
standards and transactions. 
 To enhance security by protecting investors and the public from unfair, 
unsound and illegal practices, including fraud and manipulation. 
 To improve the efficiency of the market and make transactions of securities 
more transparent. 
 To diminish the risks associated with transactions through the creation of 
appropriate measures and standards. 
 To monitor how committed Saudi listed companies are to disclosing the 
required information. 
 To oversee all activities and transactions on the Saudi Market. 
 To improve and oversee the issuance of securities and under-trading 
transactions” (CMA, 2015). 
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In general, the CMA plays a key role in developing and regulating the Saudi Stock 
Exchange by issuing the required regulations and instructions to make it possible for 
companies to perform more efficiently. Furthermore, it aims to protect investors, thus 
enhancing stability and security in the Saudi market. However, many investors have 
a negative view of the CMA and question its ability to protect investors and constrain 
illegal activities, especially in financial crises. 
2.7.4 The Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) 
Tadawul is an Arabic term that refers to the exchange of stock on the market. The 
Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) is considered necessary for the attainment of 
significant growth in the Saudi economy. It is a self-regulated authority that is 
governed by a board with nine members, who are nominated by the Saudi Capital 
Authority and appointed by the Prime Minister. The board members represent 
different governmental organizations, for example, the Ministry of Finance, the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (Central 
bank). Two members are from listed companies and four are representatives of 
licensed brokerage firms (Saudi Stock Exchange Law, 2009). 
Saudi listed companies started to operate in the mid-1930s. The first joint stock 
company on the Saudi Stock Exchange was the Arab Automobile Company (Saudi 
Stock Exchange Law, 2009). In 1975, the Saudi economy expanded exponentially 
due to an increase in the price of oil, and the Saudisation (buying shares from 
foreign investors) of foreign banks’ capital contributed to a rise in the number of large 
companies and joint stock banks. The Saudi market at that time was informal and 
not organized. Thus, throughout the 1980s, the Saudi government launched trading 
regulations along with the required systems. In 1984, it tried to regulate the market 
by creating a committee that incorporated the Ministry of Commerce and the Saudi 
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Arabian Monetary Agency. This government body was responsible for regulating and 
controlling market activities until the emergence of the CMA in 2004. 
In recent years, the Saudi government’s scheme to privatize many of its vital 
economic sectors has led to a large number of private and family companies going 
public. Thus, the number of Saudi listed companies has increased dramatically from 
81 in 2005 to 171 in 2015 (Tadawul, 2015). There are currently 171 listed companies 
across the various industries on the Saudi market, with different percentages of 
ownership. The Saudi market is now more attractive to foreign investors due to it 
having become more stable and secure. The Stock market is the only body with the 
authority to trade in securities in Saudi, and thus it has the following responsibilities:  
 “To increase and ensure fair and efficient activities in the market. 
 To ensure market integrity, quality and fairness. 
 To support investor education and awareness efforts. 
 To develop and enhance excellence of service for all customers, including 
brokers, issuers, investors, vendors, etc. 
 To improve the exchange’s capabilities and competencies. 
 To issue and enforce professional standards for brokers and their agents” 
(Tadawul, 2015). 
2.7.5 Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA)  
The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), the central bank of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, was established by two royal decrees issued on 20/4/1952. The first 
was Decree No. 30/4/1/1046, and this established the Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency. The second was Decree No. 30/4/1/1047, and this approved of the Charter 
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of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, which was attached to the decree, and 
ordered its implementation. SAMA started practicing on (04/10/1952).  
SAMA has been playing an important part in the consolidation and development of 
the Saudi financial system. At the time of its establishment, the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia did not have a monetary system exclusively of its own. Foreign currencies 
circulated in the Kingdom as a medium of exchange; along with Saudi silver coins 
Saudi banknotes had not yet been issued. There was no Saudi bank in existence 
and the banking business was being conducted by foreign bank branches. One of 
the foremost tasks of SAMA in its early stage was the development of a Saudi 
currency (SAMA, 2015). 
SAMA has also played a fundamental role in the creation of and paid special 
attention to the need for promoting the development of a national banking system. 
From 1960 to 1972, SAMA focused on banking regulations against the background 
of enlarging the banking industry and the Kingdom's acceptance of full convertibility 
of the Riyal in March 1961 in accordance with the Article VIII of the Articles of 
Agreements of the IMF (SAMA, 2015). From 1973 to 1982, SAMA's main concern 
was to restrict inflationary pressures in the booming economy, expansion of the 
banking system and manage the massive foreign exchange reserves. Then from the 
mid-1980s, SAMA's main concerns were to reform the Saudi financial market. Over 
the years, due to the growth of the economy and expansion of the financial system, 
SAMA's responsibilities have expanded (SAMA, 2015).  Some of these 
responsibilities are stated below: 
 “Dealing with the Government’s banking affairs. 
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 Minting and printing the national currency (the Saudi Riyal), strengthening the 
Saudi currency and stabilizing its external and internal value as well as 
strengthening the currency’s cover. 
 Managing Saudi’s foreign exchange reserves. 
 Managing monetary policy in order to maintain the stability of prices and the 
exchange rate. 
 Promoting the growth of the financial system and ensuring its robustness. 
 Overseeing commercial banks and exchange dealers. 
 Overseeing cooperative insurance companies and the self-employment 
professions related to insurance activity. 
 Overseeing finance companies. 
 Overseeing credit information companies” (SAMA, 2015). 
Significant improvements in banking regulation and supervision have occurred since 
the 2004 (IMF, 2013). SAMA introduced Basel II and used the Pillar 2 requirements 
to promote improvements in the risk management and capital planning of banks. In 
terms of supervision, risk-based approaches were introduced and large resources 
were assigned to supervision, with overall staffing currently being approximately 200 
people (a one hundred percent increase over the past five years). SAMA also started 
the introduction of Basel III requirements (IMF, 2013). 
Saudi Arabia implements International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for 
banks and insurance companies. The major accounting firms have a presence in 
Saudi. Listed companies use local generally accepted accounting principles and the 
auditing standards set by the Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants, 
which are not as extensive as International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
55 | P a g e  
and International Standards of Auditing (ISA). In the following section, two of the key 
functions SAMA has introduced to the Saudi banking industry are discussed. 
The first is prudential regulations and requirements. SAMA has gone to some trouble 
to introduce Basel II, which ought to complement recent improvements in banks’ risk 
management, leading to a better regime for large exposures and connected parties. 
Most of the risk management guidelines can be found in the Basel II documents 
(which are not applicable to foreign branches). A framework circular ought to be 
issued containing all aspects of risk management and the requirements in relation to 
market risk and internal controls that have been introduced over the previous ten 
years. Widespread bank losses that resulted from the 2009 failure of Al-Gossaibi and 
Bros. Co. and the Saad Group suggest the possibility of poor credit risk management. 
SAMA has responded to this by ensuring that losses were fully accounted for and by 
initiating a conversation with the banking industry to identify the lessons that need to 
be learned. In a system characterized by high single-name concentration, individual 
large exposures should receive more attention, especially during on-site inspections. 
The possibility of SAMA allowing exposures of as much as 50 percent of capital 
should be removed, with exposure being capped at 25 percent of capital. 
Furthermore, the definition of related parties needs to be made stronger to ensure 
that close family relationships are recognized (IMF, 2013) 
SAMA has advocated that banks build prudent capital and create buffers based on 
reliable financial statements. These buffers have decreased the impact of the global 
crisis and meant that the default of two large groups could be absorbed without 
threatening any bank. Capital buffers are now an integral part of the ICAAP process, 
with SAMA’s senior management endorsing them. Moreover, SAMA has now 
launched international accounting and auditing standards (IFRS and ISA) for banks 
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and their auditors with some success. It also brought in Pillar 3 disclosure 
requirements in 2008 as part of the implementation of Basel II (IMF, 2013). 
2.8 Important Regulations and Laws in the Saudi Business 
Environment  
Saudi Arabia is an emerging market that has expanded exponentially in recent years. 
However, when compared with established markets, such as the US and the UK, the 
Saudi market may not be so active in terms of corporate control and the information 
deficit may be larger. The Saudi Government is attempting to create and improve 
regulations that may contribute to increased corporate control, disclosure and 
transparency of information. This section reveals the regulations and laws that play a 
key role in regulating Saudi listed companies’ operations and structures and are 
related to the current study. 
2.8.1 Companies’ Law (1965) and Company Structure 
Companies’ Law, which was derived from the British Companies’ Law, is without 
doubt a significant regulation as well as the first formal attempt to regulate Saudi 
companies. It was issued by Royal Decree in 1965 and represented a basic system 
for all Saudi companies, which were obliged to comply with its instructions and rules. 
Despite the law having been altered to keep up with the rapid changes in Saudi 
companies, many now consider it out dated and unable to meet current requirements 
(Al-ghamdi and Alangri, 2005). 
A company’s structure plays a big part in determining its legal shape and 
organizational system. Generally, each company initially sets out a number of simple 
regulations, such as how directors to the board are elected, termination rules and 
shareholders rights. However, these regulations should accord with Saudi 
Companies’ Law. 
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2.8.2 Accounting and Auditing Standards 
In 1986, Saudi Arabia implemented national accounting and auditing standards, 
which were based on American standards. Despite the banking sector and financial 
companies applying international accounting standards, most Saudi listed 
companies use Saudi national accounting standards (IFRSs, 2010). As mentioned 
previously, the responsibility for developing and reviewing accounting and auditing 
standards in Saudi Arabia lies with the Accounting Standards Committee of the 
Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA). Recently, SOCPA has 
attempted to merge the national standards and international financial reporting 
standards (IFRSs). Thus, most banks and financial companies have started applying 
the international financial reporting standards. However, SOCPA has encountered 
some obstacles that have constrained the application, although it has not publically 
identified the potential hindrances (Alghamdi, 2012).  
In general, national accounting standards play a key role in Saudi in terms of 
developing disclosure and improving financial transaction procedures. They consist 
of 23 standards, such as disclosure requirements, revenues standard and inventory 
standard. In addition, national auditing standards help to increase the ability of 
external auditors and improve audit quality. 17 of the standards are associated with 
auditor competence, independence, audit plans, audit reports, etc. (Alghamdi, 2012). 
2.8.3 Listing Rules and Disclosure   
Since 2003, the CMA has attempted to develop and improve corporate governance 
regulations in Saudi. The 2004 Tadawul’s Listing Rules were key in terms of 
reforming corporate governance regulations. Therefore, the Saudi Corporate 
Governance Index (SCGI), which examines the degree of compliance with corporate 
governance standards, utilizes these rules. Part six of the regulations, ‘Continuing 
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Obligations’, contains 15 articles that deal with disclosure and transparency in 
corporate annual reports in order to reduce asymmetric information, (Albassam, 
2014). Article 25a makes clear that listed firms must immediately inform the CMA 
and shareholders about any major changes in their operations. The notification 
should be put on the Tadawul website no more than two hours prior to the first 
trading period in the stock market. The purpose of this is to let stakeholders know 
about any potential effects on the firm’s assets, liabilities or general business 
procedures.  
Article 26d states that the company has to put its quarterly and annual financial 
results on the stock market website straight after board approval. The CMA makes 
clear that the financial results must be announced within 15 days for quarterly results 
and 40 days for annual results. Furthermore, the annual report has to be approved 
by the board of directors and signed by the authorised directors, the CEO and the 
CFO before it can be published and circulated to shareholders (Article 26a). 
Article 27a states that listed firms must publish their annual report in the key national 
newspapers and also on the Tadawul website. All listed firms must review their 
operations during the last financial year. Furthermore, they should include the factors 
that can help investors to assess the company’s future. Thus, the board of directors’ 
report must contain the following: (i) a description of the company’s main activities; (ii) 
a description of the company’s key plans, decisions taken, future prospects and 
potential risks faced; (iii) a summary of the company’s assets, liabilities and business 
results over the last five financial years; (iv) an explanation for any major differences 
between the operational results of the present and previous financial years; (v) 
information on the company’s dividend policy; and (vi) a detailed description of the 
company’s loans and debt commitments.  
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As ownership structure is important and closely related to agency problems, Article 
27/10 instructs companies to make public the board’s report on the ownership 
structure, naming shareholders who own 5% or more of the company’s shares. This 
rule applies to directors, managers, outsiders and their associates. In addition, they 
must tell shareholders about any relevant changes during the last financial year. In 
order to increase transparency in companies’ contracts and avoid exploitation by 
insiders, Article 27/17 states that the board report must reveal any information on the 
interests of board directors, the CEO the CFO or their relatives in the firm’s 
commercial transactions and business contracts. In order to show the board’s 
importance, Article 27/16 states that the report should detail the number of board 
meetings and who attended each meeting. 
According to Article 27/22, the board report ought to contain statements affirming 
that: (i) a proper accounting system has been used; (ii) the internal control system is 
well designed and has been implemented correctly; (iii) there are no serious doubts 
regarding the company’s ability to continue and evolve; and (iv) the reasons for a 
change in the external auditors are provided. Finally, according to managerial 
signalling theory, managers (agents or insiders) are privy to more inside information 
than are ordinary shareholders (principals) (Morris, 1987; Bebchuk and Weisbach, 
2010). Thus, Article 33 forbids trading by agents within a reporting window. 
Specifically, directors, executive managers and their associates are not permitted to 
trade in any of the company’s securities during the following periods: (ii) the 10 days 
before the end of the financial quarter up until the date the quarterly results are 
announced (ii) the 20 days before the end of the financial year up until the date the 
company’s annual results are announced. Furthermore, in order to control 
executives and directors of listed firms remuneration packages, Article 36 insists that 
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the company should allow the general assembly to vote on a written policy for 
remuneration or compensation.  (Albassam, 2014) 
As the above mentioned articles have highlighted the importance of disclosure rules 
and regulations in Saudi Arabia, it is important to contextualise the above discussed 
regulations as they lay the foundations of the current study by setting out the rules 
and regulations influencing the disclosure of risk information in the Saudi banking 
industry. 
2.8.4 Disclosure act in Saudi Arabia  
Article 42 of the Capital Market Law (2009) issued by the CMA states that the 
prospectus should contain the following (CMA, 2015): 
“Information needed by the Authority’s rules which describes the issuer, the nature of 
its business, the individuals overseeing its management, such as members of the 
board of directors, executive officers, senior staff and major shareholders”.    
“Information needed by the Authority’s rules which describe the securities to be 
issued, their number, price and related rights along with the preferences or privileges 
of the issuer’s other securities, should there be any. The description will explain how 
the issue proceeds are to be disbursed and the commissions charged by anyone 
associated with the issue”. 
“A clear statement regarding the financial position of the issuer and any relevant 
financial data, including the audited financial balance sheet, profit and loss account 
and cash flow statement according to the rules of the Authority”.   
“Any other information needed by the Authority that it deems investors and their 
advisers will need to make decisions about investing in the securities to be issued”.    
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Article 45 of the Capital Market Law (2009) issued by the Capital Market Authority 
states that: 
“a. Every issuer that offers securities to the public or trades securities on the 
exchange must submit quarterly and annual reports to the authority. Annual reports 
have to be audited according to the rules of the authority. These reports must 
contain: 
1. The balance sheet 
2. The profit and loss account 
3. The cash flow statement 
4. Any other information required according to the rules of the authority” 
“B. In addition to the information required in paragraph (a) of this article, the annual 
report must contain: 
1. A sufficient description of the issuing company, the nature of its business and its 
activities, as needed according to the rules of the Authority. 
2. Information regarding the members of its board of directors, executive officers, 
senior staff and major investors or shareholders, as needed according to the rules of 
the Authority; 
3. An evaluation of the issuing company’s management of current developments and 
any possible future plans that may have a significant effect on the business results or 
financial position of the company, as needed according to the rules of the Authority. 
4. Any other information required by investors and their advisers to make a decision 
to invest in the issuer's securities, as needed according to the rules of the Authority”.  
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“c. All the information and data set out in paragraphs (a 1, 2, 3,) and (b 3) of this 
Article are deemed confidential. Prior to disclosing such information and data to the 
Authority, the issuing company is forbidden to disclose such information to parties 
not bound by a confidentiality agreement to protect such information” (for a 
comprehensive view of the disclosure act, please see chapter seven of the capital 
market law attached in the appendix). 
2.9 The Development of Corporate Governance in Saudi Arabia 
Corporate governance issues are significant in emerging markets due to these 
markets not having features like well-established financial institution infrastructures 
to deal with corporate governance matters (McGee, 2010). Corporate governance 
ought to ensure the timely and specific disclosures of all material matters concerning 
the company, including performance, financial position, ownership and management. 
Up until 2005, when the Saudi CMA drew attention to problems with companies’ 
performance, corporate governance mechanisms were not deemed significant in 
Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the 2006 market crisis in Saudi Arabia highlighted serious 
issues and weaknesses in financial reporting, specifically a lack of transparency, 
disclosure and accountability (Saudi Journal of Accountancy, 2006). Thus, corporate 
governance has since received notable support from the Saudi government. 
Furthermore, it is becoming a key issue in the Saudi business environment and is 
now much debated. In Saudi Arabia, corporate governance mechanisms include 
essential rules and standards, such as those that relate to the rights of shareholders, 
disclosure, transparency and board composition, and they regulate the management 
of joint stock companies listed on the Exchange. This ensures best practices are 
complied with and that the rights of shareholders and stakeholders are protected. 
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The laws governing the legal framework that affects corporate governance in Saudi 
Arabia fall into three groups: first, the company law system, which was derived from 
British Companies’ Law; second, the Saudi Organization for Certified Public 
Accountants; and third, the Saudi Capital Market Authority (Alghamdi, 2012).  
Corporate governance was first established by the Capital Market Authority Board in 
2006 and revised in 2010 to regulate and develop the Saudi capital market and 
improve the credibility and transparency of financial reporting. Despite the code 
being merely a guideline and not a mandatory regulation prior to 2010, Saudi listed 
companies were obliged to disclose the provisions that had been implemented and 
those which had not and to explain any reasons for non-compliance in the annual 
report. The code is comprised of five main parts. The first part is preliminary 
provisions, and this explains and defines some key terms, such as ‘independent 
member’, ‘non-executive’ and ‘shareholders’. The second part discusses the rights of 
shareholders and the General Assembly. The third part focuses on disclosure and 
transparency in relation to company policy. The fourth part discusses the functions 
and responsibilities of the board of directors. The final part includes publications 
coming into force and involves implementation (Code of Corporate Governance, 
2006). 
2.10 Financial Reporting Requirement in Saudi Arabia   
The financial reporting requirements of banks in Saudi are mostly set by SAMA. 
Such requirements are in line with the international accounting standards. In addition 
to this, banks are also required to follow other standards and regulations set by the 
ministry of commerce. Banks as companies have to follow the ministry of commerce 
regulations and as banks they have to follow SAMA regulations (Al-Mehmadi, 2004). 
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SAMA has over the years developed eight accounting standards for commercial 
banks (SAMA, 2009). SAMA also approves of the adaption of the accounting 
standards issued by the ministry of commerce for any other accounting issues that 
are not incorporated in their standards by banks (AI-Abdullatif, 2007). The Ministry of 
Commerce Accounting Standards are issued by SOCPA. Hence, compliance with 
SOCPA accounting standards is obligatory for all corporations excluding banks. 
Though, Alrajhi bank has mentioned that their bank use SOCPA standards along 
with other regulations and standards. The rest of the banks never mentioned SOCPA 
accounting standards. Al-Mehmadi (2004) mentioned that SOCPA argues that there 
should be only one accounting organization in the country responsible for issuing 
accounting standards for commercial organization including banks.  
“(i) The Banking Control Law (BCL) issued and monitored by SAMA. 
(ii) The Regulations for Companies: the Company Act Law (CAL) was introduced by 
royal decree number M6 in 1965 which is also considered the bases for accounting 
standards. 
(iii) International Accounting Standards (lAS) issued by the International Accounting 
Standards Committee. 
(iv) The financial statements presentation and disclosure requirements of the 
ministry of commerce Standards for Presentation and Disclosure (SPD). 
(v) The Bank's Article of Association (BAA) with respect to the preparation and 
presentation of financial statements. These are the internal preparation and 
presentation requirements within each bank” (Al-Mehmadi 2004). 
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As it stands today banks financial reporting regulations are enforced by such 
institutional bodies to enhanced transparency in the banking sector in Saudi Arabia. 
However, where local reporting regulations are lacking international reporting 
regulations are employed as demonstrated in the discussion. 
 Furthermore, Essayyad and Madani (2003) documented that all Saudi banks have 
to comply with the International Accounting Standards (lAS). Also, Al-Mehmadi (2004) 
studied the accounting practice of nine Saudi Banks as reported in their annual 
reports from 1997 to 2001 and showed that all Saudi Banks had adopted SAMA 
accounting standards, the BCL, and the Regulation for Companies (Company Act 
Law). Plus from 1999-2001 all banks followed the International Accounting 
Standards (lAS). While, the Islamic accounting guidance developed by the 
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) are 
not implemented by any of the Saudi banks including Islamic banks in the Kingdom. 
Even though, banks such as Alrajhi Bank, Aljazira Bank, and Bank Albilad were 
midst the Founding Members of the AAOIFI, and all of them have the desire to 
implement the AAOIFI standards. It could be argued that the problem in accounting 
regulations in Saudi Arabia arise from the fact that there are two government 
ministers concerned with financial disclosure, namely, the Ministry of Commerce and 
the Ministry of Finance. Banks have to follow the accounting standards for banks 
issued by SAMA, which is a part of the ministry of finance. Though, the accounting 
standards in Saudi Arabia are issued and enforced by SOCPA for all companies 
including banks. However, banks do not implement these standards because SAMA 
does not require them to do so (Al-Mehmadi 2004). 
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2.11 Summary  
Chapter 2 presented an overview of Saudi Arabia in order to reveal insights into the 
country’s background, legal system, banking history, regulating and supervising 
institutions, accounting and auditing profession, SAMA, listing rules and disclosure 
regulations and financial reporting requirements. An understanding of the 
fundamental underlying issues in Saudi Arabia helps with the employment of some 
measurements to obtain an understanding of risk disclosure practices in listed banks. 
The following chapter discusses the theoretical framework of the study, where 
relevant disclosure theories are discussed to explain the motives and the extent of 
corporate risk disclosure practices as well as its relationship to the main theme of 
this researcher.  
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3 Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Overview  
This chapter starts by explaining what disclosure is and providing definitions of risk 
and risk disclosure. It also provides a brief discussion of the importance of types of 
disclosure. Then theoretical discussions on disclosure theories and their relationship 
to risk disclosure theories employed in this study. There will be an explanation of 
agency theory, its connection to risk disclosure and importance of agency theory in 
relation to this investigation. Secondly it considers the signalling, it relationship to risk 
disclosure and importance to the current study as well as considering the information 
asymmetry theory its connection to risk disclosure and importance to this research. 
Thirdly, it explains stakeholder theory, its connection to risk disclosure and 
importance in relation to this study. Fourthly, this study considers the legitimacy 
theory, its connection to risk disclosure and importance in relation to the levels of 
voluntary risk disclosure. Finally, this chapter discusses a new theory “the upper 
echelon theory” which this study has incorporated into the field of disclosure. This 
theory is firstly explained then a fourth dimension added to the original framework in 
order to suit the purpose of investigating disclosure in light of this theory. Also the 
importance of this theory in relation to investigating risk disclosure in explained. It 
has been argued that there is not a single theory which can explain the phenomena 
of disclosure as a whole therefore, researchers tend to choose the most articulated 
theory with their hypotheses (Linsley and Shrives, 2000) thus this study employs six 
theories to explain the phenomena of risk disclosure and why managers sometimes 
observe this practice and sometimes do otherwise.  
3.2 Definition of Disclosure  
Disclosure in its broadest sense incorporates the exposure of any information 
regarding a particular entity, from everything that is included in that entity’s annual 
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report, information announcement, press releases, and newspapers and on the 
internet. Company’s disclosure of information is publicly conveyed to different 
interested user groups in the company. Therefore, they must report financial 
information to satisfy the user’s different needs (FASB, 2001).   There is no doubt 
that the published information is not intended to satisfy the interest of the 
shareholders, since they are the capital providers of the companies. Though, there 
are other interested groups such as employees, lenders, the public and government, 
which the company need to consider in their disclosure.  
The instability and uncertainty of capital markets signify that shareholders demand 
more high quality information when considering investment decisions. Thus, to make 
a good assessment of a particular firm shareholders and all interested user groups 
require firm information to be comprehensive, precise and transparent. Furthermore, 
disclosure has been defined by the Securities and Exchange Commission (1997) as 
the act of releasing all relevant information pertaining to an organisation that could 
affect an investment decision making process. Disclosure is all sorts of relevant 
information regarding firms’ market activities and performance. Moreover, disclosure 
is a vehicle used to persuade shareholders and other interested user groups that the 
firm is appropriately managed and is accountable to them.  Hence, it exposes firms’ 
performance and whether the internal management is administering the firm in the 
best interest of investors or not (Healy and Palepu, 2001).  
Furthermore, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1998 p.15) defines  
“…transparency as public disclosure of reliable and timely information that enables 
users of that information to make an accurate assessment of a bank’s financial 
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condition and performance, its business activities, and the risks related to those 
activities”.  
The reports also specified for banks that their disclosure must be 
comprehensiveness, relevant, timely, reliable, comparable and material. This 
signifies that all relevant information must be disclosed on timely bases so as to 
meet shareholders demands. The information contained within these reports must be 
reliable and are easy to compare with other institution within the same industry.  Also 
this information must be material in order for investors to consider in the process of 
investment decision makings. These criteria are considered large enough to matter 
to influence the economic decision makings of users. Thus it is necessary to apply 
such criteria in order to be able to evaluate banks financial performance which then 
leads to a more accurate assessment of risks by all interested user groups.   
3.3 Risk Definitions 
Linsley and Shrives (2006) claimed that a major difficulty in undertaking any risk 
disclosure research is pinpointing risk information. Therefore, it is essential to clearly 
define risk. However, defining risk is problematic as the level of management control 
over risk differs according to the kind of risk, for instance financial risks could be 
administered by financial instruments and other risks are operational (Schrand and 
Elliott, 1998). Risk has been defined by Dobler, Lajili and Zeghal (2011), as the 
occurrence of natural events, while Linsley and Shrives (2006) defined risk as the 
positive and negative outcomes of events and Solomon et al. (2000) described risk 
as potential gains and losses. Watson and Head (1998) defined risk as a set of 
outcomes occurring due to a decision that can be allocated probabilities, while 
uncertainty occurs when probabilities cannot be allocated to the set of outcomes. 
Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) gave a broad description of risk as the communication 
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of elements that have the possibility of influencing the expected results upside 
(opportunities) and the downside (events that might go wrong), while Cabedo and 
Tirado, (2004) defined risk as a succession of internal and external elements that 
indicate a company's wealth, challenges, opportunities and threats. Also, Cabedo 
and Tirado (2004) described risk as the probable loss or potential improvement in 
companies’ wealth that occurs due to the interaction of these elements. Similarly, 
Schrand and Elliott (1998) described risk as potential for loss or gain. Abraham and 
Cox (2007) put risk into three categories: firstly, variation (i.e. volatility), secondly, 
uncertainty (i.e. contingency) and thirdly, opportunity (i.e. upside).   
On the other hand, risk has also been defined professionally. The ASB (1998) 
defined risk in FRS 5 as uncertainty as to the amount of benefits, which incorporates 
both potential for enhancement and loss. Moreover, the ICAEW (2002) distinguished 
between downside and upside risk, affirming that downside risk is the risk that 
something will go wrong and volatility risk is the risk related to uncertainty, which 
allows for gain as well as loss. In addition, the ICAEW (2002) clearly indicated that 
risk reporting should specify that there could be a wide variety of different 
consequences with upside as well as downside potential.  
3.4 Definitions of Risk Disclosure 
Academics have defined risk disclosure differently. Therefore, it is important to adopt 
a fit for purpose definition since different definitions might lead to different results and 
analysis. Risk reporting practices heavily depend on a number of social and 
economic factors, such as the cultural, legal, political, economic and historical 
backgrounds of financial markets and regulations. Further, the ICAEW (1999) stated 
that risk disclosing in annual statements should incorporate “information about risks 
in the broadest sense, about actions to manage them and relevant measures”.  A 
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number of academics have defined risk disclosure as a set of information news in 
financial reports dealing with managers’ estimates, judgments and reliance on 
market based accounting policies, such as impairment, derivative hedging, financial 
instruments, economic, political, financial, management of risks, and internal control 
of risks (Hassan 2009 and Miihkinen 2012). This definition is in line with Schrand and 
Elliott (1998), who affirmed that risk reportage is all kinds of information news 
reported in financial reports dealing with business uncertainties. 
Consequently, for the purposes of this study, the researcher adopted two well-
defined and fit for purpose risk disclosure definitions. The first definition is by Linsley 
and Shrives (2006, p.3), who define risk reporting as “If the reader is informed of any 
opportunity or prospect or of any hazard, danger, harm, threat, or exposure, which 
has already impacted upon the company or may impact upon the company in the 
future or of the management of any such opportunity prospect, hazard, harm, threat 
or exposure”. The second definition is by Hassan (2009, p.669), who defines risk 
disclosure as “the financial statements’ inclusion of information about managers’ 
estimates, judgments, reliance on market based accounting policies such as 
impairment, derivative hedging, financial instruments and fair value as well as the 
disclosure of concentrated operations, non-financial information about corporations’ 
plans recruiting strategy and other operational, economic, political and financial 
risks”.   
3.5 Types of Disclosure  
To assist investors and all user groups evaluate a company’s current situations they 
have to report broad and complete information in their annual reports. As argued in 
the first empirical study of this thesis, annual reports are a central mean of 
communication between the bank and investors.  Thus, it is a fundamental part of 
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financial reporting to report adequate, precise and complete information since such 
information is needed by investors making investment choices.  
Reported disclosure in annual reports has always been distinguished based on 
whether they are mandatory or voluntary. Mandatory disclosure is information 
required by law, regulatory bodies and authorities to be disclosed in company’s 
annual reports. Whereas, Voluntary disclosure is information disclosed beyond what 
is required by law, regulatory bodies and authorities (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; 
Gernon and Meek, 2001). While, there is a non-existence of specific risk regulations 
or guidance on risk disclosure as it is the situation of most emergent economies, 
company directors will then reflect on broad risk information disclosures, which are 
suggested by professional accounting institutions as guidance for effective methods 
of voluntary risk disclosure. Generally, company directors will only disclosure risk 
information where they believe that they will benefit from such disclosures, and then 
they could be expected to disclosure voluntarily. But, there seems to be a lack of 
encouragement to report any material voluntarily due to the costs accompanying the 
exposure of risks particularly when the costs of risk exposure outstrip the benefits 
(Shrives and Linsley, 2003). Also, disclosure decreases agency conflicts and 
information asymmetries when reported voluntarily, this could sometimes tempt 
company directors to report more voluntarily.      
A strand of people maintain that corporations have always disclosed some form of 
risk related materials which meet the terms of accounting regulations and standards. 
Thus, corporations do not have to explicate supplementary risks they encounter and 
how certain risks are administered and it is for the market to penalize what it does 
not like. Although, given the agency conflicts, some company directors might not 
disclose certain risk information to increase their monetary fortune at the cost of the 
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financiers’ wealth. However, The ICAEW (1999) contends that comprehensively 
informed shareholders are essential in running capital markets well. Furthermore, to 
take good investment decisions; comprehensive and useful information should be 
reported. As mentioned above some sort of voluntary disclosure is essential since it 
could potentially influence their investment decisions. In addition, there are 
numerous potential benefits of voluntary disclosure, for example improving 
company’s image, reputation, lower cost of capital, higher stock liquidation and thus 
leads to higher company valuation (FASB, 2001; Eccles, 2001; Oliveira et al., 2006; 
Tsakumis et al., 2006).     
3.6 Theories of Disclosure  
A theory is knowledge that reveals or intends to reveal a set of phenomena 
(Christensen and Demski, 2003). It is necessary to take a theoretical stance when 
researching disclosure prior to the commencement of the process (Spira and Page, 
2008). Preceding researches on disclosure have employed a variety of theoretical 
frameworks in their investigations to expound why companies involve themselves in 
different levels of disclosure. Nevertheless, there is no single theory available to 
explain the phenomenon of disclosure as a whole and researchers tend to choose 
whichever theory articulates best with their investigation’s hypotheses (Linsley and 
Shrives, 2000). Some of the most common theories used in preceding disclosure 
investigations to interpret and rationalize disclosure practices are, agency cost 
theory, signalling theories, information asymmetry theory, stakeholder theory and 
legitimacy theory. Also, this study is a pioneer in the employment of the upper 
echelon theory in disclosure research. The explanations for these theories are as 
follows.    
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Disclosure theories are employed to shape research hypothesis and form conceptual 
development and expectations of the research at hand.  Cooke (1998) stated that 
there is another difficulty when carrying out empirical work in accounting and finance, 
which is that the appropriate theoretical form of the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables is unknown. Also, more than one relationship 
could be justified by a number of theories. This could lead to difficulties in the 
associations between variables.  Nonetheless, this investigation will employ 
disclosure theories to unfold the risk disclosure exercises of listed Saudi banks. 
Previous literature has concentrated on explaining risk disclosure using a number of 
disclosure theories, which will be explained as followed. 
3.6.1 Agency Costs Theory 
Agency cost theory, proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) could help in 
explaining manager’s incentives for voluntary disclosure. They affirmed in their study 
that an agency relationship can be considered to be a contract among investors (the 
principal) and managers (the agent) so that the agent performs some services on the 
principals’ behalf, which involves delegation of some decision-making authority to the 
agent. However, the separation of ownership from control in public shareowner 
corporations that may cause stakeholders’ interests and managers’ interests to differ 
is associated with the agency problem. Furthermore, agency costs theory 
demonstrates that owners, as principals, could decrease any possible disagreement 
by managers, who are referred to as agents acting on behalf of principals, by offering 
the agent a motive to act in the principal’s best interest and by implementing 
monitoring costs, which could hinder any irregular activities of acting agents since 
both parties attempt to maximise their own interests and the agent won’t always act 
in the best interests of the principal. Accordingly, the principal can restrict divergence 
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by incurring monitoring costs and in some cases will pay the agent to expend 
resources (bonding costs). There are other agency costs, such as residual loss, 
which is accumulated by declining benefits experienced by the principal. It is 
unrealistic for the principal or the agent at a zero cost to confirm that the agent will 
perform optimal decisions from the principal’s point of view. However, this led to 
Watts and Zimmerman’s (1978) Positive accounting theory, which believes that 
individuals work to increase their own benefits. For instance, company managers act 
to enhance their own prosperity. Hence, they are motivated to select certain 
accounting practices.  
It has been highlighted in the agency literature that the problem is not purely among 
owners, managers and outside shareowners but has now stretched out to 
encompass the demand for contracts among owners, managers and debt-holders 
and outside capital suppliers. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) pinpoint that accounting 
numbers are employed in the firm’s contracts that are intended to reduce agency 
costs. For example, debt/ equity ratios are deployed in debt contracts to limit 
managers’ actions that transfer wealth from debt-holders. Additionally, accounting 
earnings are employed in bonus plans to reduce manager avoidance 
3.6.1.1 Risk Disclosure in relation to Agency Theory 
Agency cost theory postulates disclosure as a vehicle, which reduces such conflicts, 
e.g. by providing annual reports and increasing the amount of information in such 
reports (Kelly, 1983; Marston and Shrives, 1996). Also, Healy and Palepu (2001) 
argued that there is an agency cost problem in view of disclosure. The authors 
proposed four resolutions for agency problems. First, disclosure of appropriate 
information, which allows investors to inspect compliance with contractual 
agreements and assess whether agents have administered the corporation's 
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resources in the best interest of outside owners. Second, corporate governance with 
a great amount of stress on the board of directors’ responsibility, which ought to 
monitor and discipline management in the best interest of outside owners. Third, 
information intermediaries who involve in private information production to expose 
any mismanagement of company's resources. And fourth, corporate control fillings 
that may include the risk of hostile acquisition and proxy contents and mitigating 
agency cost problem amongst corporate internal and external shareowners. There 
are number of academics whom have proxied agency costs in the disclosure 
literature by a number of variables, for instance firm size, financial leverage, audit 
type and ownership (Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Deumes 
and Knechel 2008; Mohobbot 2005). 
Furthermore, Linsley and Shrives (2000) gave an explanation of the association 
between agency costs theory and risk disclosure. The authors implied that 
disagreements are a result of the level of information, which needs to be reported by 
internal management to outsiders. Nowadays, investors and other information clients 
are receiving a small amount of information regarding risks and their management by 
managers, which might urge investors to monitor agents’ activities to make sure that 
they are acting in their best interest. This then in turn might encourage agents to 
report additional information including risk disclosure as a process of maintaining 
investors satisfied. Also, Linsley and Shrives (2003) claimed that agency costs 
theory could unfold why managers could opt to voluntarily release risk 
communication so as they could reassure stakeholders that they have risk 
management facilities in place. Yet, it might as well signify a negative reason for 
firms to voluntarily release risk news. 
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A study, which was completed by Elzahar and Hussainey, (2012) confirmed that 
agency costs raises with high leverage ratio. Moreover, Management reporting risk 
could illustrate a fundamental role in mitigating creditors’ concerns on the solvency of 
their company and its abilities to produce enough cash flows in the future (Rajab and 
Schachler, 2009). Also having a high leverage ratio encourages voluntarily risk 
reporting, which signals the capacity of a company to arrange short and long term 
obligations to investors (Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012). It has been empirically 
evident by Khang and King, 2006; Hussainey and Walker, 2009 that companies 
which hold high levels of information asymmetry are prone to signal to investors by 
disbursing higher dividends. On the contrary, other investigations hold that 
companies with low levels of information asymmetry are prone to disburse higher 
dividends (e.g., Deshmukh, 2005; Li and Zhao, 2008). 
3.6.1.2 The importance of agency cost theory in relation to this investigation  
The agency theory will act as an underpinning theory for the purpose of this study. 
Linsley and Shrives (2006) suggested that in unfolding voluntary risk disclosure the 
agency theory should be used as the underpinning theory.  This theory will be the 
foundation in interpreting the results of the current study’s questions to further 
explain why banks are reporting such information. Therefore, this theory is essential 
in explaining the levels and practices of risk disclosure in the annual reports of all 
listed Saudi banks. Agency cost theory has been previously employed to elucidate 
the relationships between risk disclosure and its determinants. Hence, in this study it 
will be employed for the same purpose but in the banking industry.     
Furthermore, Barako et al., (2007) asserted that voluntary disclosure in annual 
reports can be employed as an example of the application of agency theory. Thereby, 
voluntary disclosure is a vehicle used to persuade shareholders and other interested 
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groups that the firm is appropriately managed and is accountable to them. Which 
then lead to shareholders confidence and thus decreases information asymmetrical 
gap between them. The employment of this theory in this study is important to 
explain the motives for voluntary risk disclosure in relation to corporate governance 
attributes and other variables such as banks size, profitability, liquidity and leverage. 
Agency theory could be perceived as a dominant theory which can explain most of 
the explanatory variables. Nevertheless, more than one theory can be applied to the 
same variables, however the motive for disclosure from each theoretical perspective 
is different. Henceforth, the findings can illustrate the importance of risk disclosure in 
annual reports. Whereby, reporting such information will reduce the agency problem 
between bank insiders and investors.    
3.6.2 Signalling theory 
Spence (1973) developed signalling theory as a means to describe people conducts 
in the labour market. It has a general phenomenon, which is applicable in any market 
with information asymmetry (Morris, 1987). In this paper the author rationalized the 
signalling practice in regards to education. Where, the author disputed that the level 
of education of a job applicant was a reliable signal of their fundamental competency. 
Also he disputed that managers might not note their stuff productivity and that staffs 
with superior skills would signal their skills to the employer with the purpose of 
obtaining benefits. Moreover, Ross (1977) argued that directors with good news or 
with high quality products might give a warranty as a means to strengthen their 
signal and singularize their-selves from bad news and lower quality. This is in line 
with a latter argument put forward by, Strong and Walker (1987) who claimed that 
variations in information amid insiders and outsiders of a company can trigger 
markets meltdown. Since buyers (outsiders) in the market are incapable of 
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differentiating between the qualities of different products since, sellers (insiders) 
have not informed them about the product quality in a perfect manner. Henceforward, 
there are not any variations in prices between good quality and bad quality products. 
Voluntary disclosure is regarded as a method of signalling in relation to information 
asymmetry in the market (Akerlof, 1970). Therefore, signalling theory can address 
such problems of information asymmetry and moderates this asymmetry gap by the 
party with more information signalling it to the other.  
3.6.2.1 Risk Disclosure in relation to Signalling Theory 
There are a number of academic researchers whom have employed signalling theory 
in previous empirical disclosure investigations to explain why managers have the 
motivation to report more information news in annual report narratives (Strong and 
Walker, 1987; Suwaidan, 1997; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Watson et al., 2002). Also, 
it has been used by many researchers in explaining variations in voluntary risk 
disclosure levels (Marston, 1999; Weetman, 2003; Oliveira et al., 2006).  
Furthermore, the literature on disclosure pinpoints a number of variables as a 
representative of signalling process, which are leverage, profitability and liquidity. 
The signalling process affirm that firm executives who trust that their firm can 
perform better than other firms will desire to signal this to investors as a means of 
enticing more capital and investments. They could carry out this signalling process in 
a form of disclosure additional to any disclosure mandated by law. Moreover, this 
theory indicates that when a firm’s performance is good, directors will signal their 
firm’s performance to their investors and the rest of the market by reporting 
information, which bad performance firms cannot report. In fact this improvement of 
disclosure by managers is to obtain more advantages, good reputation and increase 
firm value, whereas keeping silent would lead to misinterpretations by investors and 
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the rest of the market as withholding the worst possible information (Spence 1973; 
Verrecchia, 1983; Strong and Walker, 1987; Mohobbot, 2005; Linsley and Shrives, 
2000; 2006; Hassan, 2009). 
Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) strongly believed that signalling theory offers a 
connection for risk disclosure and industry type association. For example, similar 
industry participants are interested in maintaining similar levels of disclosure so as to 
circumvent any negative appreciation by the market. While, Linsley and Shrives 
(2000) in connection to signalling argued that firms, which offer more good 
disclosures are not only notifying shareholders and the market that the firm is in a 
good position with regards to having a strong risk management and internal control 
systems intact. But also are increasing anticipations that similar disclosures will be 
performed in years to come hence making management more accountable.  
Managers’ decisions on the provision of voluntary reportage are established on a 
cost-benefit analysis, for example; Cooke, (1992) compared between the costs of 
information presented and the benefits, which may occur from reporting such 
information. Also, Cooke (1992) claimed that organisations’ reportage is an 
expensive matter, which requires several steps and preparations like information 
collection costs, auditing costs, supervision costs and legal fees. An argument led by 
Meek et al. (1995) stated that insiders have to maintain an equilibrium between 
benefits of lower capital costs, extra information and the costs related with such 
reportage. Accordingly, managers are prepared to report such information only when 
advantages surpass total costs.  
All in all, Linsley and Shrives (2005) posited that signalling and agency costs 
theories are most relevant in illuminating voluntary risk disclosures. Additionally, 
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Linsley and Shrives (2003) asserted that directors might wish to indicate to the 
market that their firms are more developed in their risk management than others and 
their administrators are superior risk administrators than other firm managers, which 
would consequently offer a reason for some corporations to decide to report risk 
information.  
3.6.2.2 The importance of signalling theory in relation to this investigation  
As discussed above the signalling theory emphasises that annual reports information 
are important in the investment decision making process for investors. Such users of 
such reports believe that the information reported by banks insiders will 
communicate essential signals since this information will supply opinions and 
explanations in regards to the organisation’s past, present and future positioning. 
Hence, shareholders demand precise, relevant and comprehensive information in 
order for them to make correct investment decisions. Therefore, banks annual 
reports should incorporate such measurements and enhance the transparency of 
such reports.     
The signalling theory will also act as a supporting theory in this investigation. This 
theory will also be the foundation in interpreting the results of the current study’s 
questions to further explain why banks are reporting such information.  The signalling 
theory is employed since it helps in explaining the relationship between firm value 
and the level of voluntary risk disclosure in this study. A considerable volume of 
previous investigation has stressed the association between firm value and voluntary 
disclosure based on signalling theory (Gordon et al., 2010; Anam et al., 2011). In 
essence, signalling theory implies that a company is attempting to signal good news 
to investors and other interested groups by disclosing more voluntarily (Oliveira et al., 
2006). Signalling theory is vital in explaining the levels of risk disclosure in the 
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annual reports and provides signals which will be value relevant for all user groups. 
This investigation also will employ signalling theory to explain the links between the 
determinants of risk disclosures in banking sectors and its economic consequences. 
This is confirmed by researchers such as Sheu et al. (2010) Gordon et al., (2010); 
Anam et al., (2011) who used signalling theory for explaining the reason why 
corporations provide voluntary information. It also make sense for this study to 
employ this theory since it has been argued by the literature that communicating 
clear messages to the capital market is likely to increase a firm’s present net value 
and in turn its stock market value (Gordon et al., 2010). Also it helps in explaining the 
variations of voluntary risk disclosure in the sample banks (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; 
Hassan, 2009; Al-Shammeri, 2014).  
3.6.3 Information Asymmetry Theory  
Akerlof (1970) in his work developed the asymmetry theory and referred to it as the 
“Lemon Problem”. This implies that buyers in the market are imperfectly informed 
about the quality of the product. Also, Cooper and Keim, (1983) described the lemon 
theory as one party commissioning some business transactions might have more 
information than the other party commissioning the exact transactions. Further, 
Akerlof (1970) employed his theory in regards to the automobile market, where there 
are good and bad quality cars. In this environment a buyer does not know the quality 
of a car until he owns it for a particular period of time. Therefore, the lemon problem 
occurs among sellers and buyers since it is impossible for buyers to know the 
difference between good and bad quality cars and the only people who know this 
kind of information are the sellers. Consequently, internal management of a firm has 
more information about the firm’s current condition and its upcoming future strategies 
than external investors.  
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Furthermore, Healy ad Palepu, (2001) affirmed that information asymmetry exists 
due to differences and conflicting motivations of sellers (managers/providers) and 
buyers (investors). Owing to investors’ inability to differentiate between good and 
bad business ideas put forward by entrepreneurs hence investors will value both 
ideas at an average level. Inevitably, the capital market will underrate some good 
business ideas and overrate some bad business ideas based on the information 
available.  
3.6.3.1 Risk disclosure in relation to Information Asymmetry Theory 
Disclosure of both positive and negative financial information can result in a 
reduction of information asymmetry (Von Alberti-Alhtaybat, et al 2012). Scott (2003) 
claimed that financial accounting and reporting could be perceived as a mechanism 
to control asymmetrical information problems by transferring internal information into 
external information. Moreover, Kothari (2000) stated that the theoretical literature 
demonstrates that both mandatory and voluntary exposure decrease the lemon 
problem between informed and uninformed market users. Also, Kothari (2000) 
argued that a decrease in information asymmetry has enticing consequences on the 
cost of capital and security prices volatility that results in the encouragement of 
regulators to aim for accounting standards of high quality.  
A study completed by Kothari, Li and Short, (2009) argued that since disclosure 
systems have developed in size together with the significance of evaluation of 
reported disclosures by other information agents such as financial analysts, business 
press and investors, information asymmetries and agency conflicts among different 
interested market groups generate greater demand for reporting and assurances of 
disclosures. Moreover, Dobler, (2008) debated that firm directors are expected to 
hold more information about risks encountered by their firm and their potential effects 
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on the performance of the firm than external investors who have no access to inside 
information. Henceforth, managers’ accessibility to company information is greater 
than investors, which to a certain extent impacts investors’ investment decision-
making. Thus, there are three different steps, which can reduce this informational 
gap. According to Hassan (2009) companies with high-risk levels will attempt to 
enlarge risk reportage to decrease uncertainties between investors. Secondly, 
Iatridis (2008) claimed that reporting risk relevant information in critical conditions 
could ensure investors about companies’ future cash flows and finally, managers 
have different motives to communicate risk relevant information and how they 
manage them to signal to investors their managerial skills, which will consequently 
translate into compensations (Abraham and Cox, 2007). The last step is in line with 
signalling theory. However, Lajili and Zeghal (2005) stated that promotion of 
transparency and enhanced disclosure quality by decreasing information asymmetry 
and risks can potentially benefit analysts, investors and other market users.  
3.6.3.2 The importance of asymmetry theory in relation to this investigation   
The asymmetry theory implies that buyers in the market are imperfectly informed 
about the quality of the product. Thus, internal management of a firm has more 
information about the bank’s past, current condition and its upcoming future 
strategies than external investors. Healy ad Palepu, (2001) affirmed that information 
asymmetry exists due to differences and conflicting motivations of sellers 
(managers/providers) and buyers (investors). This leads to shareholders having 
difficulty appreciating managers’ efforts to counter risks.  Yet, managers could 
reduce information asymmetries by using their discretion to provide more information 
on internal control and risk management, potentially benefitting investors and other 
market users (Lajili and Zeghal, 2005; Deumes and Knechel, 2008). This theory will 
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also assist this investigation in interpreting the findings of the current study’s 
questions to further explain why banks are reporting such information. This theory 
will also be employed for supporting answers to the second research question. The 
information asymmetry theory is also used in explaining the association between a 
number of explanatory variables and the level of voluntary risk disclosure in this 
study. Also it helps in explaining the association of the levels of voluntary risk 
disclosure and its determinants. By disclosing signals in the form of enhancement in 
the communication of a firm’s information, it is possible to decrease information gaps, 
and increase the accuracy of decision making process by the supplied information.  
3.6.4 The Upper Echelons Theory  
In pioneering work by Hambrick and Mason (1984), the two concepts of the dominant 
coalition and demographic research were combined. The authors suggested that certain 
organizational effects are linked to top management teams having specific demographic 
profiles. Moreover, the upper echelons theory proposes that the characteristics of top 
management, in particular demographic characteristics, might affect strategic decision-
makings and hence performance. At the centre of this theory is the notion that the 
background knowledge and values of corporate directors impact upon the essential strategic 
decisions made by these central corporate managers. Hambrick and Mason also claimed 
that observable attributes, e.g. age, practical experience and tenure, could function as 
practical proxies for the cognitive base that directs top directors’ decisions. Moreover, the 
upper echelons theory is categorized according to several important elements. As 
highlighted by Hambrick and Mason (1984), demographic features influence strategic 
decision making and performance. Thus, in this study the concept is extended to the 
determinants of risk disclosure, investigating whether such features of the top board could 
impact upon the determinants of risk reportage in the banking sector.  
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Figure 3-1: Upper echelons model 
 
Figure 3-1 is the adapted upper echelons framework, which is based on three fundamental 
principles: first, the strategic choices taken by institutions (the representations of the 
cognitive bases and values of the dominant players, the top board members); second, the 
cognitive bases and values of such players (the ramifications of their observable 
characteristics, such as functional trucks and education); and third, significant institutional 
consequences that are related to the observable characteristics of such players.  In fact, this 
theory proposes that institutional performance is only a representation of its top board 
directors. However, the fourth dimension (disclosure) added to the above framework can be 
directly influenced by the upper echelons theory characteristics or indirectly by the 
ramifications of the overall performance of the company, where sometimes risk disclosure 
would mean survival for an institution. This model also plays a vital part in determining key 
institutional effects, such as the provision of risk disclosure. It also grants this study the 
opportunity to investigate the core determinants of board demography in relation to risk 
disclosure.  
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3.6.4.1 The importance of the upper echelon theory in relation to this investigation   
This theory implies that certain organizational effects are linked to top management 
teams having specific demographic profiles. Moreover, the upper echelons theory 
proposes that the characteristics of top management, in particular demographic 
characteristics, might affect strategic decision-makings and hence performance. At 
the centre of this theory is the notion that the background knowledge and values of 
corporate directors impact upon the essential strategic decisions made by these 
central corporate managers. Moreover, this theory incorporates several important 
elements such as the demographic features, strategic decision making and 
performance. Thus, in this study the concept is extended to the determinants of risk 
disclosure, investigating whether such features of the top board could impact upon 
the determinants of risk reportage in the banking sector.  Such demographic traits 
play an important role in determining key institutional effects, such as the provision of 
risk disclosure in the annual reports. This theory will also assist this investigation in 
interpreting the findings of the current study’s second question to identify what 
determines risk information in the annual reports. This theory will also be employed 
for reinforcing the results to the second research question. It also grants this study 
the opportunity to investigate the core determinants of board demography in relation 
to risk disclosure.   
3.6.5 Stakeholder Theory  
Freeman initially came up with the idea of the stakeholder theory in 1978 when he 
was organising an executive education program (Freeman, 2004). Freeman (1994, 
p.46) defines this theory as “any group of individuals who can affect or is affected by 
the achievement of the organization’s objectives”. This broader definition of 
stakeholder encompasses adverse groups such as interested groups and regulatory 
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authorities. Despite the criticisms of this definition researchers have always used it 
when exploring the link between stakeholders and an organisation.  
Tencati et al., (2004) state that stakeholders incorporate employees, shareholders, 
the financial community, customers, suppliers, financial partners such as banks, 
insurance companies, government, local authorities and public administration, 
communities, even the competitors. Solomon (2010, p.15) explains the theoretical 
basis of stakeholder theory as follows: “Firms are so large, and their impact on 
society so pervasive, that they may discharge accountability to many more sectors of 
society than solely their shareholders.... Not only are stakeholders affected by 
companies, but they in turn affect companies in some way”. Unlike agency theory 
which concentrates only on the relationship between managers (agent) and 
shareholders (the principal), stakeholder theory considers the relation between 
managers and all stakeholders of the company (see Figure 3-2). Also this theory 
postulates that directors are accountable to all stakeholders (Chen and Roberts, 
2010). Donaldson and Preston (1995) claim that stakeholders are all parties that 
have an interest in a firm and can exercise power influencing its activities.  
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Figure 3-2: Stakeholder Theory (Donaldson and Preston, (1995); Freeman (2010) 
 
Sachs et al, (2009) affirm that stakeholders are essential for firm existences 
therefore a firm should know its stakeholders’ interests; in order to attempt to meet 
their interests. Stakeholders contribute to the well-being and value of the firm, and in 
return acquire profit from such a firm, but stakeholders confront risks and in some 
cases can mean risks to the corporation. It is a fact that firm cannot maintain 
themselves without their broad base of stakeholders. An example of this would be 
that companies won’t function without the support of their staff and employees. 
Another example of this would be that banks cannot accumulate deposits if 
stakeholders did not trust them enough to entrust them with their money.   
Moreover, when a firm attain a profit and has a plan to distribute dividends, the 
shareholders could obtain a profit from these dividends.  Also they can acquire 
capital gains when the share price increases and vice versa.   However, at times 
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when stakeholders are not content or do not trust the firm any more, they could then 
complain and cause damage to the firm. Stakeholders can vociferously announce 
the issue to the public via mass media, which will subsequently result in causing a 
firm to have a bad image. Stakeholders are like assets of companies, which must be 
administered and which are a source of wealth to the company (Post et al., 2002). 
Furthermore, stakeholder theory has been widely used in accounting disclosure 
literature to explain the phenomenon of risk disclosure, corporate social and 
environmental disclosure (e. g. Deegan, 2000; Amran et al., 2009; Solomon 2010). 
Stakeholders who exist in a society are generally concerned with the way that an 
organisation is managed. Therefore, as it has been established above this theory is 
based on the assumption that a firm requires the support of its stakeholders for its 
operations and requires their support to guarantee the continuity of its functionality 
(Gray et al., 1997). 
Companies require resources for their operations. However, these resources are 
affected (directly or indirectly) by the control power of stakeholders. The more 
powerful the stakeholders, the more the company must adapt (Gray et al., 1995a). 
For example, banks cannot collect deposits if the stakeholders did not trust them 
enough to entrust them with their money.  In this case, the controlling power is 
determined by the level of control they have over the resources. Moreover, Ullmann, 
(1985) states that when stakeholders exercise their control power, the company is 
more likely to react in a way that satisfies the demands of the stakeholders. 
3.6.5.1 Risk disclosure in relation to Stakeholder Theory  
This theory was chosen on account of its strength in explaining the interrelatedness 
of a company and its stakeholders. Moreover, the theory has also been used in 
previous risk disclosure studies (i.e. Amran et al., 2009; Oliveira et al., 2011b) in 
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explaining the linkage between risk disclosure, size, leverage, ownership structure, 
and board directors.   
Henceforth, it is in the stakeholders’ best interest that risk is disclosed in a timely 
manner. Given the importance of risk disclosure to stakeholder in terms of 
investment decision-makings and wealth creation. This theory could also provide   
some meaningful insights into the reasons for annual report risk disclosure. The 
attitudes of some of the external stakeholders could apply an important pressure in 
views about risk (Hellier et al., 2001). Firms disclose risk information in order to meet 
the demand of their shareholders. Research has also shown that disclosure provides 
a way of controlling and minimizing conflict of interest among stakeholders (Chow 
and Wong-Boren, 1987).  
3.6.5.2 The importance of stakeholder theory in relation to this investigation  
For the sake of knowing whether the disclosure in annual reports can offer beneficial 
information to stakeholders, and whether risk disclosure is value relevant for 
stakeholders or not, it is necessary to make clear the definition of stakeholders. In 
term of the current study, banks should consider who their stakeholders are.  
Because without understanding who their stakeholders are, companies might not 
know how to offer the information which meets stakeholders’ interests. 
Stakeholder theory asserts that a company always deals with many users as their 
stakeholders. Stakeholders incorporate employees, shareholders, banks, insurance 
companies, government, local authorities and public administration, communities, 
environment, even competitors, depositors, creditors, and borrowers. In addition, a 
community can also be a stakeholder which has the power to force a company to 
disclose its position. Therefore, corporations must uphold good communication 
channel with their stakeholders by revealing their performance timely and 
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transparently. The information might not properly be accepted by all users 
(stakeholders), and noises may disturb the communications between sender (Bank) 
and users (stakeholders); resulting in stakeholders receiving inadequate/incomplete 
information that does not meet their needs. This theory will be used to support the 
analysis in order to answer the third research question, is risk disclosure value 
relevant or not?  If the information is rewarding for stakeholders, it means information 
is value relevant for stakeholders and meets with their interests.   
3.6.6 Legitimacy Theory  
Numerous scholars have debated that social legitimacy is one of the underlying 
forces behind adopting certain disclosure regime (see Carpenter and Feroz, 1992; 
Hassan, 2008b). Carpenter and Feroz (1992) affirm in their paper that the decision of 
New York’s State to implement accrual-based accounting was an effort to retain the 
State legitimacy. The authors also state that the New York financial crisis in 1975 
drove various parties, e.g. the accounting profession, regulatory agencies and users 
of accounting reports, to question the adequacy of the state’s cash-based accounting 
exercises. Hence, government officials elected to enforce the implementation of 
accrual-based accounting so as to retain legitimacy for the State’s accounting 
exercises. Carpenter and Feroz (1992, p. 637) proclaim that: 
The state of New York needed a symbol of legitimacy to demonstrate to the public 
and the credit market that the state’s finances were well managed. GAAP, as an 
institutionalized legitimated practice, serves this symbolic purpose. Furthermore, 
Hassan (2008b) discusses that legitimacy is a process in which certain disclosure 
exercises follow the international security markets’ requirements rather than serving 
domestic needs. Directors are motivated to align the information included in their 
firms’ annual reports with the international and/or demotic requirements. Hassan 
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(2008b) also claims that such alignment allows directors to indicate that their firms 
implement state-of-the-art practices and therefore obtain social legitimacy. 
Legitimacy theory is based on the notion that organisation has a social contract; with 
its society; where it agrees to act according to socially desired actions (Guthrie and 
Parker, 1989). That means organisation’s actions are monitored by the public. 
Legitimacy theory argues that organisations can only continue to exist if the society 
recognises it as acting within acceptable value system (Rizk, 2006). Based on this 
theory, organizations social approval, in other words to legitimize their actions 
(Deegan, 2002). 
3.6.6.1 Risk disclosure in relation to Legitimacy Theory 
Oliver (1991) states that seeking social legitimacy, leads to economic gains. The 
author suggestion, assumes that the analysis of economic consequences of 
adopting new practices such as risk disclosure will lead to some economic gains.   
By reporting more discretionary risk information, directors can interconnect with the 
wider community and their shareholders.  For example, top management teams will 
attempt to legitimise their corporate actions and at the same time legitimise their 
managerial conditions. The legitimacy theory has been used in risk disclosure 
literature to explain such disclosure practices (Hassan, 2009). Because of the idea of 
social acceptance, various studies on disclosure have drawn on this theory. The 
evidence provided from these studies support the notion of using disclosure as a 
means for legitimacy (e.g. Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Deegan, 2002). 
Legitimacy theory endeavours to explain risk disclosure and aspects of the business-
society relationship. Prior studies have employed a number of variables to show the 
association between this theory and such variables. Hence, legitimacy theory, found 
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that larger firms release less risk disclosure to satisfy the information needs of 
shareholders.  But found a positive association with leverage (i.e. Hassan, 2009). In 
terms of ownership structure, Hassan (2008a) Oliveira et al., (2011b) debate that 
firm executives respond to pressures from their institutional environments through 
adopting some practices (e.g. risk disclosures) in order to obtain social legitimacy. 
Thus, top management teams of corporations with higher levels of public visibility 
have motivations (via the legitimation process) to increase transparency of risk 
disclosure as a means of building a good corporation image/reputation with 
important stakeholders in the firm. This legitimation process reduces information 
asymmetries, reduces litigation costs and reputational costs, attracts crucial 
resources, and strengthens the trust of appropriate stakeholders through the practice 
of disclosure (Toms, 2002; Bebbington et al, 2008).  
3.6.6.2 The importance of legitimacy theory in relation to this investigation  
Legitimacy theory is established upon the idea that all corporations have a social 
contact; with their community; where they come into an agreement to conduct their 
activities in a manner acceptable and desired by the larger community. Legitimacy 
has come to stress how firms will react to community expectations. Corporations 
could offer to report more information to legitimise their conditions and behaviour (e. 
g. Tilt, 1994; Patten, 1992). 
Hence, this theory is used in the current study to explain the levels of voluntary risk 
disclosure. As discussed above banks will attempt to disclosure more risk related 
information when they need to legitimise their actions and obtain the approval of their 
stakeholders and the wider society, and even perhaps to avoid additional regulations. 
Also, directors have personal interests in divulging risk disclosure for example 
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signalling their competencies to investors and how they administer such risks 
efficiently in order to win their trust and maximise their gains. 
3.7 Summary  
The above debate has revealed that there is no specific theory which can explain 
risk disclosure practices. Each theory looks at the disclosure phenomenon from a 
different perspective. In this context, Gray et al., (1995) stated that different 
theoretical perspectives need to be seen as sources of complementing each other in 
explaining different factors, at different levels of resolution, not as competing with 
one another. In line with this conclusion, Beattie and Smith (2012) documented that 
adopting more than one theories will enable us to explain the incentives of managers 
to disclose information. Notably, the type of relationship between principals and 
agents is still ambiguous in the Saudi Arabian banking industry due to the dearth of 
research in this domain. It can be concluded that agency, legitimacy and the upper 
echelon theories are the most relevant theories to the research questions of this 
study related to the risk disclosure levels and determinants. On the other hand, 
signalling and the stakeholder theories are the most appropriate for measuring the 
economic consequences of voluntary risk disclosure. The above arguments still need 
to be verified empirically, which this study will attempt to endeavour.  The following 
chapter focuses on measuring the voluntary risk disclosure levels in both set of 
banks namely Islamic and conventional.  
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4 Chapter Four: The level of Risk Disclosure in Listed Islamic and 
non-Islamic Banks:  Evidence from Saudi Arabia 
4.1 Overview      
Recently, considerable attention has been paid to investigating and improving 
corporate risk disclosure (CRD) (Oliveira et al., 2013). The goal of a great number of 
companies is to disclose sufficient information in their annual reports to satisfy their 
various shareholders' needs. However, there is a developing debate on the 
inadequacy of risk disclosure and the lack of full transparency from companies in this 
respect (Oliveira et al., 2011a; 2013). There have been demands for even greater 
disclosure to reduce asymmetries of access to corporate information and ensure 
shareholders are fully able to assess information on a company's performance 
(Oliveira et al., 2013). Risk disclosure is one aspect of these disclosure demands. 
Shareholders have become more interested in risk profiles to better understand the 
risks a company faces and how the managers are dealing with those risks as well as 
to improve the measurement and disclosure of risk-related matters (Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2004; Konishi and Mohobbot, 2007; Oliveira et al., 2013). 
To date, there has been an inadequate amount of research on corporate risk 
disclosures (Beasley et al., 2005; Lajili and Zeghal, 2005; Lajili, 2009). However, this 
lack of research is even greater in developing countries since all of the risk 
disclosure investigations have been restricted to the developed world, for example, 
German, Dutch and Anglo-Saxon countries (see Rajgopal, 1999; Linsmeier et al., 
2002; Jorion, 2002; Solomon et al., 2000; Dhanani, 2003; Lajili and Zeghal, 2005; 
Linsley, et al., 2006; Linsley and Lawrence, 2007; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Deumes 
and Knechel, 2008; Iatridis, 2008; Lajili, 2009; Elshandidy et al., 2013) and Europe 
and Latin America (see Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Thuelin, Henneron and Touron, 
2006; Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; Oliveira, Rodrigues and Craig, 2011; 2013; 
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Madrigal et al., 2012; Miihkinen, 2013; Maffei et al., 2014). Notwithstanding the work 
of Amran et al. (2009), Mokhtar and Mellett (2013), Elkelish and Hassan (2014) 
Hassan (2009; 2014) and Al-Shammari (2014), who investigated the determinants of 
risk disclosure in the UAE and Kuwait, very little attention has been given to the risk 
reporting practices of publicly listed banks in emerging economies. Therefore, little is 
known about the CRD in Arab countries in general and Saudi in particular. This study 
seeks to investigate the levels of risk disclosure in Saudi listed banks in an attempt 
to fill the gap.  
As discussed above, most previous risk disclosure work has concentrated on 
developed economies. However, it would be beneficial to investigate risk disclosure 
practices in a developing economy since developing markets have larger 
behavioural variations, and thus any research on them would contribute to the 
disclosure literature. Developed economies are efficient, have greater compliance, 
robust regulatory structures, developed corporate governance structures and 
financial reporting systems. Conversely, developing markets are less efficient and 
suffer from a lack of compliance, regulations, enforcement and transparency 
(Richardson and Welker, 2001). However, this research aims to contribute to the 
existing literature and fill the gap by examining the extent of risk disclosure in a 
sample of Saudi listed banks in the context of an emerging economy, Saudi Arabia. 
Furthermore, what makes this research even more interesting is that Saudi Arabia 
has a secretive culture, where corporations release little information regarding their 
business affairs and risk disclosures (Roberts and Kamla, 2010). 
Saudi Arabia is the focus of this study because of its unique socio-economic context. 
Firstly, Saudi Arabia is the largest emerging capital market that adopts an open 
economic philosophy based on the market economy and liberalization of trade (AMF, 
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2013). Secondly, the Saudi government has initiated several far-reaching reforms at 
the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawal) to mobilize domestic savings and attract 
foreign capital investment. These measures include the privatization of state 
corporations. Thirdly, Saudi Arabia has become one of the largest emerging 
economies in the world, having the largest stock market in the Middle East (Piesse et 
al., 2012). Also, the Saudi stock market is now the largest in the Arab world as far as 
capitalization is concerned and is becoming an important capital market in the region. 
Fourthly, compared to other countries with advanced capital markets, the Saudi 
accountancy profession is lagging behind in terms of offering professional certificates. 
Finally, the Saudi regulatory framework incorporates different legislation that requires 
the disclosure of risk related information in the corporations’ annual reports. All the 
above reasons make investigating the extent of risk disclosure in Saudi Arabia an 
important issue. 
Furthermore, this study makes some important contributions to the field. Firstly, it 
contributes to the understanding of the nature of risk disclosure in Saudi Arabia. 
Secondly, it contributes to existing risk reporting literature by being the first study to 
investigate the levels of risk disclosure in Saudi listed banks. Thirdly, it contributes to 
the literature on risk disclosure by investigating the differences between the risk 
disclosure practices of Islamic and non-Islamic banks in a rapidly developing 
emerging market. This thesis is organized as follows: section 2 describes risk 
disclosure in Saudi Arabia; section 3 discusses the theoretical framework; section 4 
reviews previous literature on the quantity of risk disclosure; section 5 discusses the 
methodology, criteria for the selection of the sample banks, the employment of 
annual reports and the data collection procedure; section 6 presents and analyses 
the empirical findings; and section 7 outlines the conclusion, limitations and further 
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research.  
4.2 Risk Disclosure in Saudi Arabia 
Financial reporting regulations in Saudi Arabia are created and managed by the 
government. They focus on protecting investors and other users of financial reports. 
The main bodies issuing rules are the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the 
Capital Market Authority (CMA), the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul), the Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) and Companies Law (1965).  The latter are 
considered to be the main bodies monitoring publicly traded Saudi companies. 
Regulating, supervising and registering are some of the most important 
responsibilities of the above-mentioned bodies, which ensure that Saudi companies 
comply with national regulations. Moreover, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
indirectly performs a supervisory role over many monitoring devices, such as the 
Saudi Capital Market Authority (CMA), the Saudi Stock Exchange and the Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA).  
Furthermore, the role of the CMA is to regulate and develop Saudi companies by 
providing appropriate rules and regulations that contribute to increasing investment 
and enhancing transparency and disclosure standards as well as protecting 
investors and dealers from illegal activities in the market (CMA, 2007). Regulations 
on transparency and disclosure are the most important to have been issued by the 
Capital Market Authority. Saudi Arabia has become one of the largest emerging 
economies in the world, and it has the largest stock market in the Middle East 
(Piesse et al., 2012). Also, the Saudi stock market is now the largest in the Arab 
world as far as capitalization is concerned, and Saudi Capital Market growth 
between 1996 and 2015 was high, with a huge increase in the number of 
transactions, volume and value trading. For example, listed firms increased in 
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number from 77 in 2005 to 171 in 2015 with a market capitalization of about $564 
billion, representing nearly 44% of the total Arab stock market capitalization (SFG, 
2009; Hearn et al., 2011; Tadawul, 2012; 15). Accordingly, the Saudi market may not 
be active in terms of corporate risk disclosure and may suffer from greater 
information deficits in comparison with established markets, such as the US, the UK 
and Europe. Although the Saudi stock market is very large compared to the markets 
of other developing countries, recent studies have found that, like those of most 
developing countries, it is not efficient (Dahel, 1999; Onour, 2004).  
This study looks at Saudi Arabia because very little is known about the financial risk 
reporting in this country. Some cultural characteristics of Saudi Arabia, such as the 
strong hierarchical social structure, the importance of kinship and personal 
relationships, religion, the importance of professionalism, accountability and trust, 
and the nature of some of its socio-economic institutions, are similar to other 
developing countries and can provide insights into those countries that share similar 
characteristics. The findings of this research should be of interest not only to 
academic researchers interested in examining the uniqueness of risk disclosure 
issues in a country but also to practitioners and policy makers in Saudi Arabia and 
other Middle-Eastern and developing countries that share a similar socio-economic 
environment as it has important policy implications. 
The study is justified on the following grounds. Firstly, it provides a starting point for 
research involving corporate risk disclosure in the Saudi context. It is one of the first 
empirical studies to use the unweighted disclosure index approach to investigate the 
levels of voluntary corporate risk disclosures in the annual reports of listed Saudi 
banks. Secondly, relatively little is known about risk disclosure in Saudi Arabia, and 
thus it may make a general contribution to this area. Thirdly, this empirical 
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investigation could benefit investors and regulators. Fourthly, it may help in studying 
other capital markets in the area, especially the Gulf Co-Operation Council (GCC) 
member states and other Middle-Eastern countries, and thus may contribute to the 
accounting literature in emerging markets. 
4.3 Theoretical framework 
As discussed in the theoretical chapter the signalling theory emphasises that annual 
reports information are important in the investment decision making process for 
investors. Such users of such reports believe that the information reported by banks 
insiders will communicate essential signals since this information will supply opinions 
and explanations in regards to the organisation’s past, present and future positioning. 
Hence, shareholders demand precise, relevant and comprehensive information in 
order for them to make correct investment decisions. Therefore, banks annual 
reports should incorporate such measurements and enhance the transparency of 
such reports.     
The signalling theory will act as a supporting theory in this investigation. This theory 
will also be the foundation in interpreting the results of the first empirical study’s 
question to further explain why banks are reporting such information.  In essence, 
signalling theory implies that a company is attempting to signal good news to 
investors and other interested groups by disclosing more voluntarily (Oliveira et al., 
2006). Signalling theory is vital in explaining the levels of risk disclosure in the 
annual reports and provides signals which will be of valuable importance for all user 
groups. This is confirmed by researchers such as Gordon et al., (2010) who used 
signalling theory for explaining the reason why corporations provide voluntary 
information. It also make sense for this study to employ this theory since it helps in 
explaining the variations of voluntary risk disclosure in the sample banks (i.e. Linsley 
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and Shrives, 2006; Al-Shammari, 2014). 
Also, legitimacy theory is established upon the idea that all corporations have a 
social contact; with their community; where they come into an agreement to conduct 
their activities in a manner acceptable and desired by the larger community. 
Legitimacy has come to stress how firms will react to community expectations. 
Corporations could offer to report more information to legitimise their conditions and 
behaviour (e. g. Tilt, 1994; Patten, 1992). Hence, this theory is used in the current 
study to explain the levels of voluntary risk disclosure. As discussed in chapter three 
banks will attempt to disclose more risk related information when they need to 
legitimise their actions and obtain the approval of their stakeholders and the wider 
society, and even perhaps to avoid additional regulations. Also, directors have 
personal interests in divulging risk disclosure for example signalling their 
competencies to investors and how they administer such risks efficiently in order to 
win their trust and maximise their gains. 
Descriptive risk disclosure is recognised as an important element in making firm 
reporting more valuable to shareholders (Miihkinen, 2012; Mokhtar and Mellet, 2013; 
Maffei et al, 2014). In order to improve firm descriptive risk disclosure, regulators and 
standard setters have attempted to advance a compound set of standards, 
demanding more information on different forms of risks (Dobler et al., 2011). 
However, firms still offer inadequate risk information (ICAEW, 2011). Similarly, the 
far-reaching research on this subject agrees that risk reporting practices are not 
beneficial for investors as such practices are not really comprehensive, in depth, 
forward-looking or adequate for the valuation of the total risk profile (Paaple and 
Spekle, 2012; Magna and Markarian, 2011) nor are they relevant for decision-
making procedures (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). Also, there is general agreement 
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in the literature regarding the inadequacies of current risk reporting. The literature on 
this issue is far from complete (e.g. Woods et al., 2007; Maffei et al, 2014) since very 
little of the current research on risk reporting has empirically examined risk 
disclosure (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Miihkinen, 2012). Thus, this current study will 
contribute to the far from complete literature on risk disclosure in developing 
countries, particularly in Islamic and non-Islamic banks.   
4.4 Literature 
The literature on the measurement of risk disclosure is profuse (Dobler, Lajili and 
Zeghal, 2011; Oliveira, Rodrigues and Craig, 2011b; Miihkinen, 2012; Barakat and 
Hussainey, 2013; Elshandidy, et al., 2013; Nitm, Lindop and Thomas, 2013; Al-
Shammari, 2014; Lipunga, 2014; Campbell et al., 2014; Elshandidy, et al., 2015). 
However, none of the previous studies have measured the levels of voluntary risk 
disclosure in Saudi Arabia, apart from Abdallah, et al., (2015) who have measured 
the level of risk disclosure in the GCC council. In their study they have only used two 
non-Islamic banks, one Islamic bank and eight non-financial corporations from Saudi 
Arabia over a one-year period. Although, financial and non-financial corporations 
cannot be examined together, since financial institutions are subject to specific 
regulations, can be expected to provide significantly different risk disclosure and are 
by nature risk-oriented institutions unlike non-financial corporations, and therefore 
their disclosure ought to be considered independently (i.e. Linsley and Shrives 2006; 
Bischof 2009; Barakat and Hussainey, 2013). Which is not the case of Abdallah et al., 
(2015)’s study. 
Thus, this is the first study that measures voluntary risk disclosure levels in all listed 
Saudi Arabian banks over a five-year period. Many studies have measured risk 
disclosure in developed economies as this is what they generally rely upon (i.e. 
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Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Elshandidy, et al., 2015). Similarly, there were some 
studies in emerging markets, which mostly rely upon voluntary risk disclosure (i.e. 
Amran et al., 2009 for Malaysia; Mokhtar and Mellett, 2013 for Egypt; Al-Shammari, 
2014 for Kuwait). However, none of the previous studies have examined voluntary 
risk disclosure in all listed Saudi Arabian banks. Hence, this investigation will 
contribute to the existing literature on developing economies by examining voluntary 
risk disclosure in a new environment. Where empirical context is unique in spite of 
having developed comparatively new market strategies typically associated with 
Western economies such as market diversification, economic deregulation, and the 
reformation of economic life (Roberts and Kamla, 2010) corporations in Saudi Arabia 
are usually considered to be operating in an Arab-Islamic context that is often 
considered to be opaque in terms of disclosure practices (Roberts and Kamla, 2010). 
Despite this view, investors have become increasingly more interested in stabilising 
the capital markets in an Arab-Islamic context that is home to many international 
financial institutions, a centre of regional trade, and is being integrated into the global 
economic system with increasing speed (Roberts and Kamla, 2010).  
While nonfinancial and mixed institutions in developed countries have been widely 
researched and reported upon in the literature (e.g. Oliveira, Rodrigues and Craig, 
2011b; Dobler, Lajili and Zeghal, 2011; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Elshandidy, 
Fraser and Hussainey, 2015), only a few studies have focused on banks and 
financial institutions in developed countries (Solomon et al., 2000; Linsley et al., 
2006; Oliveira, Rodrigues and Craig, 2011a;  Barakat and Hussainey, 2013; Maffei et 
al., 2014) and no prior investigations have been conducted purely on banks in 
developing markets (i.e. Amran et al., 2009; Hassan, 2009; Abdallah and Hassan, 
2013; Mousa and Elamir 2013; Al-Shammari, 2014; Abdallah et al., 2015). Therefore, 
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this is the only study that investigates the levels of voluntary risk disclosure in banks 
in developing economies, particularly in Saudi Arabia.  
Furthermore, whilst a small number of studies have examined risk disclosure over 
more than a one year period in developed economies (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004; 
Deumes, 2008; Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Rajab and Schachler, 2009; Elshandidy, 
Fraser and Hussainey, 2015), none have examined risk disclosure over more than a 
one year period in developing economies (e.g. Amran, Bin and Hassan, 2009; 
Hassan, 2009; Abdallah and Hassan, 2013; Mousa and Elamir, 2013; Al-Shammari, 
2014; Abdallah, et al., 2015). Therefore, the current study is the only study that 
examines voluntary risk disclosure over a period of five years in developing 
economies.   
Preceding literature examining the level of risk disclosure is very limited and focuses 
on research carried out in the West. This could be attributed to the early 
implementation of regulatory measures by firms and increased complexity of making 
investment decisions by investors in these countries. A comprehensive review of the 
literature shows that two methods are generally used to measure the level of risk 
reporting. The first method employs words as a recording unit to measure risk 
reporting levels (see Abraham and Cox, 2007), and the second approach employs 
self-constructed indices (see Al-Shammari, 2014). Therefore, this investigation aims 
to quantify voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi listed banks by using a self-constructed 
risk disclosure index. This approach is based on an un-weighed content analysis 
method, which counts risk words (which have been previously identified in the self-
constructed risk disclosure index - see appendix) within banks’ annual reports to 
measure the levels of voluntary risk disclosure. This is consistent with a number of 
prior studies (e.g. Al-Shammari, 2014; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Dobler et al., 
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2011).  
Linsley and Shrives (2003) confirmed that German and UK firms report equal levels 
of risk information. Yet, the authors revealed that only a few quantitative disclosures 
are reported in the annual reports of the firms from both countries. They also 
documented that the most reported category is “non-monetary/future”. Beretta and 
Bozzolan (2004) examined risk disclosure practices in 85 annual reports of non-
financial firms listed on the Italian Stock Market. They concentrated on the 
Management Discussion and Analyst section (MDA). The authors identified 75 risk 
items that are reported in the MDA section and documented that firms avoid 
conveying any anticipated effect of risks and the economic direction of the firms in 
quantitative terms. They also illustrated that firms are not willing to show whether 
reported future risks will affect them positively or negatively and affirmed that such 
firms were prone to report past and present risks rather than future risks.    
Linsley and Shrives (2005) investigated 79 annual reports of non-financial UK listed 
firms employing a content analysis method. They reported that the most reported risk 
categories are strategic, financial and integrity risks. They also stated that there is 
minimal exposure of quantified risk information and a considerable quantity of risk 
exposure is incorporated in the general statements on their risk policy. Mohobbot’s 
(2005) study included 90 non-financial corporations, which were randomly selected 
from the Tokyo stock market. The author documented that most corporations would 
rather report descriptive risk information and are not willing to quantify risks in their 
annual reports. The author also reported large variations in the levels of risk 
disclosure practices among the sample corporations.   
Lajili and Zeghal (2005) examined risk disclosure in the annual reports of 300 TSE 
Canadian corporations against 12 risk factors. They reported significant variations in 
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disclosure quantity on risk sources and management and a lack of uniformity, 
quantification and forward-looking risk disclosure. They also showed that financial 
risk was the most regularly reported by the sample firms, which consisted of 
information on operations in foreign currencies. This study also documented that 
firms’ disclosures were almost always qualitative in nature and lacked specificity and 
depth.   
Linsley and Shrives (2006) explored risk disclosure in the annual reports of 79 non-
financial FTSE 100 firms. The authors disaggregated risk disclosure into two 
categories. Firstly, according to six risk factors: financial, operational, empowerment, 
information processing and technology, integrity and strategy. Secondly, according 
to three narrative groups: upside/downside risk, monetary/non-monetary risk and 
past/future risk. By employing a content analysis method to measure the level of risk 
disclosure, they quantified 6,168 risk sentences that were consistent with the prior 
study undertaken by Lajili and Zeghal (2005). Most of the sample firms’ disclosures 
were qualitative, with only a few being quantitative, the majority of reported 
statements were on general risk management policy and there was a dearth of 
coherence in the risk narratives, indicating that risk information gaps are existent. 
With such reporting, shareholders are unable to effectively evaluate the risk profile of 
a firm.   
Linsley et al. (2006) studied risk disclosure in the banking industry through an 
examination of the annual reports of 18 UK and Canadian banks. The authors 
constructed a cording grid based upon the risk disclosure groups set forth by the 
Basel committee in pillar 3 “Market Discipline”. They reported that the characteristics 
known to be more beneficial relative to risk information disclosures are quantitative 
and future-oriented information, which are reported less frequently than qualitative 
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and past information in the annual reports of the sample banks of both countries.   
Konishi and Mohobbot (2007) investigated factors influencing the level of risk 
disclosure in 100 non-financial Japanese firms listed on the Tokyo stock exchange 
market. They employed a manual content analysis method to measure the extent of 
risk disclosure. They discovered that firms almost always reported descriptive risk 
information and were unwilling to quantify risk. They also documented that the 
sample firms disclosed more good news than bad/neutral news. Amran et al. (2009) 
investigated risk disclosure in 100 non-financial Malaysian corporation annual 
reports, repeating the methodology employed by Linsley and Shrives (2006) in the 
UK. They also relied on counting the number of sentences dedicated to the 
discussion of risk information as a representation of the level of risk exposure. They 
employed the stakeholder theory to connect corporations’ attributes to the amount of 
risk exposure and explain their empirical findings. The total number of sentences 
dedicated to discussion of risk information by the sampled Malaysian firms was very 
low when compared with a 2006 study done by Linsley and Shrives in the UK. 
Oliveira, Rodrigues and Craig (2011a) claimed that the implementation of IAS/IFRS 
had led to a better flow of risk related information but still had not guaranteed better 
transparency in the Portuguese banking sector. Although most banks revealed 
information about how they quantified and evaluated performance in managing 
market risks, only about one third reported quantitative information on market risk 
exposure and performance.  Oliveira, Rodrigues and Craig (2011b) affirmed that the 
implementation of IAS/IFRS and the European Union’s Modernisation Directive in 
2005 did not have a positive impact on the quantity and quality of risk disclosure in 
listed Portuguese corporations. Their disclosures were generic, qualitative and 
backward looking. Although the authors claimed that quantitative and forward looking 
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information would be more appropriate to shareholders’ decision needs, they found 
that such disclosures were less common due to potential inaccuracy and exposure to 
litigation costs.  Dobler et al. (2011) examined the extent of risk exposure in 160 non-
financial corporations from the US, Canada, the UK and Germany. Using a content 
analysis method for designated annual reports, they reported a consistent pattern 
where risk exposure was most dominant in management. The report focused on 
financial risk categories and contained little quantitative and forward looking 
exposure across the sample countries. In terms of risk exposure quantity, US 
corporations generally led, followed by German then UK ones.  
Elzahar and Hussainey (2012) examined the extent of risk disclosure in 72 non-
financial companies in the UK. Content analysis was used to quantify risk disclosure. 
They found that large companies were more likely to report more risk related-
information in their narratives. Mousa and Elamir (2013) explored the nature of risk 
disclosure within the annual reports of 46 listed firms on the Bahrain Bourse. Their 
study concentrated on all narrative sections in the annual reports, including the notes 
and accounts, and only examined the quantity of risk disclosure rather than the 
quality. One of the main findings of their study was that risk disclosures are very 
limited in the annual reports of the examined Bahraini firms. Al-Shammari (2014) 
investigated firm specific traits and corporate risk disclosure in the annual reports of 
a sample of 109 Kuwaiti listed non-financial companies. The author employed a 
manual content analysis approach to measure risk disclosure by counting the 
number of risk-related sentences in annual reports. The findings of this study 
indicated that the quantity of risk disclosures for all categories of risks was very 
limited in the annual reports of the sampled companies. 
Table 1: Summary of the literature  
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Study Country/ Period  
Type of Risk 
Disclosure 
Measure of Risk 
Disclosure 
Level of Risk 
Disclosure  
(Mean/ 
sentence 
count)  
Beretta and 
Bozzolan (2004) 
Italy (2001) Voluntary Counting the number 
of disclosed items 
75.08 
Linsley and 
Shrives (2005) 
UK(2001) Voluntary  Counting risk and risk 
management 
sentences 
6,168 
Mohobbot(2005) Japan(2003) Voluntary  Counting risk and risk 
management 
sentences 
90  
Lajili and Zeghal 
(2005) 
Canada (1999) Mandatory and 
Voluntary 
Number of words and  
number of sentences 
76.00 
Linsley and 
Shrives (2006) 
UK(2000) Voluntary Counting risk and risk 
management 
sentences 
6,168 
Linsley et al. 
(2006) 
UK and Canada 
(1999-2001) 
Voluntary Counting risk and risk 
management 
sentences 
1,325  
Amran et al. 
(2009) 
Malaysia (2005) Voluntary Counting the number 
of sentences in the 
discussion of risk 
information 
2,023  
Oliveira, 
Rodrigues and 
Craig (2011a) 
Portugal (2006) Mandatory and 
Voluntary 
A binary coding 
system 1 if the item 
was reported and 0 
otherwise. 
------- 
Dobler et al. 
(2011) 
US, Canada, the 
UK and 
Germany (2005) 
Mandatory and 
Voluntary 
Counting risk and risk 
management 
sentences  
32,521 
Elzahar and 
Hussainey (2012) 
UK (2010) Voluntary Counting number of 
risk-related sentences 
28  
Mousa and Elamir 
(2013) 
Bahrain (2011) Voluntary Counting number of 
risk-related sentences 
266 
Al-Shammari, 
(2014) 
Kuwait (2012) Voluntary Counting the number 
of risk-related 
sentences 
1,461 
Abdallah et al., 
(2015) 
GCC Countries 
(2009) 
Voluntary Counting the number 
of disclosed items 
40%  
4.5 Islamic versus non-Islamic Banks 
Within Saudi Arabia some banks operate under a set of constraints guided by the 
Islamic legal code, or Sharia. Islamic finance grew from an isolated business activity 
to an important component of the global financial system (El Gamal, 2006b). 
Economic demand for Islamic finance signals the importance of Islamic principles 
with many Muslims believing that their business activities should be guided by the 
rules of Islamic law whereby the main objective is to ensure general well-being and 
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justice, values that often conflict with the free market focus on profit maximization 
(Rahman, 2000). 
This legal system is fundamentally conservative in that it imposes a number of 
controls on Islamic banks, which are non-applicable to non-Islamic banks. Firstly, 
Islamic banks are forbidden from either paying or receiving riba (usury), or interest 
(Merchant, 2012). Secondly, Islamic banks provide finances to debtors in the context 
of a profit and loss sharing system (Khan, 2012). Particularly, Islamic banks must 
share risks under either of Mudarabah or Musharakah. Under Mudarabah, Islamic 
banks receive funds from the investing public and use those funds in any activity that 
the management deems appropriate so long as such activities are halal, not 
prohibited by Islamic law. Under Musharakah, banks provide loans to borrowers who 
will use the funds to make investments that are approved by the bank (Olson and 
Zoubi, 2008). Then, Islamic banks pool the profits and losses from its various 
investments and share them with its depositors according to a predetermined 
formula (Olson and Zoubi, 2008). Finally, Islamic financial institutions are forbidden 
from engaging in gharar (speculations), or taking unnecessary risks and engaging in 
excessive speculation (Merchant, 2012).  
In contrast to the legal system under which Islamic banks function, conventional 
banks operate under more relaxed legal constraints in their efforts to pursue profit 
maximization. For example, non-Islamic banks habitually generate income from the 
spread between the interest charged to debtors and the interest paid to depositors 
whereby the varying rates of interest charged to debtors is associated with the risk of 
the underlying investment (e.g. Mohammad et al., 2008). Since the principles that 
guide Islamic banks are more conservative than are those that govern non-Islamic 
banks, Islamic banks are less likely to been gaged in, and therefore report, risk than 
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are their conventional counterparts. Thus, this study will endeavour to answer the 
following question:   
Q. Will Islamic banks report lower levels of risk disclosure than their non-
Islamic counterparts?   
4.6 Methodology and Data 
This section describes the research methodology of the study, including the selection 
of representative banks, criteria, data collection and techniques employed.  
4.6.1 Research paradigm  
Understanding the philosophical stance or research paradigm is essential since it 
provides the researcher with guidance to identify which research design is fit for 
purpose to accomplish the research objectives (Easterby-Smith et al., 1994). 
Therefore, the preferred choice of paradigm for this research is the positivism 
paradigm, which claims that knowledge is best expressed objectively using 
determined theories that are based upon laws and facts. Such a paradigm prefers to 
measure knowledge using quantitative methods to approve or disprove theories 
(Saunders et al., 2009). Therefore, this investigation takes a quantitative approach to 
examining the levels of voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi listed banks over a 5-year 
period. 
4.6.2 Sample 
There are 24 banks in Saudi Arabia which are divided into two sets of banks. The 
first set of banks represents the 12 local banks. The second set of banks represents 
the 12 subsidiaries’ of foreign banks licensed to operate in the kingdom. The second 
set of banks is excluded from this study since their annual reports are a part of the 
mother bank, thus there is not a separate annual report dedicated to the subsidiaries 
(SAMA, 2014).     
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Moreover, the sample of the current investigation consists of 12 local listed banks on 
Tadawul in Saudi Arabia. Where, listed Islamic banks from Saudi Arabia will form the 
foundation of the Islamic bank’s data sources, while non-Islamic banks will form the 
foundation of the conventional bank’s data sources. According to the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency, there are only 12 listed local banks on the Saudi exchange market 
today. Four of these are entirely Islamic, and the other eight are conventional with 
Islamic banking windows. Accordingly, the researcher can state that a total of 12 
listed banks meet the selection criteria for this investigation. This study covers a five-
year period to examine voluntary risk disclosure levels in Saudi listed banks. This 
allows the researcher to identify any changes in the levels of risk disclosure that may 
have occurred over the period. 
This study covers a five-year period, during which the determinants of risk disclosure 
in the annual reports of listed banks in Saudi Arabia are examined. The selected 
annual reports cover the period from 2009 to 2013. Initially, the current study 
attempted to carry out this empirical investigation over a ten-year period. However, 
two banks of the entire sample were not even listed before the year 2009, and a third 
bank has had a complete conversion from being conventional into a fully functioning 
Islamic banks. Thus, the study period was reduced to five years to include the entire 
population of all listed Saudi banks. 
4.6.3 Data collection 
The nature of this investigation dictates the use of secondary data. As argued by 
Bryman and Bell (2011), secondary data sources deliver good quality data and 
involve minimal resources when executing the data collection phase. Therefore, it is 
the researcher’s belief that the examination of secondary data will provide the 
required answers for this investigation.  Annual reports for the 12 listed Saudi banks 
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are downloaded from the banks’ websites and the Saudi Arabian Stock market1F 2 
(Tadawul).  
4.6.4 The use of annual reports as the main source of research data  
Prior investigations in the field of risk disclosure have concentrated on the 
employment of annual report narratives as the main source of data (e.g. Kothari et 
al., 2009; Li, 2010; Dobler, Lajili and Zeghal, 2011; Miihkinen, 2012; Barakat and 
Hussainey, 2013; Elshandidy, et al., 2013; Al-Shammari, 2014; Elshandidy, et al., 
2015). Moreover, they are the fundamental form of communications that 
organizations employ to convey messages to their investors (Lang and Lundholm, 
1993; Holland, 1998). 
Furthermore, there is a substantial amount of support in the accounting disclosure 
literature for the examination of disclosure exercises through employing annual 
report narratives.  Accordingly, Gray et al., (1995a; 1995b) stated that constitutional 
regulations oblige organizations to publish their annual reports periodically due to 
their significance and the provision of their consistent historical image of a company. 
Moreover, Hines (1988) claimed that annual reports are the most pivotal document 
for providing a company’s social picture. A complementary argument was put 
forward by Tilt (1994), who stated that organizations can symbolically communicate 
views and values to appropriate investors through their reports. Campbell (2000) 
presented two more reasons to support the use of annual reports. Firstly, annual 
reports are the most extensively distributed of all other documents of an organization 
made public. Secondly, the organisation’s management has comprehensive editorial 
power over the voluntary disclosure of information in the published annual reports. 
Also, Tay and Parker (1990) confirmed that genuine disclosure practices can be 
                                               
2 http://www.tadawul.com.sa  
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measured more accurately from annual report narratives.   
4.6.5 Content Analysis 
Content analysis has been broadly used in social accounting research (Guthrie and 
Parker, 1989; Milne and Adler, 1999; Parker, 2005; Kamla, 2007). These studies 
analyse the information content disclosed in annual reports and acknowledge 
definite words and themes within the textual material (Beattie et al., 2004; Brennan, 
2001). When analysing the content of a written document, words, phrases and 
sentences are coded against a specific schema of interest (Bowman, 1984). 
Krippendorff (1980: p. 21) described content analysis as “a research technique for 
making replicable and valid inferences from data”. Furthermore, Bowman (1984) 
claimed that content analysis is able to collect rich data since it can reveal 
relationships that other techniques cannot. However, a weakness of content analysis 
is that it is subjective (Linsley and Shrives, 2006). Therefore, validation practices are 
often used to override this problem (Bowman, 1984).  
Additionally, content analysis can be carried out using either manual or automatic 
methods or a combination of the two. Many studies have used the manual method to 
conduct content analysis (e.g. Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 
2006) despite the labour-intensive data collection process, which limits the sample 
size (Beattie and Thomson, 2007). Automated content analysis was first used in the 
1980s, and with the creation of different content analysis software, it is constantly 
developing (Frazier et al., 1984). It is often the method chosen when the sample size 
is larger (i.e. Kothari, Li and Short, 2009). Other researchers have used both manual 
and automated content analysis methods (e.g. Elshandidy 2015). Hence, following 
previous literature (i.e. Abdallah et al., 2015) this thesis employs a manual content 
analysis method to examine the level of voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi listed bank.  
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4.7 Development of Risk Disclosure indices 
For this investigation to examine the level of voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi all 
listed banks (Islamic and Non-Islamic) two risk disclosure indexes, (which are 
checklists of different disclosure items included in banks’ annual reports), were 
required (Arvidsson, 2003). For the purpose of constructing the risk disclosure 
indexes, an extensive review of prior studies was undertaken (e.g. Hassan, 2009; Al-
Shammari, 2014; Abdullah et al., 2015). Therefore, for an item to be included, it 
should have been used in previous disclosure studies and should be related to the 
Saudi banking environment. Hence, the following steps were taken as the basis for 
the development of the risk disclosure indices for this study:  
Step 1: A comprehensive review of the prior risk disclosure literature was undertaken 
to identify disclosure items which were used in prior disclosure studies (e.g. ICAEW, 
1997, 2000; Linsely et al., 2006; Lipunga, 2014; Abdullah et al., 2015). Based on this, 
the researcher identified some items which were of relevance to the current study 
and based on this the first non-Islamic risk disclosure index was developed.  
Step 2: A review of the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI, 2014) and Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB, 2007) risk 
disclosure sections to identify the risk disclosure items that should be included in 
listed Islamic banks’ annual reports was undertaken. Due to the nature of the sample 
of this study, an Islamic risk related index was developed. 
Step 3: The two indices were reviewed with 2 independent researchers who deal 
with both Islamic and conventional bank reports and specialize in the area of 
disclosure and financial reporting to enhance the validity of the study, indexes and 
results (further discussion in following section).  
Therefore, two risk disclosure indices were developed solely for the purpose of 
measuring the level of voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi listed banks. This is similar 
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to the approach used by prior voluntary risk disclosure investigations (e.g. Hassan, 
2009; Abdullah et al., 2015). The two indices included between them a total of 67 
items that were expected to be published in the annual reports of the sample banks.  
The non-Islamic risk disclosure index included 54 items, which were divided across 8 
categories: accounting policies, financial and other risks, derivative hedging and 
general risks, financial instruments, reserves, segment information, business risk 
and compliance with regulations. While, the Islamic risk disclosure index included 67 
items, which were distributed across 10 categories: accounting policies, financial and 
other risks, derivative hedging and general risks, financial instruments, reserves, 
segment information, business risk, compliance with regulations, Islamic bank risk 
characteristics and Islamic standards (see appendix).  
This categorization of the two crafted risk disclosure indexes is due to the nature of 
the listed Saudi banks, where listed banks represent two sets of banks, namely 
Islamic banks and conventional banks, which are vigorously offering banking 
services in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, one of the important issues during crafting the 
disclosure index was deciding whether some items should be weighted more heavily 
(i.e. important) than others. In accounting research, both weighted and un-weighted 
disclosure indices are utilized (Cooke, 1989; Marston and Shrives, 1991; Owusu-
Ansah, 1998; Raffournier, 1995).  
For the purpose of this study, the un-weighted disclosure index was chosen because 
the study does not focus on a particular user group (Alsaeed, 2006; Naser et al., 
2006). Instead the study addresses all users of annual reports, and therefore there is 
no need to confer different importance levels to the disclosed risk items (Oliveira et 
al., 2006). The contents of each bank’s annual reports were compared to the items 
listed in the Appendix, and on the basis of a dichotomous model they were coded as 
118 | P a g e  
1 if disclosed or 0 if otherwise. This index coincides with other studies that quantify 
the extent of disclosure and risk disclosure (see Beretta and Bozzolan 2004; Barako 
et al., 2006; Alsaeed, 2006; Oliveira et al., 2006; 2011a). 
The total score for a bank is: 
   TD = ∑ di
n
i=1                                                  (1) 
Where d = 1 if the item is disclosed; 0 = if the item is not disclosed; n = number of 
items.   
4.7.1 Reliability and Validity of Disclosure Indices 
Weber (1988) argued that the classification procedure should be reliable and valid. 
The reliability and validity of content analysis approaches need to be reviewed 
carefully. In human-scored schemes, reliability, that is the reproducibility of the 
measurement, is a major concern (Marston and Shrives, 1991; Healy and Palepu, 
2001). The preceding studies argued that content analysis is not reliable if it is 
conducted only once or only by one specific person (Neuendorf, 2002). 
Consequently, to ensure the content validity of the initial research instrument, it was 
reviewed independently by two other researchers. Subsequently, after the 
researcher received the independent researcher’s comments and suggestions. A 
fourth experienced academic was required to discuss any ambiguities raised. The 
final disclosure checklist included 67 items. In terms of validity the research 
instruments (disclosure indices) are valid if they can measure what they claim to 
measure (Field, 2009). In this study the indices have measure what they claimed to 
measure, therefore the researcher can safely claim that the research instruments are 
valid. To ensure the reliability of the research instrument, the author and the two 
independent researchers scored three randomly selected banks. Then, the results 
from the three researchers were compared. Given that the final research disclosure 
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indices were agreed by all researchers, differences in the compliance scores from 
the researchers were insignificant. This method was adopted by Marston and 
Shrives (1991), who argued that the index scores awarded to firm could be 
considered reliable if other researchers could replicate the same results.  The final 
disclosure checklists are presented in the following table:  
Table 2: Ensuring validity of research instrument  
Categories 
Items 
suggested 
by author 
Items 
suggested by 
first 
independent 
researcher 
Items 
suggested by 
second 
independent 
researcher 
Final index 
after 
consultation 
Weight 
Accounting Policies 12 13 9 10 15% 
Financial risks 15 18 10 15 22.5% 
Derivatives hedging and General 
Risk Info 
8 10 9 11 16.5% 
Financial instruments 2 2 3 2 3% 
Reserves 2 3 2 3 4% 
Segment information 2 2 2 2 3% 
Business risk  3 6 4 5 7.5% 
Compliance with regulations 5 11 3 6 9% 
Islamic Bank Risk characteristics 9 9 9 9 13.5% 
AAIOFI Standards 5 4 6 4 6% 
Total 63 78 57 67 100% 
The weight is calculated based on final items for each standard dividend into total items (67). For example: weight of 
Accounting Policies = 10/67*100= 15% 
 
 
For example; in terms of categories the author in the initial draft of the indices 
suggested a category under the name “General Information” which incorporated 9 
items. However, both of the independent researchers suggested the removal of this 
category. After a lengthy discussion with the principal researcher, the category was 
removed. Also, under the business risk category the principal researcher only 
suggested 3 items which were “Political Risk, Diversification Risk and Performance 
Risk”. However, both of the independent researchers suggested more items, which 
after another lengthy discussion with the author two more items were included 
“General Financial Problems and Regional Financial Problems”.      
4.8 Descriptive analysis and Discussion 
This section presents the results of the analysis and the resultant discussion. The 
120 | P a g e  
results are generally based on the outcome of the descriptive statistics of disclosure 
levels and rankings related to the risk categories. Recently, there has been an 
increase in users’ demands for corporate information. The literature reveals that 
companies have been put under immense pressure to make even greater 
disclosures of corporate information, especially in relation to risks and uncertainties. 
This is the background against which the results of this study should be interpreted. 
This study sets out to examine the levels voluntary of risk disclosure amongst listed 
Saudi banks. Tables 3 and 4 display the results of the content analysis. The tables 
show that all banks in the sample disclosed risk-relevant information. Furthermore, 
the results displayed in tables 5, 6 and 7 below show that on average the level 
voluntary of risk disclosure steadily increased across the period under study, rising 
from 52% in 2009 to 77% in 2013; however, the highest score recorded was 78% in 
2011 by Banque Saudi Fransi. This provides evidence that there was an upward 
trend in the average amount of risk disclosure being published by the sampled banks 
over the period from 2009 to 2013. The average disclosure, regardless of the 
universal items or Islamic items, increased overall.  
Table 3:  Average risk disclosure level for Non-Islamic Banks from 2009 to 
2013  
Categories Saudi 
Investment 
Bank 
Arab 
National 
Bank 
National 
Commercial 
Bank 
Banque 
Saudi 
Fransi 
SAMBA Saudi 
Hollandi 
Bank 
SAAB Riyad 
Bank 
Average 
Accounting Policies 66% 73% 
 
77% 
 
69% 
 
64% 
 
82% 
 
66% 
 
73% 
 
71% 
Financial and other 
Risks 
100% 
 
81% 
 
87% 
 
91% 
 
60% 
 
90% 
 
92% 
 
93% 
 
87% 
Derivative Hedging 
and General Risks 
45% 
 
58% 
 
36% 
 
73% 
 
18% 
 
47% 
 
49% 
 
49% 
 
47% 
Financial 
Instruments 
50% 
 
50% 
 
100% 
 
50% 
 
50% 
 
50% 
 
50% 
 
50% 
 
56% 
Reserves 
 
67% 
 
100% 67% 100% 100% 
 
100% 
 
66% 
 
100% 
 
88% 
Segment 
Information 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
50% 
 
50% 
 
50% 
 
100% 
 
50% 
 
75% 
Business Risk 
 
60% 
 
52% 
 
60% 
 
52% 
 
60% 
 
60% 
 
40% 
 
44% 
 
54% 
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Compliance with 
Regulations 
67% 
 
66% 
 
67% 
 
76% 
 
67% 
 
67% 
 
83% 
 
67% 
 
70% 
Average 69% 73% 74% 70% 59% 68% 68% 66% 68% 
Notes: The disclosure score for each risk disclosure level is calculated as a ratio of the actual total items disclosed in the 
annual reports for each bank divided by the 54 items included in the risk disclosure index for non-Islamic and divided by the 67 
items included in the risk disclosure index for the Islamic banks. 
 
Table 3 shows the descriptive analysis for the level of corporate risk disclosure and 
its categories in the annual reports of all listed non-Islamic banks in Saudi Arabia. In 
general, what should be noted when observing the table above is that, from a merely 
quantitative point of view, the total risk disclosure per index reveals that Saudi non-
Islamic banks on average reported more risk disclosure than their Islamic 
counterparties. This is consistent with Abdallah et al. (2015). Furthermore, the 
results indicate that the total risk disclosure in non-Islamic banks was 68%, with the 
most common risk disclosure categories in the annual reports of the sampled banks 
being reserves (88%), financial and other risks (87%), segment information (75%), 
accounting policies (71%), compliance with regulations (70%), financial instruments 
(56%), business risk (54%) and derivative hedging (47%).  
However, in terms of reporting risk disclosure levels per category for all non-Islamic 
banks in Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Hollandi bank scored the highest in the first 
category namely accounting policies (82%). In second place, came the National 
Commercial bank by scoring (77%). Where, in third place, came jointly the Arab 
National bank and Riayd bank by obtaining a score of (73%). The Banque Saudi 
Fransi came fourth in the accounting policies category by scoring (69%). In fifth 
place, jointly came the Saudi Investment bank and SAAB bank by achieving a score 
of (66%). SAMBA bank came last in the accounting policies category by achieving 
an overall score of (64%). 
While, in the second category financial and other risks, the Saudi Investment banks 
achieved the highest score (100%), secondly, came Riyad bank (93%), thirdly SAAB 
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bank acquiring a score of (92%), fourthly came the Banque Saudi Fransi at (91%), 
next came the Saudi Hollandi bank at (90%), then the National Commercial bank 
came by obtaining a score of (87%), in seventh place, the National Arab bank came 
by scoring (81%) in the financial risk category, where SAMBA also came last in this 
category by a large difference (60%). Moreover, the third category is the derivative 
hedging, which is the lowest category where most non-Islamic banks scored below 
the (49%). It also has the lowest average of all non-Islamic banks at (47%). The 
fourth category is the financial instruments category, which is the only category 
where all non-Islamic banks from this study’s sample achieved a score of (50%) 
except the National Commercial bank which have achieved a score of (100%).  Next 
comes the reserves category where the Arab National bank, Banque Saudi Fransi, 
SAMBA, Saudi Hollandi bank and Riyad bank acquired in this category (100%), 
while secondly came together the Saudi investment bank and the National 
Commercial bank at a score of (67%) which is low compared to the first 5 banks in 
this category, lastly in the reserves category came SAAB bank at (66%). In the sixth 
category, namely segment information the banks split into two groups where Saudi 
investment bank, Arab National bank, National Commercial bank and SAAB 
obtained a score of (100%), while Banque Saudi Fransi, SAMBA, Saudi Hollandi 
bank and Riyad bank achieved a score of (50%).  
In the business risk category, the Saudi Investment banks, the National Commercial 
bank, SAMBA and the Saudi Hollandi bank all achieved a score of (60%), while the 
Arab National bank and the Banque Saudi Fransi together scored (52%). In this 
category Riyad bank achieved (44%), also in the same category SAAB bank 
obtained (40%). Finally in the compliance with regulations category, the highest 
score was acquired by SAAB bank at (83%), the second highest score was achieved 
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by Banque Saudi Fransi at (76%). While in this category Saudi investment bank, 
National Commercial bank, SAMBA, Saudi Hollandi bank and Riyad bank all scored 
the same at (67%), the Arab National bank scored (66%) in the compliance with 
regulations category.  
However, looking at it in terms of the average risk disclosure reporting per bank of 
the 8 non-Islamic banks listed on the Saudi stock market the National Commercial 
Bank was the highest, scoring 74%, followed by the National Arab Bank came 
second, scoring 73%, then the Banque Saudi Fransi at 70%, fourthly the Saudi 
Investment bank at a score of 69%. Also, in terms of average risk reporting the Saudi 
Hollandi bank and SAAB bank scored the same at 68%, followed by Riyad bank with 
little difference between them (66%). Finally, SAMBA Bank came last, scoring only 
59% in the overall average of all categories per bank.  
Table 4: Average risk disclosure level for Islamic Banks (2009 – 2013) 
Categories  ALJAZIRA ALRAJHI ALINMA ALBILAD Average   
Accounting Policies 64% 75% 71% 
 
83% 73% 
 
67% 
  
Financial and other Risks  68% 72% 70% 
 
72% 71% 
 
Derivative Hedging  and general risks 55% 69% 56% 
 
29% 52% 
 
Financial Instruments  100% 80% 50% 
 
40% 68% 
 
Reserves  
 
100% 100% 67% 
 
67% 84% 
 
Segment Information  60% 70% 50% 
 
80% 65% 
 
Business Risk  
 
44% 48% 48% 
 
60% 50% 
 
Compliance with regulations 
 
70% 83% 77% 
 
66% 74% 
 
Islamic Bank Risk Characteristics  73% 54% 44% 
 
49% 55% 
 
38% 
Islamic  Standards  30% 25% 0% 
 
25% 20% 
 
Average  66% 68% 53% 57% 61%  
 
Table 4 shows that the average risk disclosure among Islamic banks was 61%, while 
on average the most frequently reported risk categories amongst listed Islamic banks 
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in Saudi Arabia were reserves (84%), compliance with regulation (74%), accounting 
policies (73%), financial and other risks (71%), financial instruments (68%), segment 
information (65%), Islamic bank risk characteristics (55%), derivative hedging and 
general risks (52%), business risk (50%) and Islamic standards (20%). However, the 
most frequently reported categories among all banks (Islamic banks as well as non-
Islamic banks) were reserves (88%), financial and other risks (87%) for non-Islamic 
(see Tables 3) and reserves and compliance with regulations (74%) for Islamic 
banks (see Tables 4). The two most infrequently reported categories among the 
Islamic banks were Islamic standards (20%) and business risk (50%) and for non-
Islamic were derivative hedging and general risks (47%) and business risk (54%), 
(see Table 3). 
However, in terms of reporting risk disclosure levels per category for all Islamic 
banks in Saudi Arabia, the Albilad bank achieved the highest score in the first 
category namely accounting policies at a score of (83%), while, Alrajhi bank, which is 
the largest Islamic banks in the country came second in the accounting policies 
category by achieving a score of (75%). In third place came the Alinma bank, which 
is the newest bank in Saudi Arabia, being established in 2008 scoring (71%), 
(Alinma bank, 2015). While, in last place came Aljazira bank, which in 2007 shifted 
from being a conventional bank to a fully sharia-compliant bank by scoring (64%), 
(Aljazira bank, 2015). The second category is the financial and other risks. In this 
category Albilad bank and Alrajhi bank jointly scored the highest among the Islamic 
at (72%). Secondly, the Alinma bank achieved in this category a score of (70%), 
where Aljazira bank came last by acquiring a score of (68%). However, in the 
derivative hedging and general risk information, Alrajhi bank scored the highest at 
(69%), in second place Alinma bank scored (56%), followed by Aljazira bank by a 
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very close score at (55%) and coming last at a very low score at this category is 
Albilad bank (29%). In the financial instruments category, Aljazira bank topped all 
Islamic banks by obtaining a score of (100%). Alrajhi bank scored second top at 
(80%), while Alinma bank and Aljazira bank score considerably low at the financial 
instruments category at (50%), (40%) respectively. Moreover, Aljazira and Alrajhi 
banks jointly acquired the highest scores in the reserves category (100%). This could 
be attributed to large size both banks enjoy, where both banks had the largest total 
assets over the sample period. Also, in the same category Alinma and Albilad banks 
jointly acquired a score of (67%). In the segment information category, Albilad bank 
came first with a score of (80%), followed by Alrajhi bank with a score of (70%), then 
Aljazira bank with a score of (60%), and followed by Alinma bank with a score of 
(50%). While, in the business risk category Albilad scored (60%), where in second 
place came jointly Alrajhi and Alinma banks at (48%), followed by Aljazira bank with 
a score of (44%). Whereas, in the compliance with regulations Alrajhi bank scored 
the highest score at (83%), then Alinma bank came second with a score of (77%), 
followed by Aljazira bank with a score of (70%) and in fourth place came Albilad 
bank at (66%). Moreover, in the Islamic bank risk characteristics category, Aljazira 
bank acquired the highest score of (73%), in second place came Alrajhi bank with a 
score of (54%), and followed by in third place Albilad bank with a score of (49%), 
then by Alinma bank with a score of (44%). In the last category, named the Islamic 
standards Aljazira scored the highest at (30%), followed by jointly Alrajhi and Albilad 
banks with a score of (25%) and in last place came Alinma bank with zero percent. 
However, over the sampled period, amongst the Islamic banks Alrajhi Bank had on 
average the highest score at 68% in terms of risk disclosure per bank. In second 
place in terms of risk reporting per bank, Aljazira bank achieved a score of (66%). 
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Thirdly, Albilad bank on average per bank scored (57%), while Alinma Bank had the 
lowest score of (53%).  
4.9 Further Discussion 
Table 3 shows the descriptive analysis for the level of corporate risk disclosure and 
its categories in the annual reports of listed non-Islamic banks in Saudi Arabia. In 
general, what should be noted when observing the table above is that, from a merely 
quantitative point of view, the total risk disclosure per index reveals that Saudi non-
Islamic banks on average reported more risk disclosure than their Islamic 
counterparties. This could be a reflection of the inherently conservative nature of the 
principles that guide Islamic financial institutions, which aim to provide financial 
products that serve the interests of society more broadly than do non-Islamic banks, 
which are more likely to be oriented towards the pursuit of profit maximization. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that the total risk disclosure in non-Islamic banks 
was 68%.  
On the other hand, table 4 illustrates the descriptive analysis for the level of 
corporate risk disclosure and its categories in the annual reports of listed Islamic 
banks. It reveals that the average level of risk disclosure among Islamic banks was 
61%. However, table 3 and 4 indicate that Islamic banks were more likely to report 
risk disclosure than non-Islamic banks in the areas of accounting policies, derivatives 
hedging and general risk information, financial instruments and compliance with 
regulations categories. This is concurrent with Abdallah et al. (2015). It is worth 
noting, however, that the difference in the risk disclosure between Islamic banks and 
non-Islamic banks is not momentous for the overall and all-risk categories. Generally, 
this suggests that on average the two groups reported a similar amount of risks. 
However, when comparing the overall risk disclosure levels of all 12 listed Saudi 
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banks in this study with risk disclosure levels in previous studies, such as Amran et 
al. (2008) (74.5%), Deumes and Knechel (2008) (87.3%) and Maffei et al. (2014) 
(84.8%), the sample banks’ score was relatively low at 64%. This signifies that listed 
Saudi banks still have to improve upon their corporate risk disclosure levels so as to 
improve the overall risk disclosure practices among the banking industry, which will 
result in well-informed investors and more effective decision making practices. This 
was confirmed by the ICAEW (1999), who advised quantifying risk whenever 
possible to improve the quality of risk reporting. Basically, the quantification of risk by 
managers in the annual reports results in the overall enhancement of risk disclosure 
quality. This leads to investors being able to make more informed investment 
decisions.  Moreover, Islamic banks (67%) and non-Islamic banks (68%) disclosed 
almost the same amount of risk in terms of the universal items, which are the first 8 
categories of the risk disclosure index (see appendix). Islamic banks only reported 
(38%) regarding Islamic items, the last two categories of the Islamic banks risk 
disclosure index (see appendix). 
It is evident that the sample banks reported more non-financial information then 
specific financial information. Looking at the above tables, on average the total 
number of banks examined for the purpose of this investigation reported most on the 
same nonfinancial category, namely, reserves. Empirical studies in different contexts 
have provided similar results (Rajab and Schachler, 2009; Woods and Reber, 2003, 
Mokhtar and Mellett, 2013).  The total Saudi banks scored 79% on financial and 
other risks category, which is more than the average reported by previous studies, 
such as Mokhtar and Mellett (2013) (4.55%) and Maffei et al. (2014) (30%). The 
tables below show the average per year over the entire sample period of all banks. 
Table 5: Average risk disclosure of each Islamic bank (per year) 
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Table 6: Average risk disclosure of each Non-Islamic bank (per year) 
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Table 7: Average risk disclosure of each Non-Islamic bank (per year) 
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Tables 5, 6 and 7 present the descriptive statistics for the scores of the risk 
disclosure levels for each year of the sample period for the individual banks. Table 5 
displays the average risk disclosure of each Islamic bank per year. It can be seen 
from this table that Aljazira Bank witnessed a drop in terms of reporting risk 
disclosure from 68% in 2009 to 64% in 2012 before increasing up again to 71% in 
2013. Such fluctuations in risk reporting over the period could be attributed to new 
board members joining or due to new corporate governance measures adopted.   
However, as demonstrated in table 5 Alrajhi bank witnessed a decrease throughout 
the period, despite being the largest bank in terms of total assets and profitability. 
This decrease effect could be attributed to other corporate governance factors, such 
as changes in disclosure policy or changes in the top management.   Albilad bank 
witnessed a steady increase in the levels of risk disclosure over the first 4-years of 
the period before decreasing to 60% in 2013. This effect could be due to steady 
profitability levels over the latter 4 years of the examined period. While, Alinma bank 
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witnessed the no changer effect in the levels of voluntary risk disclosure for the first 
2-year, followed by a very little decrease in the subsequent year before soaring up 
again over the last 2-year of the period. This could be only attributed to trying new 
reporting strategy by management.    
On the other hand, tables 6 and 7 demonstrate that most of the individual non-
Islamic banks witnessed overall steady increases in the levels of risk disclosure over 
the sample period, which could be attributed to the same levels of profitability of 
these banks. However, Banque Saudi Fransi witnessed large changes over the 
period in its risk reporting levels, starting in 2009 at 70%, followed by a slight 
decrease to 66% in 2010, then soaring up to 78% in 2011, scoring the highest score 
of the entire sample through the whole period, then once again dropping to 74% in 
2012 and reaching the lowest score 62% in 2013. This could be due to changes in 
the board of directors, since some board members tend to lean toward a specific 
disclosure strategy. Contrastingly, SAMBA Bank observed no changes in its 
reporting levels over the sample period.  
Table 7 shows that according to legitimacy theory perspective, the motivations for 
voluntary risk disclosure by banks can be explained by the perceived level of 
stakeholder monitoring, and by perceptions of a bank’s reputation (Oliveira et al., 
2011b). Therefore, publicly visible older banks with higher levels of depositor 
confidence and with a greater ability to manage risk, disclose more risk information 
voluntarily. This could be an explanation of the high levels of risk disclosure practices 
maintained among the non-Islamic banks over the examined period, in particular the 
National Commercial Bank and Arab National Bank since they are two of the oldest 
banks in the kingdom.   
Overall, the above tables indicate that the majority of banks witnessed an increase in 
130 | P a g e  
their risk reporting levels over the 5-year period. This provides evidence that there 
was an upward trend in the average amount of risk disclosure being published by the 
sampled banks over the period from 2009 to 2013. There is only one possible 
explanation for this trend, which is that all of the sampled banks were following the 
international financial reporting standards as well as the national accounting 
standards (IFRS, 2011), requiring them to apply the IFRS7, which makes it 
categorically clear that disclosure is mandatory. This could be confirmation that 
regulation is the most powerful driver of the increases in the levels of corporate risk 
disclosure (Adamu, 2013; Lipunga, 2014). Furthermore, some studies have 
documented that the amount of information disclosed by organizations has increased 
substantially over the past few years in part due to regulations (Oliveira et al., 2011a; 
Leuz, 2010) and that there has been a rise in voluntary information provided by 
companies (Oliveira et al., 2011a; Campbell and Slack, 2008). In addition, other 
studies have reported that firms react to new requirements (Miihkinen, 2012) by 
increasing the amount of disclosure relating to either specific risk items (Roulstone, 
1999) or specific sections of their annual reports.  
 
Table 8: Banks Descriptive Information 
Banks Disclosure 
Level 
Year Firm-Specific Characteristics Variables 
LOG 
Size 
Profitability Leverage Auditor 
Dummy (1-0) 
ALJAZIRA 68%  
 
 
 
 
 
2009 
7.48 0.1% 8.98% 1 
ALRAJHI 75% 8.23 4.06% 3.57% 1 
ALINMA 52%  7.24 1.78% 0 1 
ALBILAD 53% 7.24 -1.48% 1.14% 1 
SAMBA 59% 8.27 2.52% 4.96% 1 
Saudi Hollandi Bank 67% 7.77 0.22% 13.76 1 
SABB 66% 8.10 1.78% 57.67% 1 
Riyad Bank 65% 8.25 1.78% 57.67% 1 
Saudi Investment Bank 68% 7.70 1.78% 57.67% 1 
Arab National Bank 67% 8.04 2.08% 10.99% 1 
National Commercial 
Bank 
74% 
8.41 
1.78% 57.67% 1 
Banque Saudi Fransi 70%  8.08 1.78% 57.67% 1 
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ALJAZIRA 66%  
 
 
 
 
 
2010 
7.52 0.09% 1.18% 1 
ALRAJHI 74% 8.27 3.81% 2.93% 1 
ALINMA 52%  7.43 0.07% 8.45 1 
ALBILAD 53% 7.32 1.78% 57.67% 1 
SAMBA 59% 8.27 2.39% 11.57% 1 
Saudi Hollandi Bank 67% 7.73 1.48% 9.08% 1 
SAAB 72% 8.10 1.78% 8.23% 1 
Riyad Bank 65% 8.24 1.78% 57.67% 1 
Saudi Investment Bank 69% 7.71 1.78% 57.67% 1 
Arab National Bank 72% 8.06 1.71% 14.56% 1 
National Commercial 
Bank 
74% 
8.45 
1.78% 57.67% 1 
Banque Saudi Fransi 66%  8.09 1.78% 57.67% 1 
ALJAZIRA 64%  
 
 
 
 
 
2011 
7.59 0.9% 5.93% 1 
ALRAJHI 67% 8.34 3.64% 3.18% 1 
ALINMA 51%  7.57 1.36% 6.64% 1 
ALBILAD 54% 7.44 1.78% 1.52% 1 
SAMBA 59% 8.29 2.27% 10.7% 1 
Saudi Hollandi Bank 67% 7.76 1.93% 8.99% 1 
SAAB 68% 8.14 2.3% 7.24% 1 
Riyad Bank 67% 8.26 1.78% 3.55% 1 
Saudi Investment Bank 69% 7.72 1.78% 11.79% 1 
Arab National Bank 69% 8.07 1.88% 10.95% 1 
National Commercial 
Bank 
74% 
8.48 
1.78% 57.67% 1 
Banque Saudi Fransi 78%  8.15 1.78% 57.67% 1 
ALJAZIRA 64%  
 
 
 
 
 
2012 
7.71 1.17% 8.41% 1 
ALRAJHI 55% 8.43 3.23% 0.84% 1 
ALINMA 56%  7.73 1.61% 8.24% 1 
ALBILAD 66% 7.47 3.28% 1.92% 1 
SAMBA 59% 8.30 2.21% 6% 1 
Saudi Hollandi Bank 70% 7.84 2.08% 11.77% 1 
SAAB 68% 8.19 2.27% 6.75% 1 
Riyad Bank 66% 8.28 1.87% 3.24% 1 
Saudi Investment Bank 74% 7.77 1.69% 14% 1 
Arab National Bank 77% 8.14 1.89% 9.15% 1 
National Commercial 
Bank 
75% 
8.54 
1.78% 57.67% 1 
Banque Saudi Fransi 74%  8.20 1.78% 9.24% 1 
ALJAZIRA 71%  
 
 
 
 
 
2013 
7.78 1.78% 57.67% 1 
ALRAJHI 67% 8.45 2.72% 1.3% 1 
ALINMA 56%  7.80 1.72% 32.84% 1 
ALBILAD 60% 7.56 1.78% 57.67% 1 
SAMBA 59% 8.31 2.23% 3.64% 1 
Saudi Hollandi Bank 70% 7.91 2.13% 13.03% 1 
SAAB 68% 8.25 2.33% 5.17% 1 
Riyad Bank 66% 8.31 2% 5.64% 1 
Saudi Investment Bank 67% 7.91 1.9% 14.69% 1 
Arab National Bank 77% 8.14 1.78% 6.76% 1 
National Commercial 
Bank 
75% 
8.58 
1.78% 57.67% 1 
Banque Saudi Fransi 62%  8.23 1.58% 6.35% 1 
 
As can be observed from the table above, the National Commercial Bank is the 
highest ranked bank in terms of its voluntary risk disclosure score over the entire 
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sample period. It is also the largest listed bank on the Saudi stock market in terms of 
size (total assets). This result shows that the level of risk disclosure is positively 
correlated with size. This is consistent with previous risk disclosure studies that 
employed annual reports, such as Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), Linsley and Shrives 
(2006), Konishi and Mohobbot (2007), Lopes and Rodrigues (2007), Vandemele et al. 
(2009) and Mousa and Elamir (2013), which confirmed that size is positively 
correlated with the level of risk disclosure. This outcome is also in line with signalling 
theory. According to signalling theory, larger companies rely more on external 
finance. Hence, they are incentivized to disclose more risk information in order to 
send a good signal to investors and creditors regarding their ability to manage risk. 
As has been established by prior investigation, leverage could affect the level of risk 
disclosure since the level of risk disclosure and the leverage ratio simultaneously 
increase or decrease. Moreover, firms with higher leverage are more likely to have a 
higher level of voluntary risk disclosure in their annual reports than those with lower 
leverage (Deumes and Knechel 2008; Hassan 2009; Marshall and Weetman 2007; 
Taylor et al., 2010). The table above shows that Alrajhi Bank’s risk disclosure levels 
decreased in tandem with the leverage ratio year by year over the entire sample 
period, confirming the above argument.  This is also concurrent with signalling theory, 
whereby managers tend to provide more risk management information to send a 
good signal to debt holders regarding corporate ability to meet obligations (Oliveira 
et al., 2011b).    
The banks descriptive table above shows that SAMBA Bank had a consistent level of 
risk disclosure throughout the whole sample period. Yet, its profitability levels 
decreased year by year. This non-directional relationship illustrates that there is a 
negative association between the two variables. This is concurrent with Mousa and 
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Elamir (2013), who reported a negative relationship between profitability and risk 
disclosure levels. Furthermore, applying signalling theory could mean that those 
firms that are better at risk management will have higher levels of relative profitability 
and would want to signal their superior risk management abilities to the market place 
via voluntary disclosures in the annual report.  
Auditor type has been suggested as a factor in explaining variations in voluntary risk 
disclosure levels (Al-Shammari, 2014). Furthermore, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
argued that larger audit firms are less likely to be associated with clients that 
disclose lower levels of information in their annual reports.  Chalmers and Godfrey 
(2004) claimed that these larger and better known auditing firms tend to encourage 
their clients to disclose more risk information to maintain their own reputation. The 
international Big 4 auditing firms are more likely to pressure their clients to disclose 
risk information in their annual reports to assure the shareholders regarding the 
quantity of risk that their companies face. However, the consistently changing levels 
of voluntary risk disclosure over the examined period, as can be seen from the table 
above, indicate that auditor type had no effect on the levels of voluntary risk 
disclosure in the sample banks of this study. Indeed, one of the Big 4 accounting 
firms audited all banks included in this investigation, which proves that there is no 
correlation between auditor type and the level of voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi 
listed banks. Nevertheless, the choice of an external auditor can serve as one signal 
of a firms’ value. For example, Craswell and Taylor (1992) showed that listed firms 
are more likely to choose one of the Big 4 auditing firms. Such a choice signals to 
investors that the auditing of the contents of the annual reports is of high quality.  
 
Regarding the impact of Islamic values (risk disclosure items in the Islamic index e.g. 
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Qard hassan risk “interest free loan risk”) on the level of voluntary risk disclosure in 
Islamic banks is low (38%). This low level of risk disclosure signifies the low 
compliance with the Islamic values. This effect has impacted the total level of risk 
disclosure. This could be attributed to the non-compliance of Saudi Islamic banks 
with the Islamic standards such as AAOIFI, which has decrease the levels of 
uniqueness of Islamic banks compared to non-Islamic. This is in line with prior 
literature which exhibited that Islamic banks’ report low levels of disclosure regarding 
Islamic values (e.g., Kamla, 2009). The weaknesses of disclosure about such values 
effect the investors’ as well as stakeholders’ perceptions towards the differences 
between the two sets of banks (e.g., El-Gamal, 2006a). This outcome is inconsistent 
with the argument of legitimacy theory that expects corporations’ to act in 
accordance with the values of the community (Carpenter and Feroz, 1992). For 
example, stakeholders who choose to deal with Islamic banks expect banks to fully 
comply with the Islamic value, and disclosure information concerning such actions.  
4.10 Summary  
This study sought to empirically investigate the level of voluntary risk disclosure in 
the annual reports of all listed banks on the Saudi stock market from 2009 to 2013. 
This study used the manual content analysis approach to measure voluntary risk 
disclosure by counting the number of words disclosed by the sample banks in their 
annual reports. The empirical analysis showed that overall Islamic banks reported 
less risk information than non-Islamic banks. However, the analysis also revealed 
that both types of banks reported relatively the same amount of risk information 
regarding the banks’ universal items and Islamic banks reported very little risk 
information on the Islamic risk disclosure items. Based on this, the following 
conclusion can be made: Islamic banks disclose less voluntary risk information than 
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their non-Islamic counterparties. This outcome could be a reflection of the inherently 
conservative nature of the principles that guide Islamic financial institutions, which 
aim to provide financial products that serve the interests of society more broadly than 
non-Islamic firms, which are more likely to be oriented towards the pursuit of profit 
maximization. 
This investigation results have important implications for regulators in Saudi Arabia 
as they attempt to ensure information adequacy and the increased efficiency of the 
most rapidly developing capital market. Particularly, the reported results should be 
useful to accounting and risk regulatory bodies by providing information about the 
inadequacies of risk reporting in Saudi banking sector. Regulatory institutions should 
be above all concerned about the disclosure needs of users. Specifically, this study 
is significant in that it sheds light on the voluntary risk-disclosing practices of banks 
that operate in an environment that is often considered to be opaque. Saudi Arabia 
scored zero on the secrecy vs. transparency measure in Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions. Also, directors could use the results of this study to compare the amount 
of information reported in their annual reports with other banks to ensure funding. 
The study also provides information for managers to keep investors satisfied about 
the risk that their banks encounter. Investors may use the findings for understanding 
risk disclosure behaviour of listed banks on Tadawul. It informs investors about the 
characteristics of risk information in their annual reports.  
The following chapter measures the determinants of voluntary risk disclosure. It 
investigates whether or not corporate governance attributes and board demographic 
traits have any influence on the levels of voluntary risk disclosure in listed Saudi 
Banks. 
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5 Chapter Five: Corporate Governance and Risk Disclosure: 
Evidence from Saudi Arabia 
5.1 Overview  
Regulatory institutions have had to reconsider the basis of banking regulations due 
to the global financial crisis. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and Erkens et al. (2012) 
argued that this event resulted in serious concerns regarding risk disclosures. Due to 
this catastrophic corporate failure, investors’ and stakeholders’ attention has been 
drawn to the importance of risk reporting (Linsley et al., 2008). These concerns are 
coherent with the argument put forward by Meier et al. (1995), Schrand and Elliot 
(1998), Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), Cabedo and Tirado (2004), Ahmed et al. 
(2004), Linsley et al., (2006), Linsley and Shrives (2006), Abraham and Cox (2007), 
Linsley and Lawrence (2007) and Hassan (2009), which is that risk disclosure is a 
pivotal aspect of business risks, where reporting offers greater transparency and 
enhances investors’ confidence. As is evident, the global crisis also resulted in a 
deceleration of the global economy and thus the demand for risk reporting increased. 
This had led to a number of regulatory reforms, for example, the birth of the 
International Financial Reporting Standard 7 Financial Instruments and BASEL II, 
which includes greater measures on risk transparency and disclosure. It also 
emphasises the significance of informative risk disclosure in the banking industry for 
the overall enhancement of market discipline. The disclosure of informative risk 
information in banks has been cited as instrumental in eluding banking catastrophes 
(Financial Stability Board, 2012).   
Disclosure of financial risk information is important since it increases transparency, 
thus giving shareholders’ more confidence and lowering their uncertainty about 
future cash flow as well as making it more viable for corporations to obtain external 
funding at a cost of capital, hence increasing capital market activities in general 
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(Deumes, 1999; Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Kothari et al., 2009). Institutions are 
encouraged not only to report their activities but also the risks associated with them 
as well as their strategy for and capacity to manage these risks (ICAEW, 1999). 
However, prior research shows that financial statements suffer from serious 
deficiencies and inadequacies in terms of the provision of risk and uncertainty 
disclosures (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004). One of the main causes of the global 
financial disaster in 2007 was the absence of adequate risk disclosure available to 
investors. This dearth of risk disclosure prohibited investors from having adequately 
appropriate information to evaluate corporations’ risk reportage (Rahman, 1998). 
Solomon et al. (2000) found that institutional investors consider risk reporting 
inadequate in the UK. Therefore, this leaves investors unable to adequately assess a 
firm’s risk profile, and hence they are unable to deliberate on the scale and 
categories of risk in their venture decisions (Linsley et al., 2008). This dearth of risk 
information in annual reports indicates the necessity to examine the determinants of 
risk disclosure in different settings, particularly developing markets, such as in our 
case study, Saudi Arabia.    
Whilst previous literature discusses extensively the relationship between the 
determinants of risk disclosure in developed economies (Lajili and Zeghal, 2005; 
Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Konishi and Ali, 2007; Deumes 
and Knechel, 2008; Hill and Short, 2009; Taylor, Tower and Neilson, 2010), there is 
very little mention of developing markets (Amran, Bin and Hassan, 2009; Hassan, 
2009; Abdallah and Hassan, 2013). Furthermore, none of the preceding risk 
disclosure studies have investigated the impact of the combination of corporate 
governance and demographic variables on risk disclosure practices. This study aims 
to investigate risk disclosure practices in an emerging market, Saudi Arabia, 
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empirically examining corporate governance and demographic traits as the 
determinants of risk reporting practices in Saudi listed banks. To the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, this is the only study that has attempted to examine the 
combination of corporate governance and demographic traits on risk disclosure in 
emerging markets, and thus this research makes a novel contribution to the existing 
accounting literature. Furthermore, this study contributes to the risk disclosure 
literature by employing the upper echelons theory in order to examine the 
determinants and their effects on risk disclosure practises. In addition, this is the only 
study that examines the demographic traits of the board of directors in a developing 
country. In particular, this study contributes to the board demography, governance 
and risk disclosure literature by theoretically justifying and empirically investigating 
the implications of such determinants and theories in regards to risk disclosure in the 
banking industry. This study is motivated, firstly, by the call made by Dobler et al. 
(2011) for more investigation into the influence of corporate governance 
determinants on risk disclosure, especially in developing markets and, secondly, by 
the call made by Abdallah, Hassan and McClelland, (2015) for more research into 
the relationship between demographic characteristics and risk disclosure.  
This study differs from Mousa and Elamir (2013), Mokhtar and Mellett (2013) and 
Abdallah, Hassan and McClelland (2015), who examined a single attribute of 
corporate governance characteristic and from Amran, Bin and Hassan (2009), 
Hassan, (2009), Abdallah and Hassan (2013) and Al-Shammari (2014), who did not 
investigate corporate governance and demographic attributes by comprehensively 
examining corporate risk disclosure and exploring demographic characteristics. 
Moreover, not a single study has examined corporate governance as a determinant 
of risk disclosure in the Saudi context. Also, not one of the above-mentioned studies 
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explored the demographic traits of a top management team in emerging markets. 
This investigation differs from all of the above-mentioned studies in that it examines 
the demographic characteristics of the top board of directors, employing the upper 
echelons theory to examine risk reporting practices in the banking industry. 
Furthermore, this study differs from Amran, Bin and Hassan, (2009), Hassan, (2009), 
Abdallah and Hassan, (2013), Mousa and Elamir, (2013), Mokhtar and Mellett, 
(2013), Al-Shammari, (2014) and Abdallah et al., (2015) by being the first to examine 
risk disclosure over a period of five years in a developing economy.  
The empirical findings show that large banks with high outsider ownership, high 
profitability, high regularity of audit committee meetings and gender diversity are 
more likely to demonstrate higher levels of risk disclosure practices. Also, risk 
disclosure is negatively affected by board education levels. Moreover, as can be 
seen from our empirical findings, external ownership, audit committee meetings, 
gender diversity, profitability and board education levels are primary determinants of 
risk disclosure practices in Saudi listed banks, while the rest of the independent 
variables of both corporate governance mechanisms and demographic traits are 
insignificantly correlated with risk disclosure practices in Saudi listed bank. Our 
findings have several important implications for banks stockholder, regulatory bodies 
and any other interested group on the importance of corporate governance and 
demographic determinants, which can be used to augment risk reporting in the 
banking industry. This study also supports the upper echelons theory and further 
encompasses demographic research into the risk disclosure field. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 discusses the theoretical 
framework; section 3 develops the hypotheses; section 4 outlines the research 
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design and methodology; section 5 discusses empirical analysis; section 6 is the 
discussion; and section 7 offers conclusions. 
5.2 Corporate governance and banking  
It has been argued that compared with other industries, the banking industry is the 
industry which has the highest requirements for corporate governance and 
disclosure regulations. As such industry is a financial intermediary body which is an 
important part in every country’s economy and has a major role in the financial 
system of that country (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008). Furthermore, the banking 
industry is based on trust, however banks as financial entities deal with all kinds of 
risks on a daily bases since it is a part of their business (Barakat and Hussainey, 
2013). Therefore, to keep public confidence and decrease risks, Saudi banks need 
to have good financial performance and demonstrate corporate governance best 
practice. Such behaviour is greatly important for shareholders when considering 
investment decision makings.      
5.3 Theoretical framework 
Corporate governance has been defined by Solomon and Solomon (2004: 14) as 
“the system of checks and balances, both internal and external to companies, which 
ensures that companies discharge their accountability to all stakeholders and act in a 
socially responsible way in all areas of their business activities”. Also, Sharman and 
Copnell, (2002) defined corporate governance as “the system and process by which 
entities are directed and controlled to enhance performance and sustainable 
shareholder value, and it is concerned with the effectiveness of management 
structure, the sufficiency and reliability of corporate reporting and the effectiveness of 
risk management systems”.    
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The literature has established a robust relationship between disclosure and 
corporate governance. The FRC (2008) affirmed that management effectiveness, 
firm performance and shareholder value is supported by the combined code on 
corporate governance, which also promotes certainty in corporate disclosure and 
governance. Mallin (2002: 253) stated that “corporate governance codes and their 
recommendations undoubtedly contribute towards increased transparency and 
disclosure”. Previous studies by Solomon et al. (2000) and Solomon and Solomon 
(2004) have also contributed to the relationship between corporate governance and 
risk disclosure.  
In concordance with various theoretical debates (i.e. agency theory regards 
corporate governance as a control mechanism), the literature has generally reported 
a link between reporting and corporate governance (Ho and Wang, 2001; Elshandidy 
and Neri, 2015). For instance, the impact of corporate governance attributes on 
disclosure exercises has proven to diminish information asymmetries and enhance 
the functionality of organisational stewardship. Furthermore, the precision of risk 
information is used as an external control mechanism, which lessens agency costs 
and is of great importance to all interested groups (investors and analysts). This 
provides all interested groups with the functionality to formulate precise investment 
decisions and evaluate institutions’ risk profiles effectively (Elshandidy and Neri, 
2015; Campbell et al., 2014; Kravet and Muslu, 2013; Miihkinen, 2013).  
The theoretical association between corporate governance and disclosure has 
mainly been examined through information asymmetry (signalling theory) and 
agency theory. In the case of future disclosure examinations, the literature has 
proposed the employment of agency and signalling theories to examine the links 
between disclosure and managerial incentives (Core, 2001; Beyer et al., 2010). 
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Moreover, corporate governance mechanisms have been recognised as controlling 
agency problems and guaranteeing that directors’ actions are in the best interest of 
shareholders (Ho and Wong, 2001). 
 Agency theory explains the disagreements between directors and shareholders 
when directors’ interests differ from those of shareholders. However, it has been 
established by a number of prior investigations that various monitoring mechanisms, 
such as audit committees, independent external auditing and well-timed financial 
reviews (Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Spira and Page, 2003) are able to mitigate 
agency problems since they provide top management with more reliable information 
for financial reporting purposes. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that monitoring 
plays a central part in controlling the conduct of directors. Healy and Palepu (2001) 
proposed four resolutions for agency problems, the second of which includes 
corporate governance, with an emphasis on the board of directors’ responsibility to 
monitor and discipline management in the best interest of outside owners.  
Information asymmetry conflicts (also underpinned by signalling theory) between 
internal directors and external investors could extend to internal control systems in 
the case of corporate governance (Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973). Accordingly, 
outsiders cannot observe internal control activity and conduct in some circumstances 
due to the lack of regulations and guidance on internal control activity and conduct. 
Therefore, shareholders tend not to have a full understanding of the nature and 
scope of internal control systems. This leads to shareholders having difficulty 
appreciating managers’ efforts to counter risks.  Yet, managers could reduce 
information asymmetries by using their discretion to provide more information on 
internal control and risk management, potentially benefitting analysts, investors and 
other market users (Lajili and Zeghal, 2005; Deumes and Knechel, 2008). 
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It has been noticed from prior literature that agency theory and information 
asymmetry, both of which underpin signalling theory, are deployed to explicate risk 
disclosure to investors (Abraham and Cox, 2007; Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; 
Vandemaele et al., 2009; Elshandidy et al., 2013). When internal management 
decides to disclose risk information to decrease agency conflicts, this culminates in 
mitigating information asymmetries between both parties.  However, internal 
management might sometimes choose to release some risk information to signal 
their competence and capability to handle risks to distinguish themselves from the 
rest, which might translate into an improved reputation and some monetary gain.  In 
addition to formulating this thesis’s hypotheses, the following section discusses a 
number of corporate governance attributes and their potential impact on risk 
disclosure practices.  
Corporate governance studies investigate the relationship between corporate 
governance attributes and corporate performance. This investigation concentrates 
on the impact of corporate governance attributes on risk disclosure. Whilst a number 
of studies have looked into the effect of corporate governance on disclosure in 
developed countries, the impact of corporate governance on risk disclosure in 
developing markets has received scant attention. Thereafter, this research will try to 
address this gap and contribute to the literature by examining the effect of corporate 
governance attributes on risk disclosure practices in Saudi Arabia.  
The upper echelons theory implies that certain organisational effects are linked to 
top management teams having specific demographic profiles. This theory proposes 
that the characteristics of top management, in particular demographic characteristics, 
might affect strategic decision-makings and hence performance. At the centre of this 
theory is the notion that the background knowledge and values of corporate directors 
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impact upon the essential strategic decisions made by these central corporate 
managers. Thus, in the current study the concept is extended to the determinants of 
risk disclosure, investigating whether such features of the top board could impact 
upon the determinants of risk reportage in the banking sector.  Such demographic 
traits play an important role in determining key institutional effects, such as the 
provision of risk disclosure in the annual reports. This theory will also assist this 
investigation in interpreting the findings of the current study’s question to identify 
what determines risk information in the annual reports. It also grants this study the 
opportunity to investigate the core determinants of board demography in relation to 
risk disclosure.   
5.4 Literature 
While many studies have examined the individual characteristics of corporate 
governance, such as ownership structure and independent outside directors 
(Mohobbot, 2005; Konishi and Ali, 2007; Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Hill and Short, 
2009; Taylor, Tower and Neilson, 2010), only a few have explored corporate 
governance characteristics in developed countries (Abraham and Cox, 2007; Oliveira, 
Rodrigues and Craig, 2011b; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012), Apart from Mousa and 
Elamir (2013), Mokhtar and Mellett (2013) and Abdallah, Hassan and McClelland 
(2015), who examined a single attribute of corporate governance characteristics, 
percentage of foreign ownership, duality and board size, the literature on developing 
economies has not explored comprehensively corporate governance characteristics 
(Amran, Bin and Hassan, 2009; Hassan, 2009; Abdallah and Hassan, 2013; Al-
Shammari, 2014). Furthermore, not a single study has examined corporate 
governance as a determinant of risk disclosure in the Saudi context in particular. 
Therefore, this is the first study that focuses on the Saudi market in that domain. In 
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addition, the current study is the only one that explores corporate governance 
characteristics and risk disclosure in the GCC market since the previous literature 
focused on firm-specific characteristics.  
Furthermore, whilst a small number of studies have examined risk disclosure over 
more than a one year period in developed economies (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004; 
Deumes, 2008; Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Rajab and Schachler, 2009; Hill and 
Short, 2009; Taylor, Tower and Neilson, 2010; Elshandidy, Fraser and Hussainey, 
2015), none have examined risk disclosure over more than a one year period in 
developing economies (Amran, Bin and Hassan, 2009; Hassan, 2009; Abdallah and 
Hassan, 2013; Mousa and Elamir, 2013; Al-Shammari, 2014; Abdallah et al., 2015). 
Therefore, the current study is the only study that examines risk disclosure over a 
period of five years in developing economies.  
While nonfinancial and mixed institutions in developed countries have been widely 
researched and reported upon in the literature (Carlon, Loftus and Miller, 2003; 
Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2005; Lajili and Zeghal, 2005; 
Combes-Thuelin, Henneron and Touron, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Deumes 
and Knechel, 2008; Hill and Short, 2009; Taylor, Tower and Neilson, 2010; Oliveira, 
Rodrigues and Craig, 2011b; Dobler, Lajili and Zeghal, 2011; Elzahar and Hussainey, 
2012; Elshandidy, Fraser and Hussainey, 2015), only a few studies have focused on 
financial institutions in developed countries (Solomon et al., 2000; Linsley, Shrives 
and Crumption, 2006; Oliveira, Rodrigues and Craig, 2011a; Maffei et al., 2014) and 
no investigations have been conducted on financial institutions in developing 
markets (Amran, Bin and Hassan, 2009; Hassan, 2009; Abdallah and Hassan, 2013; 
Mousa and Elamir 2013; Al-Shammari, 2014; Abdallah, et al., 2015). Therefore, this 
is the only study that investigates financial institutions in developing economies, 
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particularly Saudi Arabia. Also none of the above studies have examined the 
demographic attributes of top management teams or have they employed the upper 
echelons theory in examining the nature and determinates of risk disclosure. 
Therefore, this is the only study that examines the demographic traits of the top 
boards in developing countries. This is a response to the call for more research into 
the relationship between the demographic characteristics and risk disclosure made 
by Abdallah, Hassan and McClelland (2015). Based on the developing and 
appropriate preceding literature on disclosure and risk disclosure in relation to 
corporate governance, a number of corporate governance attributes will be 
presented along with their potential impact on risk disclosure practices. This study’s 
hypotheses will thus be formulated. 
5.5 Hypotheses development 
5.5.1 Ownership Structure 
Corporate governance and financial reporting have been markedly affected by 
ownership structure and corporate culture (Beattie et al., 2001). It has been argued 
that ownership and governance (which constitute the board of directors) could affect 
companies’ risk reporting since the directors compose the yearly reports for 
shareholders (Abraham and Cox, 2007). Moreover, when reviewing the literature for 
the purpose of conducting this investigation, it was noticed that a variety of proxies 
have been applied to the ownership structure variable. These are: ownership 
concentration; institutional ownership; the number of shareholders; government 
ownership; the proportion of shares owned by outsiders; family ownership; 
managerial ownership; the percentage of closely held shares (CHS); foreign 
ownership and the NOSH-Factor, which combines the free-float shares; the 
percentage of total share available to the ordinary investor; total strategic holdings; 
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and investment-company held shares. However, empirical research has discovered 
a mixture of outcomes in this regard, which might be explained by the dissimilarity 
between the employed measurement and the ownership factor.  
As a consequence, Fama and Jensen (1983) stated that modern establishments are 
distinguished by the detachment of ownership from control i.e. detaching 
management decisions from monitoring decisions.  Additionally, Cooke (1989, p.177) 
stated, “Where there is a divorce of ownership from control, the potential for agency 
costs exists because of conflict between, firstly, shareholders and managers and, 
secondly, bondholders and shareholder-managers”. Owusu-Ansah (1998) confirmed 
that ownership structure and disclosure connection is explained by agency theory 
since modern corporations are distinguished by the detachment of ownership from 
control. 
On the one hand, corporations with dispersed public ownership of securities will be 
inclined to have high agency costs, whereby stockholders can pressurize 
management for more information as part of the monitoring activity. On the other 
hand, in the event of concentrated ownership, there is little or no physical 
segregation between owners and managers of the capital and most of the risk 
related information can be exchanged at boardroom meetings or in a casual manner. 
Hence, less risk related information will be accessible to the public (Mohobbot, 2005).  
Furthermore, information asymmetry can also be related to the discussion on the 
effect of ownership structure on financial reporting. Concentrated ownership 
companies may not encounter a high level of information asymmetry via augmented 
exposure, and these companies are not as easily able to comply with public 
reportage since most of the information is communicated at meetings and other 
informal manners (Mohobbot, 2005). What’s more, Owusu-Ansah (1998) claimed 
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that when there is extensively distributed ownership, individual shareholders are not 
in a strong position to influence company disclosure policies and practices owing to 
not having the power to access the firm’s internal information. Conversely, Hossain, 
Tan and Adams (1994) posit that discretionary reporting tends to be more common 
in extensively held companies in order for directors to efficiently oversee managers 
so as to optimize the firm’s financial interests and ensure that they are operating in 
the best interests of the owners.   Nevertheless, Kothari (2000) stated that the 
ownership distribution pattern and dispersed managerial ownership foster the 
demand for reporting to be high. However, Mohobbot (2005) argued that in the case 
of concentrated ownership concentration, most of the risk related information could 
be exchanged at the boardroom meeting or by any other casual manner, which will 
result in less risk related information being available to the market. Thus, there may 
be a negative relationship between risk disclosure and the number of shareholders. 
What’s more, Wallace and Naser (1995) argued that the more people who demand 
to know about the activities of a company, the more comprehensive the reporting of 
the company. The authors also proposed that the boost in risk reporting could solve 
supervising difficulties related to growth in the proportion of the company owned by 
outsiders.  
Konishi and Ali (2007) established that there was an insignificant correlation between 
the ownership diffusion pattern and the number of risk disclosures. However, the 
researchers still felt that there was an association between the two variables. They 
explained that managers could hold a high proportion of stocks and choose not to 
report all risk related information. Konishi and Ali (2007) confirmed that risk reporting 
policy is controlled by the board of directors or the top management team, implying 
that there can be no risk disclosure without their involvement. In addition, Deumes 
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and Knechel (2008) discovered a negative relationship between internal control 
disclosures and both ownership concentration and managerial ownership. The 
authors suggested that this could indicate that there are monetary reasons why 
corporate managers voluntarily disclose more/less information on internal control 
and that corporate managers evaluate the disclosure’s costs and advantages then 
only disclose if the advantages outweigh the costs. 
In spite of this, The Office of Fair Trading (2009) argued that government ownership 
can influence markets through immediate participation, for example, as market 
makers or as suppliers and buyers of goods and services or by indirect participation 
in private markets via taxation, regulations and subsidies. Moreover, Owusu-Ansah 
(1998) claimed that government ownership could lead to unusual access to 
corporations’ information so as to monitor their investment actions, making them less 
motivated to increase public disclosure.   
Konishi and Ali (2007) acknowledged that the aim of those corporations’ disclosure 
strategies is to respond to the disparities in the demand for public exposure 
encountered. They also argued that where the government owns the majority of 
shares, risk reportage would be lower than when ownership is dispersed. This is due 
to the increased pressure on corporate managers to report more risk related 
information. However, Cooke (1998) documented an insignificant relationship 
between government ownership and disclosure. Nonetheless, Mohobbot (2005) 
contended that if the number of foreign investors is high, there is more pressure on 
corporate managers to report higher numbers of risk related disclosures.  
Furthermore, Mangena and Tauringana (2007) reported a positive relationship 
between disclosure and foreign holdings, whereas Konishi and Ali (2007) 
documented an insignificant relationship between the two variables.  
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In the case of institutional holdings, Hassan (2008c) affirmed that company directors 
respond to demands from institutional environments by adjusting some practices, 
such as the reportage of risk related information, so as to acquire social legitimacy. 
Additionally, Taylor (2011) stated that institutional stockholders are expected to 
reduce asymmetrical information by performing an overseeing role due to close 
contacts with the management of organizations as well as preventing management 
from withdrawing risk information. However, Solomon, Solomon, Norton and Joseph 
(2000) reported that institutional stockholders in the UK acknowledged that 
expanded corporate risk disclosure would aid their portfolio investment decision-
making, yet they did not support a regulated setting for risk disclosure or any general 
statement on business risk.  Furthermore, Abraham and Cox (2007) discovered that 
there was a negative relationship between risk disclosure and long-term institutional 
investors in the UK, whereas they found a positive correlation with short-term 
investors. However, Taylor (2011) reported that there was no significant association 
between long-term institutional shareholders and disclosure in Australia. The author 
also discovered a positive correlation between short-term institutional shareholders 
and risk reportage.  
Therefore, directors might provide more information to investors as a signal in order 
to decrease information costs rising from dispersed ownership structure. Marshall 
and Weetman (2007) claim that higher levels of insider control as proxied by the 
percentage of closely held shares (CHS) are correlated with lower levels of risk 
disclosure. This finding backs the argument that information asymmetries exists 
between managers and shareholders when there is a divorce of ownership from 
control (Cooke, 1989; Mohobbot, 2005).  Moreover, the agency theory advocates 
that companies with greater (lower) inside (outside) ownership structure are 
151 | P a g e  
expected to be more (less) secretive and less transparent (Brown et al, 2011; 
Deumes and Knechel, 2008). Hence, where there is a greater parting of ownership 
from control, investors monitoring costs are more likely to be higher in contrast to 
companies with a lesser parting of ownership from control. In order to decrease this 
phenomenon companies ought to offer more risk disclosure (Eng and Mac, 2003; 
Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Elshandidy et al, 2013).   
Elshandidy et al. (2013) documented a positive significant correlation between 
ownership structure (proxied by CHS and NOSH-Factor) and risk disclosure. In 
addition, some empirical research results have revealed that institutions with lower 
insider ownership (proxied by CHS) are prone to higher risk disclosure (Elshandidy 
et al., 2013; Marshall and Weetman, 2007; Gelb, 2000). Also, institutions with higher 
outsider ownership (proxied by NOSH-Factor) are prone to considerably higher 
levels of risk disclosure (Elshandidy et al., 2013; Deumes and Knechel, 2008; 
Abraham and Cox, 2007). Akhigbe and Martin (2006); Sharma (2014) found a 
positive association between disclosure and ownership structure banking sector. 
Therefore, the following hypotheses were formulated: 
H1: There is a negative relationship between risk disclosure and insider 
ownership. 
H2: There is a positive relationship between risk disclosure and outsider 
ownership. 
5.5.2 Board Size  
To date, there have been few specific investigations into the relationship between 
board size and risk disclosure (Muzahem, 2011). However, a number of researchers 
have examined board size in the context of voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006) claimed that there is no consensus regarding a 
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connection between the level of voluntary exposure and board size and that it 
remains an empirical issue. The same could be said for the relationship between 
board size and risk disclosure. Moreover, Chen and Jaggi (2000) argued that a large 
number of directors on the board could lessen the information asymmetry issue and 
instigate more disclosure. Also, Healy and Palepu (2001) confirmed that the number 
of directors on the board could affect its control and monitoring operations, though 
disclosure is regarded as a monitoring item that could be increased. 
Conversely, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) agreed that the more directors on the 
board the less efficient it would be at monitoring management. According to agency 
theory, bigger boards are bad and corrupt, while smaller boards are good and 
effective in terms of enhancing performance and disclosure (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Free rider problems between executives, expanded decision-making time, 
raised costs, poor communication and monitoring could all have an adverse effect on 
disclosure levels and good practice (Jensen, 1993). However, several recent studies 
have associated large boards with greater risk disclosure (Allegrini and Greco, 2013; 
Elshandidy et al., 2013; Nitm et al., 2013; Elshandidy and Neri, 2015) 
All in all, the empirical findings on this issue have been mixed.  Nitm et al. (2013), 
Elshandidy et al. (2013), Allegrini and Greco (2013) and Elshandidy and Neri (2015) 
all found a positive relationship between the number of directors on the board and 
risk disclosure. In addition, Abeysekera (2010) discovered that there was a positive 
connection between discourse and board size in Kenya. However, Cheng and 
Courtenay (2006) established that there was no significant association between the 
two variables, while Jia et al. (2009) Guest (2009) and Coles et al. (2008) 
documented a negative relationship between board size and disclosure and 
performance. Farag et al (2014) find a positive and highly significant association 
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between board size and disclosure level in the banking industry. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis was formulated:  
H3: There is a positive relationship between risk disclosure and board size. 
5.5.3 Independent Directors 
It has been claimed by agency theorists that the board of directors acts as a shield 
and plays a substantial part in corporate governance in terms of decision control and 
the monitoring of operations (Cheng et al., 2006). However, Ho and Wong (2001) 
contented that agency theory does not assume that all groups on the board of 
directors enhance accountability and extend disclosure. There is a mixture of 
corporate insiders and outsiders on the board, all of whom may have distinctive 
views on disclosure. The outsiders (independent directors) act as a measure of 
corporate governance quality and are more likely to minimize agency problems and 
lower the demand for regulatory intervention in corporate disclosure (Abraham and 
Cox, 2007).  Accordingly, Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) claimed that more 
independent directors are required on boards of directors to control and monitor the 
operations of managers and that this leads to more disclosure from corporations.   
However, the empirical findings on independent directors and risk disclosure are 
diverse. Abraham and Cox (2007) and Elshandidy et al. (2013) confirmed that there 
was a positive correlation between independent directors and risk disclosure, 
whereas Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) found no significant relationship between risk 
disclosure and independent directors. Jizi et al (2014) supported a positive 
association between disclosure and board independence based on large US 
commercial banks. Therefore, the following hypothesis was formulated:  
H4:  There is a positive relationship between risk disclosure and independent 
directors. 
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5.5.4 Non-executive Directors 
The empirical findings on the influence of non-executive directors on disclosure 
practices have been mixed. Fama and Jensen (1983) claimed that the existence of 
non-executive directors on the board could result in the reduction of agency conflicts 
among owners and managers. Moreover, Barako et al. (2006) argued that non-
executive directors are regarded by investors and stockholders as a fundamental 
control and monitoring element of corporate governance, delivering the 
indispensable checks and balances required to improve board effectiveness. Also, 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) affirmed that non-executive directors are considered to be 
the control, check and balance mechanism that increases board effectiveness. 
However, Ho and Wong (2001) contented that agency theory does not assume that 
all groups on the board of directors enhance accountability and extend disclosure. 
In opposition, Abraham and Cox (2007) claimed that an increased number of non-
executive directors on the board makes it more likely that stockholders’ preferences 
on accountability and transparency are met.  Furthermore, the authors argued that 
the findings illustrated that the combination of boards play a substantial part in the 
transmission of risk related disclosures to shareholders and different groups of 
directors. As a result, more reportage is predicted if the non-executive directors are 
in fact performing their monitoring job rather than their perceived-monitoring job, 
putting pressure on management to release more information (Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002; Eng and Mac, 2003). 
Berry (2008) confirmed that in his roles as a non-executive director of a number of 
UK corporations he had endeavoured to contribute to the expansion of efficient risk 
management as well as attempting to clarify the key risks to the board. He also 
argued that not all non-executive directors are independent and that dependent non-
executive directors could have contacts with management which would call to 
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question their role in monitoring, controlling and increasing disclosure levels.  
Empirical investigations by Abraham and Cox (2007) and Deumes and Knechel 
(2008) found that there was no significant relationship between non-executive 
directors and risk disclosure, whereas, Eng and Mac (2003) and Elshandidy et al. 
(2013) reported a positive relationship between non-executive directors and risk 
disclosure. Based on this discussion the following hypothesis was formulated:   
H5: There is a positive relationship between risk disclosure and non-executive 
directors. 
5.5.5 Audit Committee Independence 
It has been argued that limited research has attempted to examine the link between 
disclosure and the features of audit committees (Albitar, 2015). As a part of the 
internal control system and corporate governance, corporations assign audit 
committees. Audit committee members have to work on behalf of the board of 
directors and for the benefit of investors.  Moreover, Barako et al. (2006) explained 
that the audit committee can play a supervisory role, which would lead to an 
enhanced quality of information flowing between stockholders and directors, 
particularly in the event of financial reporting wherein the two parties hold unequal 
levels of information. Similarly, Forker (1992) stated that an audit committee can act 
as an efficient monitoring mechanism that minimizes agency costs and augments 
disclosure. In addition, Ho and Wong (2001) claimed that because audit committees 
contain predominantly non-executive managers, they have the power to moderate 
the amount of information withheld. Audit committees play potentially an important 
part in ensuring sound corporate governance (Avison et al., 2012)  
Furthermore, Taylor (2011) argued that the agency theory argument suggests that 
the more independent the audit committee is from upper administration, the more 
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probable it is to act in the best interests of the firm’s investors in terms of decreasing 
information asymmetry. The researcher also acknowledged that audit committees 
have two main responsibilities, firstly, to make sure that risks are coped with and 
internal controls exist to protect against risks and secondly, to ensure that corporate 
statements are examined to guarantee the integrity of financial and other investor 
related disclosures for shareholders.  
Nevertheless, the empirical findings on disclosure and audit committee 
independence have been mixed. Taylor (2011) and Oliveira et al. (2011b) reported a 
positive association between audit committee independence and risk disclosure. 
However, they also reported an insignificant association between risk disclosure and 
the financial expertise of audit committee members. Furthermore, Neri (2010) found 
an insignificant relationship between these two variables. Therefore, the following 
hypothesis was formulated:   
H6: There is a positive relationship between risk disclosure and the 
independence of audit committee. 
5.5.6 Audit committee size 
As previously stated, a part of the internal control system and corporate governance 
corporations assign audit committees. This concept was first proposed and 
examined by Forker (1992). The stated that an audit committee can act as an 
efficient monitoring mechanism that can minimize agency costs and augment 
disclosure. Moreover, Ho and Wong (2001) claimed that the presence of an audit 
committee significantly affects the extent of disclosure. Also, the authors claimed that 
because audit committees contain predominantly non-executive managers, they 
have the power to moderate the amount of information withheld. Moreover, Chen 
and Jaggi (2000) argued that a large number of directors on the committee could 
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lessen the information asymmetry issue and lead to more disclosure.  Prior empirical 
research has indicated a positive relationship between disclosure and audit 
committee size (Barako et al., 2006). Therefore, the following hypothesis was 
formulated:    
H7: There is a positive relationship between audit committee size and risk 
disclosure  
5.5.7 Audit committee meetings  
Previous literature has offered pragmatic evidence on the advantages of directors 
meticulously controlling disclosure, with the number of meetings being a key aspect 
of this control (Allegrini and Greco, 2013). Karamanou and Valeas (2005) claimed 
that regular meetings have a fundamental impact on audit committee effectiveness. 
It has also been argued that regular audit committee meetings are more likely to lead 
to compliance with responsibilities and the monitoring of financial reporting (to 
improve the quality of information that flows between stockholders and directors, 
where the two parties hold unequal levels of information (Barako et al., 2006)). In 
addition, Chen et al. (2006) affirmed that meeting more regularly decreases the risk 
of fraud. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) documented a positive relationship between 
the regularity of audit committee meetings and the probability of making earnings 
forecasts, thus leading to greater disclosure. Also, Allegrini and Greco (2013) 
reported a positive link between the regularity of audit committee meetings and 
disclosure. Therefore, the following hypothesis was formulated:       
H8: There is a positive correlation between the number of meetings of the 
audit committee and risk disclosure. 
5.5.8 Demographic Variables  
There have been a number of examinations of the relationship between the 
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attributes of top organizational managers and various organizational effects (Michel 
and Hambrick, 1992; Bantel, 1993; Walt and Ingley, 2003; Kang et al., 2007; Adams 
and Ferreira, 2009; Mutuku et al., 2013). Two essential theoretical advances in the 
area of organizational research are key. Firstly, Cyert and March (1963) developed 
the concept of the dominant coalition, which shifts the focus from the individual CEO 
to the whole team of the board of directors in terms of organizational leadership. The 
second concept is the increased emphasis on utilizing observable demographic 
characteristics, such as age, gender, tenure and experience in organizational studies 
and investigating the link between these attributes and organizational consequences 
(Pfeffer, 1983; Tihanyi et al., 2000; Mutuku et al., 2013) 
In groundbreaking work by Hambrick and Mason (1984), these two concepts, namely 
the dominant coalition and demographic research, were combined. The authors 
suggested that certain organizational effects are linked to top management teams 
having specific demographic profiles. Moreover, the upper echelon theory proposes 
that top management characteristics, in particular their demographic characteristics, 
could impair strategic decision making. At the centre of this theory is the idea that 
background knowledge and the values of corporate directors impact upon essential 
strategic decisions made and acted upon by these central corporate managers. 
Hambrick and Mason also claimed that observable attributes, for example, age, 
practical experience and tenure, could function as practical proxies for the cognitive 
base that guides top directors’ decisions.  
However, a number of academic researchers have criticized the demographic 
approach (Pettigrew, 1992; Lawrence, 1997; Aldrich, 1979). Therefore, the main 
concern is the necessity to access the “black box” that might contain the operative 
mechanism connecting demographic characteristics to organizational aftermath 
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consequences (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). Pettigrew (1992: 178) claimed that 
little is known about “the processes by which top teams go about their tasks”. 
Lawrence (1997) illustrated that demographic variables are sometimes employed as 
representatives for subjective concepts. The author noticed that investigators 
depending on the demographic approach make a congruence assumption via which 
demographic variables are employed to represent subjective concepts without 
offering a logical justification for why this is a valid approach.  
Yet, studies investigating team demography and processes have offered important 
insights into the reported “black box”. For instance, Smith et al. (1994), Tihanyi et al. 
(2000) and Mutuku et al. (2013) reported that top management team demography 
was indirectly associated with performance via intervening process variables 
incorporating social integration and communication. Meanwhile, Pelled, Eisenhardt 
and Xin (1999), Walt and Ingley (2003), Kang et al. (2007) and Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) reported that team demography diversity can lead to disagreement, which 
can affect group performance, which in turn affects all aspects of organizational 
decision-making and outcomes.  In addition, some of these investigators found that 
these associations were further controlled by task routines and group longevity.  
Limitations are inherent in any approach. However, a strand of literature that 
depends predominantly on top management team demographic variables has 
produced important findings. These investigations mostly concentrated on two 
dimensions of team composition. Firstly, they focused on the impact of demographic 
attributes on the consequences of organizational decisions based upon the notion 
that particular demographic attributes are connected with top management 
perceptions, which eventually lead to certain actions and consequences. Some of 
these investigations recognized a significant link between top management team 
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demographic traits and corporate strategies (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; Bantel, 
1993; Mutuku et al., 2013; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Nielsen and Huse, 2010; 
Ellwood and Gracia-Lacalle, 2015; Allini et al., 2016).  
All in all, the dependence on the demographic approach still appears to be justified 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). Lawrence (1997) also demonstrated that 
demographic variables have important qualities, offering high content validity and 
replicability in a domain where replication is all too rare.  In addition, Pfeffer (1983) 
recommended the employment of observable managerial traits as a means of 
addressing the shortcomings of subjective studies, which sometimes incorporate 
measurement error, differences in conceptualizations and low levels of explained 
variance. This is also reflected in Finkelstein and Hambrick’s (1996: 47) work, which 
demonstrated that, “an executive’s tenure in the firm is open to essentially no 
measurement error”. Furthermore, the authors responded to the limitations of the 
dependence on psychological as matched to demographic variables. Finkelstein and 
Hambrick (1996: 46) also noted that demographic traits are more easily obtainable 
by investigators since top directors are normally reluctant to “submit to batteries of 
psychological tests”. 
The decision that institutions make to disclose risk related information necessitates 
careful assessment and consideration of a huge collection of complicate 
organizational issues. However, extending the demographic approach into the field 
of banks’ risk disclosure practices could lead to better understanding of the role of 
top management teams and their decisions in relation to voluntary risk disclosure at 
their banks.  In the following section, the demographic characteristics are explored 
and hypotheses are developed.  
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5.5.8.1 Gender Diversity  
The presence of woman on the board of publicly listed institutions is becoming of 
interest to researchers (Ellwood and Gracia-Lacalle, 2015). However, one could 
argue from an agency theory viewpoint that gender does not influence the 
effectiveness of the board of a firm. However, the upper echelons theory argues that 
top management demographic characteristics, such as gender, could influence 
strategic decision-making.  Hence, gender differences might indicate variations in 
behaviour and skills between board members (Allini et al., 2016). Moreover, prior 
studies have generally revealed a mixture of results regarding women directors. 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Nielsen and Huse (2010) reported that women on 
top management teams influence decisions positively, while Bianco et al. (2011) 
strongly question their capacity to impact upon or add extra value to the team. In 
contrast, evidence from previous risk disclosure studies falls into two strands of 
literature.  The first strand found that there is a positive correlation between gender 
and risk disclosure (Nitm et al., 2013; Allini et al., 2016), whereas the second strand 
reported a negative relationship between the two variables (Allini et al., 2014). 
Therefore, the following hypothesis was formulated: 
H9: There is a positive relationship between gender and risk disclosure   
5.5.8.2 Tenure 
Tenure is a significant factor in group procedure within a top management group. On 
the one hand, augmented tenure is related to decreased disagreement, permanence 
and better communication (Katz, 1982). It has also been argued that more tenure 
time on the board could be linked with shared cognitive structures and social 
cohesion (Michel and Hambrick, 1992). On the other hand, it has been argued that 
top board tenure could have negative outcomes (Keck, 1997) since directors working 
together for extensive periods of time could  be inclined to develop similar views 
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owing to the long-term acculturation of top team associates, which then results in a 
shared common perspective and corporate paradigm (Pfeffer, 1983). Such effects 
might result in dysfunctional decision-making, generating combined defensive 
avoidance (Keck, 1997; Janis and Mann, 1977). However, due to the ambiguous and 
difficult nature of risk disclosure decisions, a common understanding of the nature of 
risk disclosure could be fundamental. Therefore, members of the top management 
team with extended tenure could cultivate a more precise shared cognitive structure 
regarding the nature of risk disclosure decisions. Furthermore, extended tenure 
enables board members to better evaluate the surrounding environment of banks’ 
risk disclosure. Therefore, the following hypothesis was formulated: 
H10: There is a positive relationship between tenure of the board and risk 
disclosure.  
5.5.8.3 Education Levels 
Prior literature has indicated that educational background affects strategic decision 
making procedures and outcomes (Hitt and Tyler, 1991). Moreover, it ensures better 
monitoring and the effectiveness of top management boards in light of agency theory 
(Allini at al., 2016). Also, it is an important determinant in the disclosure exercise 
(Farook et al., 2011; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Therefore, Hambrick and Mason 
(1984) claimed that executives with superior educational qualifications are better 
able to embrace new and innovative actions as well as uncertainty. Moreover, 
educational qualifications could be perceived as an important institutional asset, 
which may influence accounting values and exercises (Gray, 1988). Top executives 
with a strong educational background tend to have superior technical knowledge and 
a more open-minded attitude to risk disclosure decisions, which could lead to the 
reduction of information asymmetry (Domhoff, 1983). However, Guner et al. (2008) 
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stated that there is a dearth of empirical studies on the association between board 
effectiveness and educational background. Only a few studies have examined this 
relationship empirically and revealed the same results. Gul and Leung (2002) and 
Allini et al. (2015) reported a negative association between educational background 
and risk disclosure. Therefore, the following hypothesis has been formulated:  
H11: There is a negative association between educational background of the 
board and the risk disclosure.  
5.5.8.4 Diversity 
Top management team diversity is referred to as the heterogeneity of top executive 
teams regarding age, gender, tenure, educational background, nationality, ethnicity 
and functional background (Williams and O’Reilly, 1998; Simons et al., 1999; Walt 
and Ingley, 2003; Carter et al., 2003; Kang et al., 2007; Allini et al., 2016). Moreover, 
Shaw and Barrett-Power (1998) affirmed that diversity is a progressively significant 
element in institutions, which are becoming more diverse in respect of age, 
nationality, background, gender, ethnicity and other demographic traits. It has also 
been determined that when disentangling complex, non-routine issues, diverse 
groups are more efficient as they include a collection of personalities with different 
proficiencies, experience, capabilities and viewpoints. It has also been illustrated that 
boards with diverse membership with different abilities make more novel and higher 
quality decisions than boards with less diverse membership (Bantel and Jackson, 
1989). The literature shows that numerous variables influence the association 
between diversity (based on nationality) and board decision-making (in the case of 
this study, this could be the decision to disclose or withhold any risk information 
disclosures). Furthermore, risk disclosure studies have found that diversity 
significantly influences risk disclosure (Allini et al., 2016). Based on the above 
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discussion, the following hypothesis was formulated: 
H12: There is a positive association between diversity of the top management 
team and the degree of risk disclosure 
5.5.9 Control variables  
Control variables are incorporated in this study to reduce the influence of the above-
stated determinants. This study incorporates as control variables size and 
profitability, which are discussed in the subsequent section. These are also in 
accordance with some prior literature (Elshandidy et al., 2013; Nitm et al., 2013; Khlif 
and Hussainey, 2014; Allini et al., 2016; Elshandidy and Neri, 2015). 
5.5.9.1 Size 
Company size variable is one of the most extensively used and associated variables 
with risk disclosure as well as being a forceful driver for disclosure. However, 
company size proxies a number of disclosure theories, which make it confusing and 
difficult to interpret the size real effect and its meaning becomes uncertain 
(Raffournier, 1997). However, there is a wider range of theoretical explanations for 
the correlation between company size and risk disclosure.   
There are a number of prior investigations, which have employed company size as a 
representative for political costs. For instance, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) 
claimed that political expenditures are greater in large corporations than in small 
companies, owing to their large shareholders/investors base. Moreover, Linsley and 
Shrives (2000) argued that large firms entice greater media, public and politicians 
attention. According, Cooke (1989a) cutting political expenditures could offer 
motivations for directors to report more information. Also, a number of studies 
proclaimed that large corporations have effective information systems in place, which 
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makes reporting supplementary information less expensive than the case in their 
smaller counterparties. 
On the other hand, Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) claimed that proprietary costs 
connected with the competitive disadvantages of reportage are reduced as firm size 
expands. Disclosure is an expensive practice and requires the employment of 
professional staff to execute the process of disclosing, therefore large companies 
tend to have the financial means for the execution of this process. Moreover, 
shareholders theory is employed to interpret risk reportage behaviour. In a study 
completed by Amran et al., (2009) the authors accomplished that as the organisation 
develop in size, the number of investors’ enlarges. Thereafter, it is predicted that the 
weight of disclosure becomes greater to fulfil their requirements. Further, Linsley and 
Shrives (2006) affirmed that investors might have a belief that bigger organisations 
should offer more publicities or the investors might have different desires for firm 
information and bigger organisations might answer to their expectations or desires.       
Furthermore, Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) stated that in large corporations the 
amount of external capital tends to be excessive for example, majority of their assets 
are borrowed from financial institutions. Therefore, the difficulty is great in the notion 
that larger corporations encounter more risky uncertain situations. Moreover, bigger 
corporations possess a wide range of divergent operations and encounter more 
difficulty compared to smaller companies, therefore it is anticipated that they possess 
more risks and information to report to their clients (Abraham et al., 2007). Although, 
Deumes and Knechel (2008) claimed that high inherent risk makes it more probable 
that faults befall in disclosing risks on to clients.   
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Nonetheless, the empirical evidence of disclosure investigations indicated that the 
impact of company size on risk reportage is diverse. Some researches established 
no relationship among company size and risk disclosure such as Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2004; Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and Kinney, 2007; Doyle, Ge and McVay, 
2007. Whereas, majority of the other empirical results demonstrated that there was a 
positive and significant relationship between size and risk disclosure for example, 
McNally et al., 1982; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Linsley and Shrives, 2006, 
Abraham and Cox, 2007, Deumes and Knechel, 2008, Barakat and Hussainey, 2013, 
Elshandidy et al, 2013, Nitm et al, 2013. Although, there are some studies, which 
reported negative correlation between both variables such as Lajili and Zeghal 2005, 
and Hill and Short 2009. The current study expects a positive relationship between 
the level of voluntary risk disclosure and size of the bank.   
5.5.9.2 Profitability 
Profitability is employed as a company performance proxy, which is of a major 
interest to end users of annual statements. Therefore, signalling theory will lead to 
corporate managers wanting to signal their excellent risk management abilities to 
investors through reporting risks in their companies’ annual reports (Konishi and Ali, 
2007). Moreover, Elshandidy et al. (2013) stated that high-profitability companies 
have superior incentives to signal the quality of their performance and their capability 
to administer risks effectively. Also, it has been established that managers of highly 
preformed companies would be willing to report more information so as to signal 
good news, enhance company’s image and managerial abilities in overseeing risks 
to the market to entice more investment (Iatridis, 2008).  
Furthermore, it is assumed that profitable corporations are better and have effective 
risk management systems since they have more resources obtainable to them to 
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invest in internal control and risk management systems (Deumes and Knechel, 
2008). These systems could imply the identification and management of risks at their 
early phases, which sequentially the corporation benefits from in preventing such 
losses and augmenting their profitability and performance. Therefore, investors of 
such corporations demand fewer disclosures concerning risks and company 
management that leads to the demotivation of management to intensify internal risk 
reportage.  On the other hand, Skinner (1994) argued that bad performance elevates 
managers’ incentives to report all types of risk related information and ensure 
stockholders about the corporation’s future prospects in order to circumvent the 
adverse effect of future litigation risks.   
However, empirical investigations have evident a mixture of findings between risk 
reportage and profitability. Where, on the one hand Mohobbot, (2005), Deumes and 
Knechel (2008) and Miihkinen, (2012) outcomes indicated a positive association 
between risk disclosure and profitability. On the other hand, Lajili and Zeghal, (2005), 
Neri (2010) and Oliveira et al., (2011) discovered a negative relationship among 
profitability and risk reporting. This study predicts a positive relationship between the 
level of voluntary risk disclosure and profitability.   
5.6 Methodology and Data   
This section describes the research design of this investigation, including sample, 
data collection and techniques used to accomplish the aims of this research.  
5.6.1 Sample and Data Collection 
Following prior literature on the subject (Lipunga, 2014; Barakat and Hussainey, 
2013), this study excluded all non-financial corporations.  Financial institutions are by 
nature risk-oriented institutions unlike non-financial corporations, and therefore their 
disclosure ought to be considered independently (Linsley and Shrives, 2005, 2006; 
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Barakat and Hussainey, 2013). This research encompasses all listed banks on the 
Tadawul Stock Market. 
 Annual reports are used in this investigation because of their wide coverage and 
availability. This study’s focus on annual reports is due to their being the main source 
of information for shareholders as well as their growing use in statements, showing 
their value to user groups (Elshandidy et al., 2013; Barakat and Hussainey, 2013; 
Elshandidy and Neri, 2015). This is concurrent with Marston and Shrives (1991), who 
described them as the “main disclosure vehicle” and argued that annual reports are 
the most complete financial statements accessible to investors. Moreover, Beattie et 
al. (2002) affirmed that annual reports provide comprehensive narratives, information 
as well as explaining accounting figures, sketches and presents perspectives. Also 
they corroborate quantitative measures incorporated in the financial reports (Chugh 
and Meador, 1984). (For further argument please see section 4.6.4)  
5.6.2 Content Analysis Approach  
Such studies analyse the information content revealed in annual reports and 
acknowledge words and themes within the textual material (Beattie et al., 2004; 
Brennan, 2001). Therefore, when analysing the content of a written document, words, 
phrases and sentences are coded against a specific schema of interest (Bowman, 
1984). In terms of this study, the annual reports of all banks are coded against a set 
of words in order to quantify the level of risk disclosure reported in their annual 
reports over the five-year period. Krippendorff (1980: 21) described content analysis 
as “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data”. Also, 
Bowman (1984) argued that content analysis facilitates the collection of rich data 
since it can reveal relationships that other techniques cannot. However, a weakness 
of content analysis is that it is subjective (Linsley and Shrives, 2006). Therefore, 
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validation practices are often used to override this problem (Bowman, 1984). (For 
further argument see section 4.6.5) 
5.6.3 Risk Disclosure Index Development 
See Section 4.7 
5.6.4 Reliability and Validity Measures  
See Section 4.7.1 
5.6.5 Multicollinearity issues 
This is an important assumption which has to be met under the multiple regressions 
to ensure that no perfect multicollinearity occurs between the independent variables 
(Field, 2009). This is important since the occurrence of serious multicollinearity in the 
regression models could inflate standards errors for the coefficients of the 
explanatory variables (Wallace et al., 1994; Gujarati, 2003). In this study the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is used to inspect the existence of multicollinearity. 
This is in line with prior research such as Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, (2005), which 
employed the VIF to check for any multicollinearity in their study. However, the 
degree to which the correlation among the variables is perfect or harmful differs. 
Tabachnich and Fidell (1996) advocated that the correlation coefficient should not 
exceed 0.7 in order to avoid any noises in the model. Where, Gujarati, (2003) 
proposed that as a rule of thumb serious multicollinearity happens when the 
correlation coefficient exceeds 0.8. However, some literature suggested that for 
serious multicollinearity to occur, the VIF must exceeds the 10 marks (Neter et al., 
1983; Naser et al., 2006).  
5.6.6 Regression Model 
This study uses the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model to 
examine the relationship between risk disclosure in the annual reports and both 
corporate governance mechanisms and demographic traits in all Saudi listed banks: 
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RISKD it= β0 it +β1CHS it +β2 NOSH-FACTOR it +β3 BSIZE it +β4 INDEP it 
+β5 NON it +β6 ACINDEP+β7 ACSIZE it +β8 ACMEET it +β9 EDUC it +β10 TENU 
it+β11 GENDER it + β12 DIVERSITY it+ β13 SIZE it + β14 PROF it + β15 
ISLAMIC.DUM it + β16 YEA.DUM it +                                  (2) 
 
Where: RISKD = risk disclosure score  
β0 = the intercept  
Β1….. β16 = regression coefficients (See Table 9 for explanation) 
 ɛ = error term  
I = Bank  
T = Year 
 
Dependent variable: risk disclosure score. Following prior studies (Linsley and 
Shrives, 2006; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Abdallah et al., 2015), content analysis 
is used to measure the level of risk disclosure in the annual reports. The number of 
risk-related words is used as a measure of risk disclosure levels.  
Independent variables: To examine the determinants of risk disclosure, corporate 
governance and demographic traits, information was collected from different sources. 
Table 9 summarizes the measurement and definition of those variables. 
Table 9: Summary of variable names, description and sources 
Abbreviated 
name 
Full name 
Variable 
description 
Predicted 
Sign 
Data source Prior studies 
Dependent variables 
RISKD Risk 
disclosure  
Risk disclosure 
level based on risk 
index  
 Annual 
reports 
Linsley and Shrives, 
(2006); Elzahar and 
Hussainey, (2012); 
Abdallah et al., 
(2015)  
Independent variables 
1. Corporate Governance characteristics   
BSIZE Board size Number of board 
members 
+ Annual 
report 
Elshandidy and Neri 
(2015); Elzahar and 
Hussainey (2012); 
CHS Internal 
Ownership 
Percentage of 
shares held by 
internal 
shareholders 
- DataStream Elshandidy et al. 
(2013); Marshall and 
Weetman, (2007); 
Elshandidy, (2014) 
NOCH-Factor  External 
Ownership  
Percentage of 
shares held by 
external 
shareholders  
+ DataStream Elshandidy et al. 
(2013); Elshandidy 
and Neri (2015); 
Elshandidy, (2014) 
INDEP Independent 
directors 
Number of non-
executive directors  
on the board of 
directors 
+ Bloomberg 
Annual 
Report 
Alergini and Greco 
(2013); Allini et al. 
(2016); Allini et al., 
(2014) 
171 | P a g e  
NON Non-
executive 
directors 
Dummy variable 1 
if board contains 
non-executive 
directors and 0 
otherwise. 
+ Bloomberg 
Annual 
Report  
Elshandidy et al. 
(2013); Nitm et al. 
(2013); Elshandidy 
and Neri (2015);   
ACINDEP Audit 
committee 
independence  
Proportion of non-
executive director 
on board. 
+ Bloomberg 
Annual 
Report 
Oliveira et al., 
(2011b); Neri, (2010) 
ACSIZE Audit 
committee 
size 
Number of audit 
committee 
members 
+ Annual 
report 
Elzahar and 
Hussainey (2012);  
ACMEET Audit 
committee 
meetings 
Number of audit 
committee 
meetings 
+ Annual 
report 
Karamanou and 
Vafeas (2005); 
Alergini and Greco 
(2013); Allini et al. 
(2016) 
2. Demographic characteristics 
EDUC Education 
Levels 
Dummy variable 1 
if one of the board 
members holds a 
PhD and 0 
otherwise. 
+ Annual 
report 
Allini et al. (2016) 
TENU Tenure Dummy variable 1 
if the number of 
years the board 
member 
permanence on 
the board is above 
the sample 
median of 5 years, 
0 otherwise.  
+ Annual 
report 
Chung et al., (2015) 
GENDER Gender 
Diversity  
Dummy variable 1 
if board contains 
female directors 
and 0 otherwise. 
+ Annual 
report 
Allini et al. (2016); 
Nitm et al. (2013); 
Allini et al. (2014) 
DIVE Diversity 
(Based on 
Nationality)  
Dummy variable 1 
if board contains 
more than one 
nationality and 0 
otherwise. 
+ Annual 
report 
Nitm et al. (2013); 
Allini et al. (2016); 
3. Firm-specific characteristics (Control Variables) 
SIZE Bank size Natural logarithm 
of total assets 
+ DataStream Elzahar and 
Hussainey (2012); 
(2007); Mokhtar and 
Mellet, (2013);  
PROF Profitability ROA (Return On 
Assets) 
+ DataStream  Elzahar and 
Hussainey 
(2012);Elshandidy 
and Neri (2015) 
ISLAMIC.DUM Islamic 
dummy 
variable 
Dummy variable 1 
if the bank is 
Islamic and 0 
otherwise  
+ SAMA Abdullah et al., 
(2015) 
This table provides the description and measures of risk disclosure reporting, as dependent variables, and 
firm characteristics, corporate governance mechanism and demographic traits as independent variables. It 
also provides the source of each variable. 
172 | P a g e  
5.7 Empirical analysis  
5.7.1 Descriptive analysis 
Table 10 shows the main descriptive statistics for the corporate governance 
variables and the demographic traits used in the analysis of the sample banks in this 
investigation. It shows the minimum, maximum, statistical mean, standard deviation, 
skewness and kurtosis. Firstly, it shows that the mean total voluntary risk disclosure 
reported by all sample banks is 66.03%. It also shows that there is a large variation 
in reporting voluntary risk disclosure between the sampled banks, with a minimum of 
51% and a maximum of 78%. It also shows that the mean of CHS holdings is 19% 
and the mean of NOCH-Factor ownership is 29.5%, while the mean board size is 10 
directors, with a mean of 7 members of the board in the sample banks consisting of 
non-executive directors. Furthermore, the table shows that the independent directors 
mean is 5, with a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 8 independent directors. 
Secondly, the audit committee (AC) independence mean is .75, whereas the audit 
committee size ranges from 2 to 5 directors, with a mean of 3. There is also a large 
variation in the number of AC meetings between the sample banks, with a minimum 
of 3 meetings, a maximum of 11 and a mean of 5. 33.3% from the selected banks 
are Islamic and 66.6% are non-Islamic banks. Finally, this table also shows the 
demographic traits of the top management teams included in the descriptive analysis, 
which are gender diversity, tenure, education levels and diversity (based on 
nationality). It is also important to note that all of these variables have been treated 
as a dummy variable (1-0).  Where gender scored an overall mean of .08, tenure of 
the top board of directors scored a total mean of .6, while education scored a total 
mean of .7 and diversity scored a total mean of .3 in the entire sample of this 
investigation. 
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Table 10:  Descriptive statistics 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Devi Skewness Kurtosis 
RISKD 60 .51 .78 .6603 .07059 -.503 -.488 
CHS 60 .00 69.00 19.1000 17.46056 .858 .102 
NOCH 60 25.00 45.00 29.5000 5.08091 1.016 .127 
BOARDSIZE 60 7.00 11.00 9.5500 .94645 -.211 -.259 
INDEP 60 3.00 8.00 5.1333 1.62049 .370 -1.081 
NON 60 1 11 7.37 2.718 -.538 -.878 
ACINDEP 60 .00 1.00 .7500 .43667 -1.185 -.619 
ACSIZE 60 2.00 5.00 3.7667 .96316 .021 -1.219 
ACMEET 60 3.00 11.00 5.3667 1.95688 1.092 .883 
GENDER 60 .00 1.00 .0833 .27872 3.093 7.826 
TENURE 60 .00 1.00 .6000 .49403 -.419 -1.889 
EDUCATION 60 .00 1.00 .7000 .46212 -.895 -1.241 
DIVERSITY 60 .00 1.00 .3333 .47538 .725 -1.526 
SIZE 60 7.24 8.58 7.9940 .35203 -.447 -.831 
ROA 60 -.01 .04 .0192 .00869 -.636 3.124 
ISLAMIC.DUM 60 .00 1.00 .3333 .47538 .725 -1.526 
RISKD: Risk disclosure score (based on an unweighted disclosure index); CHS: Internal ownership (Percentage of 
shares held by internal shareholders); NOCH-Factor: External ownership (Percentage of shares held by all external 
shareholders); BSIZE: Board size (Number of board members); INDEP: Independent directors (Number of non-
executive directors  on the board of directors); NON: Non-executive directors (Dummy variable 1 if board contains 
non-executive directors and otherwise 0); ACINDEP: Audit committee independence (Dummy variable; 1 if audit 
committee independence exists, and 0 otherwise); ACSIZE: Audit committee size (Number of audit committee 
members); ACMEET: Audit committee meetings (Number of audit committee meetings); GENDER: Gender 
(Number of females on the board); TENU: Tenure (Dummy variable 1 if the number of years the board member 
permanence on the board is above the sample median of 5 years, otherwise 0); EDUC: Education (Number of 
board members holding a PhD); DIVE: Diversity (Number of other nationalities of the board ); SIZE: Bank size 
(Natural logarithm of total assets); PROF: Profitability (Return On Assets)  
5.7.2 Regression analysis  
The analysis of the level of voluntary risk disclosure of all Saudi listed banks and 
their determinants led to some concrete results. Where five of the independent 
variables, namely Noch-Factor, audit committee meetings, gender diversity, 
education levels and ROA, are the main variables directing risk disclosure decisions 
in Saudi listed banks. The model summary (at the bottom of the regression table 
below) demonstrates that the R square and adjusted R square are high for the study 
under consideration, where both R square and adjusted R square are high at .706 
and .576, respectively, supporting the explanatory power of the model. The Durbin-
Watson test confirmed that there is no autocorrelation problem with the data. 
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Moreover, the summary below indicates that the model is significant, with an F value 
of 5.458, confirming the fitness of the model used for the purpose of this study. 
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Table 11: Pearson correlation Matrix 
  RISKD CHS NOCH BOARDSIZE INDEP NON ACINDEP ACSIZE ACMEET GENDER TENURE EDUCATION DIVERSITY SIZE ROA ISLAMIC 
RISKD 1 -0.129 .411** -0.107 -0.171 -0.095 0.074 0.136 0.054 0.093 -.356** -0.241 .375** .479** .271* -.488** 
CHS  1 -.492** .364** 0.195 .290* -0.190 0.243 0.196 0.061 0.195 -0.059 -.261* 0.006 .329* 0.204 
NOCH   1 0.073 -0.248 -.308* .325* -0.062 0.153 -0.215 -0.218 -0.173 .547** 0.071 -0.227 -0.214 
BOARDSIZE    1 -0.038 .467** -0.072 0.013 .566** 0.016 0.007 -0.081 0.226 0.101 .283* .264* 
NON      1 0.050 .454** .459** 0.138 -0.103 0.251 0.114 -0.052 0.200 0.074 
ACINDEP       1 0.141 -0.089 0.174 -0.079 .294* .408** -0.225 -.279* -.408** 
ACSIZE        1 0.190 -0.242 0.121 -0.046 -0.086 0.019 0.219 0.025 
ACMEET         1 -0.212 0.014 0.030 -0.024 -0.055 0.158 .304* 
GENDER          1 -0.246 0.197 .426** -0.166 -0.181 -0.213 
TENURE           1 0.134 -.433** -0.126 0.039 0.217 
EDUCATION            1 0.077 -0.211 -0.148 -.309* 
DIVERSITY             1 0.112 -0.055 -.500** 
SIZE              1 .529** -.535** 
ROA               1 -0.055 
ISLAMIC                1 
For variables explanations see table 10.  Note that ** and * indicate that there is a correlation significant at the 0.01 and at the 0.05 between the respective factors respectively.  
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Table 11, the Pearson correlation matrix is deployed to measure the strength and the 
direction of the linear relationship between any two variables. The results above in 
the correlation coefficient demonstrate a positively significant correlation between the 
level of risk disclosure and NOCH-Factor at a value of .411**. They also show the 
same relationship between board diversity at a value of .375**, size at 479**, 
profitability at .271* and the level of voluntary risk disclosure. Moreover, the 
correlation matrix indicates a negatively significant association between tenure at a 
value of -.356**, Islamic at -0.488** and the level of voluntary risk disclosure 
practices. However, the table shows that the highest correlation was between bank 
size and the level of risk disclosure at .479**. Moreover, table 11 shows that there 
are insignificant associations between CHS, board size, independent directors, non-
executive directors, audit committee independence, audit committee size, audit 
committee meetings, gender diversity, tenure and education levels with the level of 
voluntary risk disclosure reported by all Saudi listed banks.  
Table 12: Regression results for the corporate governance and the 
demographic variables 
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients  
t 
 
Sig. 
 
VIF 
B Std. Error 
Constant 0.310 0.363 0.854 0.398  
CHS -6.178 0.001 -0.096 0.924 3.675 
NOCH 0.008 0.003 2.823 0.007 6.114 
BOARDSIZE -0.018 0.014 -1.310 0.198 5.098 
INDEP 0.009 0.006 1.336 0.189 3.181 
NON -0.003 0.005 -0.571 0.571 5.354 
ACINDEP -0.028 0.024 -1.163 0.252 3.182 
ACSIZE 0.012 0.009 1.272 0.211 2.378 
ACMEET 0.010 0.005 2.059 0.046 2.826 
GENDER 0.114 0.034 3.371 0.002 2.579 
TENURE -0.024 0.016 -1.492 0.143 1.766 
EDUCATION -0.039 0.019 -2.008 0.051 2.308 
DIVERSITY -0.031 0.032 -0.940 0.353 6.891 
SIZE 0.026 0.049 0.535 0.595 8.639 
168 | P a g e  
ROA 2.832 1.036 2.734 0.009 2.347 
ISLAMIC vs. Non-Islamic -0.063 0.040 -1.568 0.125 7.559 
Model Summary  
Adjusted R square 0 .591 
F value 4.484 
P Value 0.000 
For variables explanations see table 10. Note that “+” indicates that there is a positive correlation or a 
proof of influence exists between the respective factors and “-“indicates that there is a negative correlation 
or proof. 
  
This study uses Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression analysis to examine the 
determinants of the level of voluntary risk disclosure in all Saudi listed banks. The 
coefficients table above demonstrates the interrelationships between the risk 
disclosure score as the dependent variable and a number of corporate governance 
attributes and demographic traits variables as independents. Also the table above 
shows the interrelationships between the two firm-specific variables as control and 
the level of risk disclosure. Thus, before conducting the regression analysis, 
multicollinearity was tested by employing the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) to detect 
any noises in the model. When carried out for the purpose of this investigation, this 
statistical test gave no indication of multicollinearity problems as shown in the table 
above. Since the VIF did not exceed 10 for any variable in any model, it was 
concluded that collinearity was not a serious problem (Neter et al., 1983; Naser et al., 
2006). Moreover, it can be seen from the regression results table above that there is 
a positive significant relationship between NOCH-Factor, audit committee meetings, 
gender, size, profitability and voluntary risk disclosure in listed banks on Tadawul. 
The coefficients on the variables are positive and statistically significant 
at .05, .05, .01, .01 and .05, respectively. Also, the table shows that there is a 
negatively significant association between board education and risk disclosure, with 
a coefficient value of .05, while the rest of the independent variables of both 
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corporate governance mechanisms and demographic traits are insignificantly 
correlated with the level of voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi Arabia.        
5.8 Discussion   
This investigation found that ownership structure has a significant effect on the level 
of voluntary risk disclosure. These findings are in line with prior empirical findings 
which indicate that corporations with higher outsider ownership (as proxied by 
NOCH-Factor) are more likely to provide considerably higher levels of risk disclosure 
(Elshandidy et al., 2013; Abraham and Cox, 2007). Also, these results are in line with 
both agency theory and information asymmetry theory, which both propose that 
directors are only driven to offer higher levels of voluntary risk disclosure when there 
is a widely dispersed ownership structure to mitigate information asymmetries owing 
to external pressures (Mohobbot, 2005; Lajili and Zeghal, 2005), implying that H2 is 
empirically supported. In regards to ownership the results show that 29.5% which is 
higher than internal ownership (19.1%) in all listed banks. This pressurise the 
directors to disclose more risk information.  
Also, the coefficient on audit committee meetings is .012 and is significant at value 
of .05 significance level. These findings show that banks with high frequency of audit 
committee meetings are more motivated to disclose more voluntary risk information. 
Such results are consistent with prior empirical findings by Karamanou and Vafeas 
(2005) and Allegrini and Greco, (2013). Also, this outcome is consistent with the 
agency theory, whereby internal and external monitoring practices complement each 
other in reducing agency conflicts and information asymmetry between different 
types of stockholders, implying that H8 is empirically supported.  
 The result shows that the average audit committee meetings during the year are 5 
times. This average is matching with Eow (2003) who found that the audit committee 
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in Malaysia should meet at least five times in a year. The number of audit committee 
meetings might be a measure of carefulness and, therefore, audit committee 
effectiveness. Consequently, frequency of audit committee meetings is positively 
related to risk disclosure. Menon and Williams (1994) found that audit committee 
independence is unlikely to be effective unless the committee is also active (i.e. 
meets frequently). An audit committee that holds fewer meetings is perceived to be 
less likely to pursue their duties diligently. Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) perceived an 
effective audit committee to be a function of audit committee members’ desire to 
carry out their duties. Menon and Williams (1994) agree with Kalbers and Fogarty 
but pointed to the number of committee meetings as a measure of that desire. This 
finding was validated by Abbot et al. (2000), who opined that the desire to fulfil audit 
committee responsibilities is signalled by the number of audit committee meetings. 
Yet, the other corporate governance variables (CHS, INDEP, NON, BSIZE, 
ACINDEP and ACSIZE) are found to have an insignificant correlation with the level 
of voluntary risk disclosure in all Saudi listed banks.    
In terms of the demographic characteristics, table 12 shows that banks with women 
on the top management board of directors are more likely to disclose voluntary risk 
disclosure. The coefficient on gender diversity is 0.117 and is significant at the 0.01 
significance level. This effect is consistent with the previous empirical findings of 
Nitm et al. (2013) and Allini et al. (2016). Also, Adams and Ferreira (2009) reported 
that women on top management teams influence decisions positively. Moreover, this 
is consistent with the upper echelons theory, which proposes that top management 
demographic characteristics, such as gender, could influence strategic decision-
making such as the decision to report voluntary risk disclosure, implying that H9 is 
empirically supported.  
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Even though the presence of women is only 8% of the boards of Saudi banks, it 
positively contributes towards the level of voluntary risk disclosure as the results 
exhibit. Which, suggest that more women should be included in the boardrooms. 
Despite the fact that women participation in the boardroom is very much restricted 
due to segregation of women from men in the Islamic teachings and a tradition deep-
rooted the country they positively affect the levels of risk disclosure. This association 
is in line with the argument suggested by the upper echelons theory implying that 
certain organizational demographic attributes such as gender affect strategic 
decision-makings and hence performance. Looking at it within the scope of this study 
gender is an attribute of top board members and a driver of risk disclosure in Saudi 
banks. This is suggesting that women directors improve the effectiveness of the 
board and enhance transparency. This finding is in line with results obtained by 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Allini et al., (2016).  
 This study finds a negative association between board education levels and risk 
disclosure, since the coefficient is -0.039 statistically significant at 5%. This outcome 
is consistent with Gul and Leung (2002) and Allini et al., (2016). Therefore, the H11 
is accepted. This relationship is concurrent with the the upper echelons theory which 
proposes that top management demographic attributes influence firms strategic 
decision-makings i.e. the revelation of risk disclosure and ensures better monitoring 
and the effectiveness of top management boards. Moreover, this outcome adds to 
the literature on such relationship, since the literature argues that there is a scarcity 
of empirical evidence on the relationship between board education levels and board 
effectiveness (Güner et al., 2008). The findings of this study do not support that the 
following demographic traits variables (TENU and DIVE) have a significant 
relationship with risk disclosure is Saudi Arabian listed banks.  
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Additionally, for the control variables, the findings report that the coefficient on 
profitability is 2.644 and is significant at a .05 percentage level. This effect is 
consistent with prior literature that examined profitability in relation to risk disclosure 
and observed the same findings (Deumes and Knechel 2008; Miihkinen, 2012; Khlif 
and Hussainey, 2014). This association between profitability and risk disclosure is 
also consistent with signalling theory. Helbok and Wagner (2006) and Linsley et al. 
(2006) confirmed that banks with superior risk management techniques tend to have 
greater levels of profitability, and hence directors have greater incentives to signal 
their performance and their capacity to manage risk successfully. Moreover, 
managers of companies with high profitability would tend to provide more risk 
information in order to justify their present performance to the shareholders as well 
as to justify their compensations to the firm’ owners. This justification is matching 
with Agency theory which argues that corporate managers of profitable corporations 
are motivated to disclose more information to increase their compensation (Abd El 
Salam, 1999). This positive correlation may be justified based on the fact that 
corporate boards of highly profitable firms are more likely to disclose more 
information to increase stockholders’ confidence and to raise capital at the lowest 
cost (Marston and Polei, 2004).  
5.9 Summary  
This investigation sought to empirically examine the impact of corporate governance 
and top team demographic traits on the levels of voluntary risk disclosure practices 
and to identify the determinants of voluntary risk disclosure practices in all Saudi 
listed banks from 2009 to 2013. The empirical findings show that banks with high 
outsider ownership, high profitability, high regularity of audit committee meetings and 
mixed gender diversity on the top management board of directors are more likely to 
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demonstrate higher levels of voluntary risk disclosure practices. Also, the level of 
voluntary risk disclosure is negatively affected by high board education level. 
Moreover, as can be seen from the empirical findings of this investigation, external 
ownership, audit committee meetings, gender diversity, board education and 
profitability are primary determinants of voluntary risk disclosure practices in listed 
banks on the Saudi Exchange Stock Market (Tadawul), while the rest of the 
independent variables of both corporate governance mechanisms and demographic 
traits are insignificantly correlated with the levels of voluntary risk disclosure 
practices in Saudi banks.  
The findings of this study have several important implications, by informing banks’ 
stockholders, regulatory bodies and any other interested groups about the 
importance of corporate governance and demographic determinants, which can be 
used to augment voluntary risk reporting in the banking industry in an effort to ensure 
information adequacy and increased market efficiency. The reported findings should 
be useful to accounting and risk regulators by providing information about the 
inadequacies of risk disclosure in Saudi and a more complete picture of risk 
components and determinants in listed banks. While this study does not explore the 
risk profiles of Islamic banks directly, the results somehow propose that Islamic 
banks are more likely to be risk-averse than their non-Islamic counterparts 
suggesting a worthy field for future research. These implications could extend to the 
governance, board demography and risk disclosure literature by theoretically 
justifying and empirically investigating the implications of such determinants and 
theories in regards to voluntary risk disclosure in the banking sector. This focus is 
significant because it provides insights into the determinants of voluntary risk 
disclosure in banks that operate in an environment regarded as being invariably 
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opaque. Further research could also consider the use of bootstrapping to increase 
the use of the data.  
The following chapter measures the economic consequences of risk disclosure. It 
examines the effect of the level of voluntary risk disclosure on firm value.    
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6 Chapter Six: Value relevance of voluntary risk disclosure levels: 
Evidence from Saudi banks 
6.1 Overview   
The need for financial reporting and disclosure raises from increased information 
asymmetry gaps and agency conflicts between insiders (managers) and outsiders 
(investors) (Kothari et al., 2009). However, corporate disclosures can assists in 
reducing such information gaps, ease such conflicts augment the credibility of such 
financial reportage, and complement the role of accounting information in relation to 
firm value (FV). Previous researches have studies the consequences of disclosure 
on market valuation of firm (Klein et al., 2005). Enhanced accessibility of corporate 
information can enhance the capital market efficiency and entice more investors 
(Wang et al., 2008). Hassan et al., (2009) reported that disclosure is employed as an 
instrument to moderate agency costs ascending from the likelihood that insiders 
might not act in the best interest of investors. It has also been argued by Pagano et 
al., (2002) that disclosure is an instrument which permits stakeholders to enlarge 
their ability in monitoring and improving the valuation of the firm. 
The literature on the economic consequences of disclosure has mostly explored 
well-developed economies and focused on non-risk voluntary disclosure (Healy and 
Palepu, 1993; Clarkson et al., 1996; Baek et al., 2004; Nekhili et al., 2012; 2015). In 
addition, Hassan et al. (2009) claimed that all the empirical findings on disclosure are 
in line with finance-theory extrapolations, implying that greater public disclosure of 
information to investors and interested groups increases the valuation of the firm.  
Prior investigations have explored the relationship between voluntary disclosure and 
the cost of capital and stock liquidity (Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Easley and 
O’Hara, 2004; Healy et al., 1999; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000), and a small stream of 
literature has examined the relationship between voluntary disclosure and firm value 
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(Hassan et al., 2009; Nekhili et al., 2012, 2015; Uyar and Kilic, 2012). However, to 
the best of the researcher’s knowledge, all prior research on the latter relationship 
has been conducted on developed economies, whilst there is no empirical research 
focusing on this association in developing economies. Thus, the objective of this 
study is to examine the relationship between the levels of voluntary risk disclosure 
and firm value in a developing economy, Saudi Arabia. Preceding literature has 
examined disclosure levels of firms and determinants of disclosure; whereas, there is 
not a large body of research which examine the effect of disclosure on FV (Uyar and 
Kilic, 2012) yet the dearth is even greater when it comes to the effect of voluntary 
risk disclosure on firm value. Thus, there is a need for more elaboration on the value 
that corporate information have on risk disclosure in banks. 
This study is motivated by the fact that the effect of disclosure on firm value is still an 
empirical issue (Hassan et al., 2009). Further to this Al-Akra et al., (2010), has 
demounted that there is little empirical research to back the link between the two 
variables. Moreover, Hassan et al., (2009 p.80) has briefly touched upon this 
association by asserting that, “There is little direct empirical evidence with regard to 
the relationship between disclosure and firm value”. Hence, this research is 
motivated to conduct an empirical study in Saudi listed banks to demonstrate what 
the level of voluntary risk disclosure can add value for the sample banks. It is also 
motivated by the rarity of studies exploring the impact of the level of risk disclosure in 
relation to firm value. In addition, Vogel (2005) argued that the findings associated 
with the relationship between disclosure and firm value still remain inconclusive. 
Such inconclusiveness creates ground for further investigation not just for risk 
disclosure, but also for other kinds of disclosure. Furthermore, prior researches have 
claimed that the association between firm value and disclosure is sensitive to the 
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proxy used for valuation of the firm (Uyar and Kilic, 2012; Elzahar, 2013). The above 
argument also highlights the need for more research into this association. There is a 
dearth of academic examination that studies the potential economic consequences 
and valuation implications for banks. Finally, this study is motivated by the dearth of 
research on financial institutions reporting disclosures, risk disclosure and by the 
calls for more research on the valuation implications of such disclosures made by 
preceding studies (Hassan et al., 2009; Leuz and Wysocki, 2008). 
This study makes some contributions to the literature of risk disclosure and 
economic consequences. Even though, there have been a dearth of empirical 
studies studying the link between risk disclosure and market valuation in the banking 
sector, as far as the researcher knows, this is the first study to empirically investigate 
this relationship in Saudi banks. The study offers a unique contribution to the existing 
literature by looking at the economic consequences of risk disclosure in Saudi listed 
banks. This study also contributes to the literature on general accounting disclosure 
and in particular advances the literature on risk disclosure in developing economies 
by empirically examining the link between voluntary risk disclosure levels and the 
market valuation of banks in Saudi Arabia. It also contributes to the literature by 
extending the traditional research on corporate disclosure beyond the narrow focus 
of financial disclosure to include risk disclosure in relation to firm value. This study 
also contributes to the existing literature by indicating that there is a positive firm 
value arising from the levels of voluntary risk disclosure. It also contributes to the 
understanding of the role of accounting information in relation to the market valuation 
of a firm. Studies about such markets are required and are fundamental to 
ameliorating the weak transparency and disclosure situation through attracting the 
attention of regulatory institutions and corporation directors (Uyar and Kilic, 2012). 
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There is a lack of research investigating the impacts of risk disclosure on the firm 
value for banks in a developing country. Thus this study fills this gap.  
It has been suggested by previous literature that there is a positive link between the 
levels of disclosure in relation to firm value. However, this association continues to 
be vague whether rises in information can assure an enhanced market valuation of 
the firm for MTBV and ROA or not. Hence, the possible impact of risk disclosure on 
firm value is still an open empirical question particularly for banks in emerging 
markets. This study fills this gap in the literature by providing a direct analysis of the 
association between risk disclosure and firm value based on two different measures 
namely market to book value at the end of the year and profitability (MTBV and 
ROA). The first measure is a market based measure and the second is an 
accounting based measure.  This study focus is on banks in an emerging market 
context which offers a unique empirical setting which permits for a clearer and richer 
picture between their levels of voluntary risk disclosure and banks market valuation 
from well-developed countries. This investigation contributes to the literature by 
demonstrating that corporate risk disclosure is essential for efficient firm value. This 
proposes that policymakers, accounting and regulatory institutions such as SAMA, 
SOCOPA and the CMA might earnestly contemplate the quantity, quality and 
comprehensiveness of risk materials when endeavouring to facilitate capital market 
efficiency for Saudi listed banks by introducing a new form of risk disclosure’ 
measures. Prior economic consequences studies tend to concentrate on the cost of 
equity and remain silent in regards to the valuation of firms (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). 
The findings of this investigation produce some awareness to help directors who 
attempt to increase the market value of their banks. The evidences of this 
investigation on the influence of risk disclosure in relation to firm value contribute to 
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previous disclosure and risk disclosure literature by advancing the association 
between the two variables, which states that different proxies for firm value may 
have different effects on the level of risk disclosure.  
Preceding research has concentrated on other forms of economic consequences 
ignoring the market valuation of banks. The effects of augmented disclosure on cost 
of capital (Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Kothari et al., 2009) analysts’ forecasts (Wang 
et al., 2013) financial performance (Wang et al., 2008) and share price anticipation of 
earnings (Schleicher et al., 2007). This stream of literature is focused mostly on 
developed countries. There is a dearth of research investigating the link between 
disclosure and firm value stated Uyar and Kilic (2012), especially in developing 
economies. This stream of research is still in its early stage. However, to the best of 
the researcher knowledge research concerning the association between risk 
disclosure and firm value is absent in general and in particular in banks in developing 
markets. However, the economic consequences have not yet been empirically 
examined in banks in developing markets and in the case of this study in Saudi 
Arabia measuring the influence of risk disclosure on firm valuation.  
The empirical findings of this study indicate that the impact of the levels of voluntary 
risk disclosure on frim value vary depending on the proxy used for firm value. The 
results reported based on the market based measure show that there is a non-
significant relationship between firm value and the levels of voluntary risk disclosure 
(MTBV). The results generate from the accounting based measure (ROA) show that 
there is a positively significant association between the levels of risk disclosure and 
firm value. The reminder of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 discusses the 
theoretical framework, section 3 provides the literature review and hypothesis 
180 | P a g e  
development; section 4 discusses control variables, section 5 outlines the research 
design; section 6 discusses the results; and section 7 concludes.   
6.2 Theoretical framework 
An assertion has been made by Linsley and Shrives (2006) that there is a difficulty in 
considering any risk disclosure investigation, which is to clearly identify risk 
information. Thereforth, it is crucial to impeccably define risk. Yet, defining risk can 
be problematic as the level of management control over risk varies in accordance to 
the type of risk, for example, financial risk could be controlled by financial 
instruments and other risks are operational (Schrand and Elliott, 1998).  (For further 
discussion see section 4.3). Therefore, for the purpose of this study, the researchers 
adopted a well-defined and fit for purpose risk disclosure definition by Linsley and 
Shrives (2006, p.3), who defined risk reporting as “If the reader is informed of any 
opportunity or prospect or of any hazard, danger, harm, threat, or exposure, which 
has already impacted upon the company or may impact upon the company in the 
future or of the management of any such opportunity prospect, hazard, harm, threat 
or exposure”. (For further discussion see section 4.3) 
6.2.1 Risk Disclosure Theories  
A number of different theories have been proposed to explain why companies report 
risk information. However, there is no single theory which can explain the 
phenomena of disclosure as a whole, thus researchers tend to choose the most 
articulated theory with their study’s hypotheses (Linsley and Shrives, 2000). This 
section will consider the theoretical perspectives employed for the purpose of this 
study. 
Modern firms are reknowned by the detachment of ownership from control (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983) and this contributes to the widening information gap between 
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managers (insiders) and investors (outsiders). Thus, there is a great need for 
corporate risk disclosure as it represents a vital line of communications between the 
two parties.  Cooke (1989) argued that where there is a detachment of ownership 
from control, the likelihood of agency costs arises due to disagreement between 
shareholders and managers and between bondholders and shareholder-managers. 
Also, Healy and Palepu (2001), Verrecchia (2001) and Hassan et al., (2009) 
contended that the need for more corporate disclosure arises from the information 
asymmetry problem. Henceforth, enhancing voluntary disclosure can reduce such 
conflicts and lessen future corporate performance uncertainty as well as facilitate 
trading in shares hence increases firm valuation (Hassan et al., 2009).   
The influence of disclosure on firm value can be explained based on signalling and 
stakeholder theories. A number of prior researches have attempted to highlight the 
relationship between firm value and voluntary disclosure based on signalling theory 
(Gordon et al., 2010; Anam et al., 2011). All-inclusive disclosure indicates better 
corporate governance management and fewer agency conflicts, leading to a higher 
market valuation of the firm (Sheu et al., 2010).  In addition, Gordon et al. (2010) 
asserted that voluntary disclosure in annual reports sends a clear signal to the 
capital market that is likely to increase a firm’s present net value and in turn its stock 
market value. Gallego-Alvarez et al., (2010) argued that disclosure has a positive 
consequence on shareholder value creation. While, Cormier et al., (2011) claimed 
that, disclosure supplies value-relevant information to stock markets.  In essence, 
signalling theory implies that a company will try to signal good news to investors and 
other interested groups by disclosing more voluntarily (Oliveira et al., 2006). 
Moreover, Linsley and Shrives (2005) posited that signalling theory is the most 
relevant theory in terms of illuminating the phenomena of voluntary risk disclosure. 
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Furthermore, some previous investigations have reported that increasing the levels 
of voluntary disclosure culminates in less misevaluation of share prices, thus 
increasing firms’ market value (Anam et al., 2011).   
Moreover, according to the signalling theory, when a firm’s performance is good, 
directors will prefer to signal their firm’s performance to their investors and the rest of 
the market by reporting more supplementary information, whilst directors of firms that 
are performing badly do not. In fact, such disclosure by managers has many 
advantages, such as improved reputation of a firm, higher liquidity of stocks and 
increased market valuation of a firm, whereas when firms keep silent, investors and 
the rest of the market can misinterpret this as them withholding the worst possible 
information (Spence 1973; Verrecchia, 1983; Strong and Walker, 1987; Mohobbot, 
2005; Linsley and Shrives, 2000; 2006; Hassan, 2009). Increased information 
disclosure allows shareholders to make accurate assessments of the fundamental 
parameters in relation the future stock returns, decreasing non-diversifiable 
estimation risk and uncertainty in relation to future cash flows as well as future 
profitability (Clarkson et al., 1996). Also through augmented disclosure, the 
willingness for shareholders to trade is improved and enhances the liquidation of 
shares cultivating in an increased firm value (Easley and O’Hara, 2004). 
It has been noted that some organisations restrict their disclosures to only 
mandatory disclosure, whereas others might aim for more transparency and the 
disclosure of other supplementary information. Also, it has been established by prior 
investigations that traditional mandatory disclosure is unsuccessful in capturing value 
relevant information (Healy and Palepu, 1993; Hussainey and Walker, 2009), whilst 
previous literature has claimed that there are a number of advantages to voluntary 
disclosure (Nikhil et al., 2015). Moreover, directors could opt for more voluntarily 
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disclosure of information regarding their risk management and the methods used to 
deal with risks in their organisation as a means of conveying the firm’s genuine value 
to external investors (Merkley, 2014). Furthermore, increased voluntary disclosure is 
predicted to increase stock liquidity by diminishing transaction costs and raising the 
demand for shares hence increase future profitability. It is also predicted that 
improved disclosure will decrease uncertainty surrounding the estimation of stock 
returns. Furthermore, the rate of return required by company shareholders will be 
reduced, the company’s capital costs will plummet and the company’s market value 
will rise. Moreover, prior studies have found that increased information disclosure 
can impact upon a company’s market value by increasing the actual cash flow to 
investors as a consequence decreases agency conflicts (Lambert et al., 2007). 
The signalling theory will also act as a supporting theory in this investigation. This 
theory will also be the foundation in interpreting the results of the current study’s 
questions to further explain why banks are reporting such information.  The signalling 
theory is employed since it helps in explaining the relationship between firm value 
and the level of voluntary risk disclosure in this study. For the sake of knowing 
whether the disclosure in annual reports can offer beneficial information to 
stakeholders, and whether risk disclosure is value relevant for stakeholders or not, it 
is necessary to make clear the definition of stakeholders. In term of the current study, 
banks should consider who their stakeholders are.  Because without understanding 
who their stakeholders are, companies might not know how to offer the information 
which meets stakeholders’ interests. 
Stakeholder theory asserts that a company always deals with many users as their 
stakeholders. Stakeholders incorporate employees, shareholders, banks, insurance 
companies, government, local authorities and public administration, communities, 
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environment, even competitors, depositors, creditors, and borrowers. In addition, a 
community can also be a stakeholder which has the power to force a company to 
disclose its position. Therefore, corporations must uphold good communication 
channel with their stakeholders by revealing their performance timely and 
transparently. The information might not properly be accepted by all users 
(stakeholders), and noises may disturb the communications between sender (Bank) 
and users (stakeholders); resulting in stakeholders receiving inadequate/incomplete 
information that does not meet their needs. This theory will be used to support the 
analysis in order to answer the third research question, is risk disclosure value 
relevant or not?  If the information is rewarding for stakeholders, it means information 
is value relevant for stakeholders and meets with their interests.   
6.3 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development   
Out of the many studies reported in the literature, only a few have explored firm 
value and disclosure in developed countries (Healy et al., 1999; Leuz and Verrecchia, 
2000; Baek, Kang and Park, 2004; Da Silva and Alves, 2004; Uyar and Kilic, 2012; 
Elzahar et al., 2015) and only one study has examined firm value and disclosure in 
emerging economies (Hassan et al., 2009). To the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge, not a single study has explored the effect of voluntary risk disclosure on 
firm value and thus this is the first to do so. This dearth of literature makes this 
exploration of the relationship between firm value and voluntary risk disclosure in the 
context of Saudi Arabia all the more valuable.  
This study focuses particularly on the market valuation in relation to voluntary risk 
disclosure reported by all Saudi listed banks. It is worth noting that most of the 
preceding investigations into firm value have concentrated on disclosure in non-
financial corporation (Baek et al., 2004; Hassan et al., 2009; Nekhili et al., 2012; 
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2015; Elzahar et al., 2015), leaving the association between the two variables in the 
banking industry completely un-researched. This study is intended to shed light on 
the effect of banks’ voluntary risk disclosure on firm value in an emerging market. 
Risk disclosure in the banking industry is still relatively under-researched and suffers 
from major limitations (Oliveira et al., 2011a; Barakat and Hussainey, 2013).  This is 
of particular importance for a number of reasons. Banks are risk management 
entities since their primary business it to take risks and provide liquidity. Accordingly, 
banks are predicted to release considerable amounts of risk disclosure in order to 
enlighten external investors (Bessis, 2002), thus indirectly increasing the market 
valuation of the firm. Generally, disclosure has ascended to a different level of 
significance within banks compared to non-financial corporations since by their 
nature banks are inherently opaque (Huang, 2006).   
 Prior literature on disclosure has indicated that corporate disclosure can moderate 
the information asymmetry amid internal and external personnel (Kothari et al., 2009). 
Therefore, improved disclosure may culminate in increased demand for a firm’s 
shares and, thus, a rise in the price of shares (Clarkson et al., 1996; Hassan et al., 
2009; Healy and Palepu, 1993) since the disclosure ought to reveal the firm’s value 
(Healy et al., 1999). An environment rich in information might result in positive 
economic consequences, such as increases in the value of the firm (Beyer et al., 
2010; Leuz and Wysocki, 2008). The consequences of augmenting the levels of 
disclosure are usually debated in terms of diminishing mispricing, increasing 
profitability and firm value (Botosan and Plumlee, 2002). Moreover, prior empirical 
researches provide some supporting proof in relation to the association between 
voluntary disclosure levels and firm value. Healy et al., (1999) documented that 
companies with increased levels of disclosure could at the same time enjoy 
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considerable improvements in market valuation. This direct effect of the levels of 
disclosure on firm value influences administrators’ decisions and effects the 
distribution of future cash flows (Lambert et al., 2007). Also, according to Elzahar et 
al., (2015) augmented disclosure will possibly enhance the market valuation of firms.  
Substantial amounts of literature studied the effects of disclosure in generally, but 
the number of studies that investigated the impact of disclosure on firm value is 
limited. This lack is even greater when exploring risk disclosure in relation to firm 
value. Several empirical investigations established that voluntary disclosure 
augments stockholders’ ability to forecast future earnings, which has an effect of the 
valuation of the firm (e.g., Hussainey et al., 2003). It has been contended by Rhodes 
and Soobaroyen (2010) that disclosure can limit the raise of agency conflicts by 
diminishing information asymmetry, consequentially augments market valuation of 
firms. Sheu et al., (2010) stipulated that the capital market only supplies higher firm 
valuations to firms, which opt for a more inclusive disclosure policy. Gordon et al., 
(2010) provided strong evidence that greater levels of voluntary disclosure are 
positively related with the valuation of the firm.  
Nonetheless, the findings of researches investigating the relationship between 
corporate disclosure and firm value are mixed. For instance, several investigations 
have documented a positive link between the two variables (see Baek et al., 2004; 
Cheung et al., 2010; Gordon et al., 2010; Jiao, 2011; Anam et al., 2011; Dhaliwal et 
al., 2011). However, Hassan et al., (2009) claimed that the effect of disclosure on 
firm value is still worthy of empirical investigation. They intimated that there is no 
significant association between firm value and discretionary disclosure although 
there is a negative and significant relationship between the market value of the firm 
and mandatory exposure. Concurring with their findings, Uyar and Kilic (2012) 
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claimed that the link between discretionary disclosure and company value differs 
according to the proxy employed for the market value of the firm.   
In theory, the market value of a firm raises due to augmented disclosure levels via 
either a reduction in the cost of capital or an upturn in the cash flow to the company's 
shareholders or both (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Diamond and Verrecchia, 
1991). Debatably, high exposure levels decrease the cost of capital since they 
encourage investors to lower their estimation of the risk level and, thus, decrease the 
mandated rate of return when purchasing a company's shares (Coles et al., 1995; 
Clarkson et al., 1996). Moreover, the value of the company rises following the 
predicted enhancement in stock liquidity since the transaction costs are decreased 
whilst the demand for the company's shares soars (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; 
Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). There could be problems with information 
asymmetry and agency conflicts between company directors and external 
stakeholders (Healy and Palepu, 2001) since external investors do not generally 
have access to the in-house information of the firm that is freely available to 
company directors. This could affect the expectations of outside stakeholders 
concerning risk, mandated returns and company cost of capital and, thus, the 
company’s share value. However, augmented voluntary corporate disclosure can be 
employed to mitigate these problems (Hassan, 2009). 
Healy and Palepu (1993) argued that the higher the disclosure level, the more 
possibility there is that shareholders are able to understand the way managers 
operate. Also, Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) claimed that by lowering the 
information asymmetry amongst management and un-informed shareholders leads 
to less uncertainty regarding the future performance of the company and an 
enhancement in the liquidity of its shares. Hence, Coles et al. (1995) and Clarkson et 
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al. (1996) contended that lower transaction costs in addition to a higher demand for 
shares could lead to an upturn in share price and, thus, the value of the firm. 
Nonetheless, the impact of augmented disclosure may not be positive since it might 
have a negative impact on the company's competitiveness (Healy and Palepu, 1993) 
and, thus, have an adverse impact on the company's valuation. High quality 
exposure has a positive impact on the value of a company due to institutional 
investors being attracted to the company (Dhaliwal et al., 2011).  
Hassan et al., (2009) argued that the association between the two variables is 
complicated and depends upon whether the exposure is voluntary or mandatory. 
However, the authors found no significant link between firm value and the voluntary 
exposure made by Egyptian companies, whereas they identified a negative and 
significant relationship between company value and mandatory exposure. Moreover, 
Uyar and Kilic (2012) established that the link between discretionary disclosure and 
firm value is influenced by the measurement of firm value. For example, when they 
used market-to-book value as opposed to market capitalisation as the dependent 
variable in the regression model, their findings went from positive to insignificant. 
Furthermore, earlier investigations that examined the effect of disclosure on 
company value reported mixed findings as previously emphasised. The limited 
empirical literature examining the relationship between market value firms and 
voluntary disclosure suggests a positive relationship between the two variables 
(Baek et al., 2004, Lim et al., 2007; Anam et al., 2011; Sheu et al., 2010; Nekhili et 
al., 2012), for instance, Anam et al. (2011) and Sheu et al. (2010) reported that 
discretionary disclosure levels in Malaysia and Taiwan are associated with company 
value. Correspondingly, Silva and Alves (2004) established that financial information 
discretionarily reported by Latin American companies has a significant and positive 
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relationship with company value. However, Uyar and Kilic (2012) and Elzahar et al., 
(2015) claimed that the link between discretionary exposure and company value 
differs according to the proxy employed for the market value of the firm, and Hassan 
et al., (2009) reported that the association between the two variables depends on the 
type of disclosure used. Vafaei et al.’s (2011) study included both developed and 
developing countries and documented that there is a significant association between 
disclosure and firm value for Hong Kong and the UK and reported a negative 
relationship between the two variables for Singapore and Australia. Therefore, based 
on the above discussion the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H13: There is a positive association between the levels of voluntary risk 
disclosure and firm value.  
6.4 Research control variables  
For literature related to the control variables; check section 5.5.9 However, in 
additional to these variables; in this study the model contains additional three control 
variables which are leverage; liquidity and dividend pay-out.      
6.4.1 Leverage 
Leverage is employed as a representative for agency costs, where higher leverage 
level results in higher agency costs (Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007). Therefore, Oliveira 
et al., (2011) and Elshandidy et al., (2013) stated that companies bearing high levels 
of leverage ratio are inclined to be more risky and unpredictable. However, the 
agency theory posits that agency costs upsurge with high leverage ratio (Elzahar 
and Hussainey, 2012). Correspondingly, Abraham, Solomon and Stevenson, (2007) 
confirmed that firms which are viewed to possess higher levels of market risk are 
motivated to release larger amounts of information in an attempt to minimise 
monitoring costs which stakeholders will experience when investing in the 
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organisation. Consequently, stockholders of such companies might introduce more 
restrictive agreements into their debt contracts, which will lead to the escalation of 
agency and monitoring costs. On the other hand, it is likely that corporations with 
higher levels of risk will report larger sums of risk related disclosures since the 
managers have an incentive to comprehensively explicate the sources of these risks 
so as to decrease agency costs (Linsley and Shrives, 2006). However, risk news 
relevant market, credit and internal risk control could play a fundamental part in 
mitigating creditors’ anxieties about the solvency of the company’s and its 
competences to generate sufficient cash flows in the future (Rajab and Handley-
Schachler, 2009). 
Also, the leverage variable is employed as a proxy for signalling arguments to clarify 
disclosure exercises in public firms.  However, Elzahar and Hussainey, (2012) 
claimed that corporate directors report risk news when they have a high leverage 
level to signal to stockholders and depositors the company’s competences to meet 
short and long term financial obligations. Also, Linsley and Shrives, (2006) claimed 
that firms with high risk levels will report additional information on how they handle 
risks in an attempt to signal to stakeholders and other participants that there is a 
well-organised risk management system in place and management capabilities and 
skills in administering such risks. On the other hand, some researchers disputed that 
such organisations might be unwilling to voluntarily reveal risk information since their 
management might not desire to consider their risk level where investors thereafter 
might regard them as a risky company and decide not to invest in such risky 
business (Mohobbot, 2005). On the contrary, low risk level firms will dispatch good 
signals by releasing a greater amount of risk disclosure in order to entice more 
capital (Iatridis, 2008).    
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Empirical studies on the relationship between risk disclosure and leverage levels 
indicated either a positive or a no significance relationship. None of the prior 
investigations reviewed illustrated a negative association. Abraham and Cox, (2007); 
Deumes and Knechel, (2008); Iatridis, (2008); Elshandidy et al., (2013); Hassan, 
(2009) demonstrated a positive association between the two variables. Whereas, 
Elzahar and Hussainey, (2012); Nitm et al., (2013); Miihkinen, (2012) did not find any 
significant relationship among risk disclosure and leverage levels. The current study 
expects a positive relationship between the level of voluntary risk disclosure and 
leverage.  
6.4.2 Liquidity 
Liquidity is an important variable, which represents information of many elements on 
firm’s ability to meet short and long term financial obligations. This information could 
be of a major assistance for regulatory institutions, investors and debtholders. 
Therefore, the incapability of a firm to meet its financial requirements for both short 
and long term could lead to postponements in repaying debts, loss of confidence in 
the market between lenders and creditors and in extreme cases bankruptcy (Naser, 
Al-Khatib and Karbhari, 2002). According to Cabedo and Tirado, (2004) accounting 
standards necessitate a reflective cash flow statement to be generated to enlighten 
clients of the liquidity flows of the company and help them in the evaluation of the 
firm’s ability to produce liquidity to meet its commitments. However, Wallace et al., 
(1994) argued that high liquidity companies are more motivated to report risk news 
than low liquidity companies. Yet, their results indicated that liquidity has a significant 
and a negative effect on disclosure level.  
Capital need theory posited that corporations report more risk related information in 
an attempt to entice capital at the lowest cost. Therefore, Chio, (1973) argued that 
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corporations that are prone to reveal more valuable information than obligated by law 
are regularly those going to the financial market to raise capital. This amplification in 
disclosure would signify two things for them; a lower cost of capital and a reduction 
in the level of risk associated with a certain security.  
Foster, (1986) implied that in capital markets when firms try to raise capital at the 
lowest achievable cost, in the existence of competition on the same security 
proposed and future returns, there are risks and uncertainties incorporated in the 
firm and its securities, which lead stockholders, investors and other market 
participants demand more news to aid appraise the risks of the current future cash 
flows, securities value and investment decisions. Consequently, firms are motivated 
to report information that will minimise the risk related info, which sequentially allows 
them to raise capital at the lowest achievable costs.  
Jensen and Meckling, (1976) theorised that agency cost theory describes the 
relationship between the stockholder and manager, where the stockholder gives 
some decision-making authority to the manager who acts on his behalf. Although, 
disagreement occurs since both parties attempt to maximise their own interest for 
instance, increasing dividends considerably will result in making the firm become 
riskier by not having enough cash flow, which will hurt lenders.  Another example 
would be when managers choose to borrow more capital on the same assets, which 
results in making current lenders worse off. This kind of conflict would potentially 
lead to more demands for risk related information.   
However, empirical researches evident a mixed findings on the relationship between 
liquidity and risk disclosure. Some researches documented a negative relationship 
between the two variables (Wallace et al., 1994; Naser, Al-Khatib and Karbhari, 
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2002) while others documented an insignificant correlation between liquidity and risk 
disclosure (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Wallace and Nasser, 1995; Owusu-Ansah and 
Yeoh, 2005; Al Shammari et al., 2008). The current study expects a positive 
relationship between the level of voluntary risk disclosure and liquidity of the bank.   
6.4.3 Dividend Pay-out 
Prior academic literature have argued from an agency perspective that dividends 
could prove to have a diminishing impact on agency costs via the distribution of free 
cash flow that a company’s administration may on the other hand employ on 
unprofitable ventures (Jensen, 1986). It also has been acknowledged that dividend 
policies are employed as a mean of handling agency matters between outside 
investor and corporate insiders (Fluck, 1998). Dividend payments could be regarded 
as a form of risk premium that is distributed to the investors. Also, stockholders who 
are in receipt of dividends might be less inclined towards information regarding the 
risks an institution is trying to address. Therefore, disbursing dividends among 
shareholders could compensate for the reduction in risk disclosure (Elshandidy and 
Neri, 2014). Another argument led by Farinha (2003) states that directors might be 
paying out dividends to circumvent any disciplinary actions taken by investors.   
Previous empirical studies on corporate disclosure reported that organisations with 
lower dividend yields are more prone to offer significantly greater levels of disclosure 
than firms with higher yields (Hussainey and Walker, 2009). Additionally, the fact that 
companies have an option of dividend policy proposes that higher dividend 
disbursements are related to less riskiness and less information asymmetry 
(Elshandidy and Neri, 2014). This study predicts a positive relationship between the 
level of voluntary risk disclosure and bank’s dividends pay-out.   
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6.5 Research design 
6.5.1 Sample and Data Collection  
This section describes the sample, the sources of relevant information and the data 
collection procedure and defines all variables used for the purpose of this 
investigation (for further details see section 4.6).  
6.5.2 Development of Risk Disclosure index 
See Section 4.7   
6.5.3 Reliability and Validity of Risk Disclosure Index 
See section 4.7.1 
 
Dependent variable:  This study uses two different proxies for measuring firm value. 
Firstly it uses the market based measure which is the natural logarithm of market to 
book value at end of year (MTBV). This is in line with previous studies (Hassan et al., 
2009; Uyar and Kilic, 2012). Secondly, it uses the accounting based measure, which 
is the return of assets (ROA). This is consistent with (Garay et al., 2013; Aras et al., 
2010). Two measures examinations have different theoretical implications (Hillman 
and Keim, 2001). The current study employs two dependent variables related to firm 
value to test the hypothesis of the study. This is concurrent with preceding literature 
(Barontini and Caprio, 2006; Sheu et al., 2010). These two models measure how the 
level of voluntary risk disclosure affects the market value of the bank. This study’s 
main emphasis is on exploring the relationship between the levels of voluntary risk 
disclosure and firm market value. An extensive line of preceding literature has 
argued that discretionary disclosure is better used as an instrument intended to 
reduce information asymmetries and satisfy shareholders’ information demands. The 
aim of this research is to investigate whether increased discretionary risk disclosure 
affects the firm’s market value.  
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Endogenous variable: Risk Disclosure; which proxies for the level of voluntary risk 
disclosure of all banks included in the sample of the study. The level of voluntary risk 
disclosure is the totality of the scores attained from 54 items that fall into 8 different 
categories of information (See appendix).  The level of voluntary risk disclosure was 
calculated based on an un-weighted (Dichotomous) risk disclosure index, whereby 
an item is assigned a score of 1 if it is disclosed and a score of 0 if otherwise (Uyar 
and Kilic, 2012; Hassan et al., 2009).  This measure was preferred since the 
research does not concentrate on a specific user group (Naser et al., 2006) but 
rather addresses all users of annual reports. Thus, there is no need to put different 
weights on the reported risk items (Oliveira et al., 2006). 
Table 13: Summary of variable names, description and sources 
Abbreviated 
name 
Full name 
Variable 
description 
Predicted 
Sign 
Data 
source 
Prior studies 
Dependent variables 
 
 
 
FV 
 
 
 
Firm value  
Natural logarithm 
of the ratio of 
market value of 
equity to book 
value of 
equity at the 
financial year-end 
(MTBV) 
 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
DataStream 
 
Hassan et al., (2009); Uyar 
and Kilic (2012); Nekhili et 
al., (2015) 
ROA (Return On 
Assets)  
Garay et al., (2013); Aras 
et al., (2010); Klapper and 
Love,( 2002) 
Independent variable 
RISKD 
Risk 
disclosure 
Risk disclosure 
level based on risk 
index 
 
Annual 
reports 
Hassan et al., (2009); Uyar 
and Kilic (2012); Nekhili et 
al., (2014) 
Control variables  
1. Firm-specific characteristics  
SIZE Bank size Natural logarithm 
of total assets 
+ DataStream Al-Akra and Ali (2012); 
Moumen et al., (2015)  
Jankensgard et al., (2014) 
PROF Profitability ROA (Return On 
Assets) 
+ DataStream  Moumen et al., (2015); 
Jankensgard et al., (2014)   
LEV Leverage Long-term debt/ 
total assets   
+ DataStream  Uyar and Kilic (2012); 
Jankensgard et al., (2014) 
LIQ Liquidity Current Ratio: 
Current 
Assets/Current 
Liabilities 
+ Annual 
report 
Diamond, and Verrecchia, 
(1991). 
DIVID Dividend 
payout 
Dividends per 
share  
+ DataStream Jankensgard et al., (2014); 
Elzahar et al., (2015) 
196 | P a g e  
2. Corporate Governance characteristics 
 BSIZE Board size Number of board 
members 
+ Annual 
report 
Nekhili et al., (2015); Ntim 
et al., (2012) 
CHS Internal 
Ownership 
Percentage of 
shares held by 
internal 
shareholders 
- DataStream Jankensgard et al., (2014); 
Nekhili et al., (2015) 
NOCH-Factors   External 
Ownership  
Percentage of 
shares held by 
external 
shareholders  
+ DataStream Nekhili et al., (2015); 
Defond et al., (2005) 
INDEP Independent 
directors 
Number of non-
executive directors  
on the board of 
directors 
+ Bloomberg 
Annual 
Report 
Nekhili et al., (2015); Ntim 
et al., (2012)  
NON Non-executive 
directors 
Dummy variable 1 
if board contains 
non-executive 
directors and 
otherwise 0. 
+ Bloomberg 
Annual 
Report  
Ntim et al., (2012) 
ACINDEP Audit 
committee 
independence  
Dummy variable; 1 
if an audit 
committee 
independence 
exists, and 0 
otherwise 
+ Bloomberg 
Annual 
Report 
Nekhili et al., (2015); 
Defond et al., (2005) 
ACSIZE Audit 
committee 
size 
Number of audit 
committee 
members 
+ Annual 
report 
Defond et al., (2005); Black 
et al., (2006)  
ACMEET Audit 
committee 
meetings 
Number of audit 
committee 
meetings 
+ Annual 
report 
Black et al., (2006) 
3. Demographic characteristics 
EDUC Education 
Levels 
Number of board 
members holding a 
PhD  
- Annual 
report * 
TENU Tenure Dummy variable 1 
if the number of 
years the board 
member 
permanence on 
the board is above 
the sample median 
of 5 years, 0 
otherwise. 
+ Annual 
report 
* 
GENDER Gender 
Diversity  
Number of females 
on the board  
+ Annual 
report 
* 
DIVE Diversity  Number of other 
nationalities on the 
board   
+ Annual 
report * 
ISLAMIC.DUM Islamic 
dummy  
Dummy variable 1 
if the bank is 
Islamic and 0 
otherwise  
+ Annual 
report  
Abdallah et al (2015) 
This table provides the description and measures of risk disclosure reporting, as dependent variables, and firm 
characteristics, corporate governance mechanism and demographic traits as independent variables. It also 
provides the source of each variable. 
* No prior studies have examined the association between risk disclosure and firm value using these variables.    
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6.5.4 Model development 
The aim of this research is to examine the association between firm value and 
voluntary risk disclosure level. Moreover, since all of the selected variables can 
affect firm value directly or indirectly by affecting the level of voluntary risk disclosure 
two synchronised models, wherein the level of voluntary risk disclosure is a strategic 
choice that relies on a wide range of variables, was developed (see Table 13).    
The market based measure: 
𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖𝑡 + β1 RISKD𝑖𝑡 + β2 NOCH_FACTOR𝑖𝑡 + β3 BSIZE𝑖𝑡 + β4 INDEP𝑖𝑡 +
β5 NON𝑖𝑡 + β6 ACINDEP𝑖𝑡 + β7 ACSIZE𝑖𝑡 + β8 ACMEET𝑖𝑡 + β9 EDUC𝑖𝑡 +
β10 TENU𝑖𝑡 + β11 GENDER𝑖𝑡 +  β12 DIVE𝑖𝑡 +  β13 SIZE𝑖𝑡 +  β14 PROF𝑖𝑡 +
β15 CHS𝑖𝑡 + β16 LEV𝑖𝑡 + β17 LIQ𝑖𝑡 + β18 DIVID𝑖𝑡 + β19 YEA. DUM𝑖𝑡 +
β20 ISLAMIC. DUM𝑖𝑡 + ɛ𝑖𝑡                                    (3) 
Where: MB = Firm Value (measure by market to book value)   
β0 = the intercept   
Β1….. β20 = regression coefficients (See Table 13 for more explanation) 
ɛ = error term  
I = Bank  
T = Year 
 
The accounting based measure: 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖𝑡 + β1 RISKD𝑖𝑡 + β2 NOCH_FACTOR𝑖𝑡 + β3 BSIZE𝑖𝑡 + β4 INDEP𝑖𝑡 +
β5 NON𝑖𝑡 + β6 ACINDEP𝑖𝑡 + β7 ACSIZE𝑖𝑡 + β8 ACMEET𝑖𝑡 + β9 EDUC𝑖𝑡 +
β10 TENU𝑖𝑡 + β11 GENDER𝑖𝑡 +  β12 DIVE𝑖𝑡 +  β13 SIZE𝑖𝑡 +  β14 CHS𝑖𝑡 +
β15 LEV𝑖𝑡 + β16 LIQ𝑖𝑡 + β17 DIVID𝑖𝑡 + β18 YEA. DUM𝑖𝑡 +
β19 ISLAMIC. DUM𝑖𝑡 + ɛ𝑖𝑡                                      (4) 
 
Where: FV = Firm Value (measure by ROA)   
β0 = the intercept   
Β1….. β19 = regression coefficients (See Table 13 for more explanation) 
ɛ = error term  
I = Bank  
T = Year 
6.6 Analysis and discussion    
6.6.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 14 presents the summary descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
analyses to determine the empirical directional or non-directional relationship 
between firm value and the voluntary risk disclosure levels in banks listed on the 
Saudi Stock Market (Tadawul). A number of interesting findings emerged from the 
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descriptive statistics. It demonstrated a great disparity in voluntary risk reporting 
practices among the sample population. For example, RISKD ranged from a 
minimum of 51 percent to a maximum of 78 percent, with an average of 66.03 
percent of voluntary risk disclosure levels in the sample. Also, it showed that the 
average market to book value of listed banks in Saudi Arabia is 1.72 percent with a 
maximum value of 4.02 and a minimum value of 0 percent. 
The figures for all control variables (which were generated from corporate 
governance, demographic attributes and firm-specific characteristics) are presented 
in the next paragraph as minimum, maximum and mean values in percentages. (Also 
see Table 14). Table 14 demonstrates that CHS holdings has in this model reported 
quite a large variation ranging from 0 percent for the minimum and 69 percent for the 
maximum with a mean of 19.1 percent. This phenomenon could be attributed to the 
nature of the ownership structure in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where some banks 
are wholly owned by a single family who sets on the board of directors and act as 
internal shareholders. Alrajhi bank is an example of such structure. While, the table 
below shows that NOSH holdings has reported a minimum of 25 percent, a 
maximum of 45 percent and a mean of 29.5 percent. Also, Table 14 illustrates that 
BSIZE ranges from 7 members to a maximum of 11 on the board of directors, with 
an average mean of 9 members. Whereas, the INDEP members of the board 
recorded an average mean of 5 members with a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 8. 
Table 14 also shows that NON members have a minimum of 1 member to a 
maximum of 11 members with an average mean of 7. The table below illustrates that 
the descriptive statistics for the ACINDEP which has recorded a minimum of 0 
members and a maximum of 1 audit committee independent member.  ACSIZE has 
a mean of 3 members with a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 5. For the audit 
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committee frequency of meetings (ACMEET) table 14 shows that there is a minimum 
of 3 meetings, a maximum of 11 and an average mean 5.  Further, GENDER has a 
minimum of 0 members and a maximum of 1 on the board of directors. TENU has 
recorded a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1, while EDUC recorded a minimum of 
0 and a maximum of 1. Also DIVE recorded a maximum of 1. Table 14 also 
demonstrates that SIZE has an average mean of 8, a minimum of 7 and a maximum 
of 7.60 percent, While, PROF has a maximum of .04, a minimum of -.01 and a mean 
of .019. LEV on the other hand has a maximum of 13.7, a minimum of 0 percent and 
an average mean of 0.57. LIQ has reported in the table below a minimum of 1.10, a 
maximum of 10 percent and a mean of 1.4. Lastly, DIVID has reported a minimum of 
0, a maximum of 69 and a mean of 25 percent.          
Table 14: Descriptive statistics for all variables included in this study of MTBV 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
RISKD 60 .51 .78 .6603 .07059 -.503 -.488 
MTBV 60 .00 4.02 1.6038 .83039 .563 1.323 
ROA 60 -.01 .04 .0192 .00869 -.636 3.124 
CHS 60 .00 69.00 19.1000 17.46056 .858 .102 
NOCH 60 25.00 45.00 29.5000 5.08091 1.016 .127 
BOARDSIZE 60 7.00 11.00 9.5500 .94645 -.211 -.259 
INDEP 60 3.00 8.00 5.1333 1.62049 .370 -1.081 
NON 60 1 11 7.37 2.718 -.538 -.878 
ACINDEP 60 .00 1.00 .7500 .43667 -1.185 -.619 
ACSIZE 60 2.00 5.00 3.7667 .96316 .021 -1.219 
ACMEET 60 3.00 11.00 5.3667 1.95688 1.092 .883 
GENDER 60 .00 1.00 .0833 .27872 3.093 7.826 
TENURE 60 .00 1.00 .6000 .49403 -.419 -1.889 
EDUCATION 60 .00 1.00 .7000 .46212 -.895 -1.241 
DIVERSITY 60 .00 1.00 .3333 .47538 .725 -1.526 
SIZE 60 7.24 8.58 7.9940 .35203 -.447 -.831 
ISLAMIC 60 .00 1.00 .3333 .47538 .725 -1.526 
LEV 60 .00 13.76 .5780 2.04382 5.695 33.444 
LIQ 60 1.10 10.89 1.4118 1.26123 7.444 56.696 
DIVID 60 .00 69.15 25.8103 21.41391 .340 -.796 
FV: Firm value (Market to Book Value); RISKD: Risk disclosure score (based on an unweighted disclosure index); CHS: 
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Internal ownership (Percentage of shares held by internal shareholders); NOCH-Factor: External ownership (Percentage 
of shares held by all external shareholders); BSIZE: Board size (Number of board members); INDEP: Independent 
directors (Number of non-executive directors  on the board of directors); NON: Non-executive directors (Dummy variable 
1 if board contains non-executive directors and otherwise 0); ACINDEP: Audit committee independence (Dummy 
variable; 1 if audit committee independence exists, and 0 otherwise); ACSIZE: Audit committee size (Number of audit 
committee members); ACMEET: Audit committee meetings (Number of audit committee meetings); GENDER: Gender 
(Number of females on the board); TENU: Tenure (Dummy variable 1 if the number of years the board member 
permanence on the board is above the sample median of 5 years, otherwise 0); EDUC: Education (Number of board 
members holding a PhD); DIVE: Diversity (Number of other nationalities of the board ); SIZE: Bank size (Natural 
logarithm of total assets); PROF: Profitability (Return On Assets); LEV: Leverage (Long-term debt/ total assets); LIQ: 
Liquidity (Current Ratio: Current Assets/Current Liabilities); DIVID: Dividend pay-out (Dividends per share) and 
ISLAMIC.DUM: Dummy variable 1 if bank is Islamic and 0 otherwise   
 
6.6.2 Market-based measure results 
6.6.2.1 Univariate analysis 
Table 15 illustrates the correlations between firm value and the levels of voluntary 
risk disclosure along with the correlations for the other explanatory variables. It also 
presents the Pearsons correlation matrix for all variables employed in this study’s 
regression analysis to check for multicollinearity. Bivariate analysis was used to 
check for multicollinearity. When the level of association between the risk disclosure 
score and firm value, measured by the market to book value at end of year and other 
associations between the control variables, was legitimately low, this indicated that 
there were no multicollinearity problems. Later in the ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression analysis, the calculated variance inflation factor (VIF) values support the 
absence of multicollinearity defects as multicollinearity did not exceed the 10 percent 
mark (Naser et al., 2006; Field, 2009).  
Similarly, Pearsons correlation matrix was used to test for the directional and non-
directional relationships between firm value and the rest of the control variables. This 
study further examined residual statistics and Durbin-Watson statistics for linearity 
and autocorrelation problems (See Model Summary in Table 16). However, the tests 
showed no serious violation of these linear assumptions. In addition, the table 
illustrates that there is no statistically significant association between the dependent 
201 | P a g e  
variable (FV based on MTBV) and the endogenous variable (RISKD) of this 
investigation. However, there are a number of statistically significant associations 
between the dependent variable and the control variables. For example, CHS, 
BSIZE, PROF and DIVID are statistically significant and positively associated with 
FV, while EDUC is statistically significant and negatively correlated with FV. The 
highest correlation that can be seen from table 15 is between BSIZE and FV at a 
value of 0.604, followed by EDUC at a value of 0.463. Also, table 15 indicates that 
there are insignificant correlations between the rest of the control variable and the 
dependent variable (Based on the market measure). 
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Table 15: Pearson correlation Analysis 
 MTBV RISKD CHS NOCH BOARDSIZE INDEP NON ACINDEP ACSIZE ACMEET GENDER TENURE EDUCATION DIVERSITY SIZE LEV LIQ DIVID ISLAMIC 
MTBV 
 
1 -0.115 .393** -0.014 .600** 0.165 .272* 0.067 0.226 0.16 0.021 0.07 -.255* 0.165 -0.035 0.057 -0.062 .262* .316* 
RISKD 
 
 1 -0.129 .411** -0.107 -0.171 -0.095 0.074 0.136 0.054 0.093 -.356** -0.241 .375** .479** -0.093 -.294* .318* -.488** 
CHS  
 
1 -.492** .364** 0.195 .290* -0.19 0.243 0.196 0.061 0.195 -0.059 -.261* 0.006 0.049 0.063 0.232 0.204 
NOCH  
  
1 0.073 -0.248 -.308* .325* -0.062 0.153 -0.215 -0.218 -0.173 .547** 0.071 -0.052 -0.114 -0.113 -0.214 
BOARDSIZE  
   
1 -0.038 .467** -0.072 0.013 .566** 0.016 0.007 -0.081 0.226 0.101 0.002 -0.069 0.135 .264* 
INDEP  
    
1 .439** .335** .335** 0.075 0.05 0.11 .326* -0.169 -.478** 0.19 -0.016 -0.079 0.073 
NON  
     
1 0.05 .454** .459** 0.138 -0.103 0.251 0.114 -0.052 0.083 -0.174 0.168 0.074 
ACINDEP  
      
1 0.141 -0.089 0.174 -0.079 .294* .408** -0.225 -0.062 -.274* -0.086 -.408** 
ACSIZE  
       
1 0.19 -0.242 0.121 -0.046 -0.086 0.019 -0.137 -0.121 .302* 0.025 
ACMEET  
        
1 -0.212 0.014 0.03 -0.024 -0.055 -0.123 -0.093 -0.004 .304* 
GENDER  
         
1 -0.246 0.197 .426** -0.166 .336** -0.054 -0.111 -0.213 
TENURE  
          
1 0.134 -.433** -0.126 -0.091 0.108 -0.045 0.217 
EDUCATION  
           
1 0.077 -0.211 0.123 0.114 -0.167 -.309* 
DIVERSITY  
            
1 0.112 0.103 -0.085 -0.04 -.500** 
SIZE  
             
1 -0.166 -.299* .658** -.535** 
LEV  
              
1 0.009 -0.233 -0.008 
LIQ  
               
1 -0.167 0.215 
DIVID  
                
1 -.268* 
ISLAMIC  
                 
1 
 
For variables explanations see table 14.  ** Denote correlation is significant at the 5% level (tow-tailed tests). * Denote correlation is significant at the 10% level (tow-tailed tests). 
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6.6.2.2 Multivariate analysis 
For a more comprehensive analysis of the relationship between firm value and 
voluntary risk disclosure (Based on the market measure), a multivariate analysis, 
which controls for other variables expected to impact upon the value of the firm, was 
conducted. The method used to study the relationship between firm value and 
voluntary risk disclosure levels in all listed Saudi banks was the ordinary least square 
(OLS) regression analysis. The results of the regression are presented in table 15. 
This study’s model used a market based measure; market to book value at year-end 
as the dependent variable, total risk disclosure score as its endogenous variable and 
a mixture of corporate governance, demographic attributes and firm-specific 
characteristics as control variables (see Table 13). As can be observed from the 
model summary table the model is significant at the (0.000) level with an F value of 
(7.024) and with an adjusted R square of 0.692 percent. Therefore, the explanatory 
power of the independent and control variables on firm value are fairly high. However, 
based on this model the regression analysis table indicates that there is an 
insignificant relationship between firm value and the level of voluntary risk disclosure 
in Saudi listed banks. Therefore, this study’s hypothesis is rejected in this model. 
The results are consistent with previous studies, such as Uyar and Kilic (2012) and 
Hassan et al., (2009). This investigation’s outcome based on the market based 
measure (MTBV) is inconsistent with the signalling theory, which indicates that when 
a firm’s performance is good, directors will signal their firm’s performance to their 
investors and the rest of the market by reporting more information voluntarily, whilst 
directors of firms that are performing badly will not do so. The purpose of such 
disclosure is to obtain a good market reputation and increase firm value since 
investors and the rest of the market may misinterpret a firm keeping silent as it is 
withholding the worst possible information (Mohobbot, 2005; Linsley and Shrives, 
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2000; 2006; Hassan, 2009). This model outcome is also inconsistent with previous 
literature, which have employed a market based measure and found positive 
association between voluntary risk disclosure and firm value (Ahmad, 2015). This 
research model finding is attributed to the deep-rooted tendency of the Saudi capital 
market to be opaque (Roberts and Kamla, 2010) and explained by Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions, where Saudi Arabia scored zero on the secrecy vs. 
transparency measure.  
Table 16 also presents the multivariate analysis for all of the control variables, where 
NOCH has a negatively significant relationship with firm value at 5% level. Also, 
there is a positively significant relationship between board independence and firm 
value at 10% level. In addition, audit committee independence has a positively 
significant association with firm value at 10% level. There are positively significant 
associations between DIVERSITY and SIZE and firm value at 1% and 10% levels, 
respectively. There is a positive association between nature of bank (Islamic vs non-
Islamic) and firm value at the 1% level. However, the rest of the control variables are 
split between two groups, the first group being negatively insignificant and the 
second group being insignificantly associated with firm value.    
Table 16: Regression analysis  
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
t 
 
 
Sig. 
  
 
VIF B Std. Error 
(Constant) -10.020 5.260 -1.905 0.065  
RISKD 0.403 1.507 0.267 0.791 3.144 
CHS 0.007 0.007 1.050 0.301 3.634 
NOCH -0.063 0.031 -2.057 0.047 6.699 
BOARDSIZE 0.178 0.148 1.204 0.236 5.436 
INDEP 0.128 0.070 1.843 0.073 3.535 
NON -0.058 0.053 -1.094 0.281 5.850 
ACINDEP 0.708 0.302 2.347 0.024 4.822 
ACSIZE 0.050 0.100 0.505 0.616 2.570 
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ACMEET -0.064 0.055 -1.164 0.252 3.201 
GENDER -0.551 0.404 -1.363 0.181 3.524 
TENURE 0.162 0.164 0.988 0.330 1.828 
EDUCATION 0.065 0.207 0.315 0.754 2.546 
DIVERSITY 1.520 0.323 4.705 0.000 6.553 
SIZE 1.240 0.675 1.837 0.074 6.690 
LEV 0.028 0.036 0.781 0.440 1.527 
LIQ -0.063 0.069 -0.921 0.363 2.075 
DIVID 0.008 0.005 1.497 0.143 3.394 
ISLAMIC 1.923 0.451 4.266 0.000 7.759 
Model Summary  
Adjusted R Square: 0.692 
F value: 7.024 
Sig. :  0.000 
For variables explanations see table 14. Note that “* ** ***” represent 10% 5% 1% respectively, 
which indicates that there is a positive correlation or a proof of influence exists between the 
respective factors and “-“indicates that there is a negative correlation or proof. 
6.6.3 Accounting-based measure results 
Table 17 shows the correlation matrix for the dependent and continuous independent 
variables. Consistent with this study’s hypothesis, the levels of voluntary risk 
disclosure is positively significant with firm value based on ROA at a value of 
(0.271*). It signifies that the overall level of voluntary risk disclosure of all Saudi 
listed banks has strong impact on profitability. The correlation matrix also shows the 
interrelationships with this model’s explanatory variables. It shows that CHS (0.329*); 
BSIZE (0.283*); SIZE (0.529**); DIVID (0.557**) are positively correlated with firm 
value. While, ACINDEP (-0.279*) and LEV (-0.398**) are negatively associated with 
firm value based on the second model. In terms of the other control variables, the 
correlation between them and firm value based on ROA is insignificant. It shows that 
NOCH (0.055*); GENDER (0.098*) and LEV (0.034*) are negatively correlated with 
firm value. While, DIVERSITY (0.043*) are positively associated with firm value 
based on the second model. In terms of the other control variables, the correlation 
between them and firm value based on ROA is insignificant.  
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Table 17: Pearson correlation Analysis 
  ROA RISKD CHS NOCH B.SIZE INDEP NON ACINDEP ACSIZE ACMEET GENDER TENURE EDUCAT DIVERS SIZE LEV LIQ DIVID ISLAMIC 
ROA 1 .271* .329* -0.227 .283* -0.172 0.200 -.279* 0.219 0.158 -0.181 0.039 -0.148 -0.055 .529** -.398** -0.011 .557** -0.055 
RISKD  1 -0.129 .411** -0.107 -0.171 -0.095 0.074 0.136 0.054 0.093 -.356** -0.241 .375** .479** -0.093 -.294* .318* -.488** 
CHS   1 -.492** .364** 0.195 .290* -0.190 0.243 0.196 0.061 0.195 -0.059 -.261* 0.006 0.049 0.063 0.232 0.204 
NOCH    1 0.073 -0.248 -.308* .325* -0.062 0.153 -0.215 -0.218 -0.173 .547** 0.071 -0.052 -0.114 -0.113 -0.214 
B.SIZE     1 -0.038 .467** -0.072 0.013 .566** 0.016 0.007 -0.081 0.226 0.101 0.002 -0.069 0.135 .264* 
INDEP      1 .439** .335** .335** 0.075 0.050 0.110 .326* -0.169 -.478** 0.190 -0.016 -0.079 0.073 
NON       1 0.050 .454** .459** 0.138 -0.103 0.251 0.114 -0.052 0.083 -0.174 0.168 0.074 
ACINDEP        1 0.141 -0.089 0.174 -0.079 .294* .408** -0.225 -0.062 -.274* -0.086 -.408** 
ACSIZE         1 0.190 -0.242 0.121 -0.046 -0.086 0.019 -0.137 -0.121 .302* 0.025 
ACMEET          1 -0.212 0.014 0.030 -0.024 -0.055 -0.123 -0.093 -0.004 .304* 
GENDER           1 -0.246 0.197 .426** -0.166 .336** -0.054 -0.111 -0.213 
TENURE            1 0.134 -.433** -0.126 -0.091 0.108 -0.045 0.217 
EDUCAT             1 0.077 -0.211 0.123 0.114 -0.167 -.309* 
DIVERS              1 0.112 0.103 -0.085 -0.040 -.500** 
SIZE               1 -0.166 -.299* .658** -.535** 
LEV                1 0.009 -0.233 -0.008 
LIQ                 1 -0.167 0.215 
DIVID                  1 -.268* 
ISLAMIC                   1 
For variables explanations see table 14 
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6.6.3.1 Multivariate analysis 
This study also presents in table 18 below the regression results for the second 
model, which shows the analysis of the association between the levels of voluntary 
risk disclosure and firm value (Based on the accounting measure). As can be 
observed from the model summary table the model is significant at the (0.000) level 
with an F value of (3.877) and with an adjusted R square of (0.518 %). Therefore, 
the explanatory power of the independent and control variables on firm value based 
on ROA are fairly high. However, the accounting based measure indicates in the 
table below that there is a positively significant relationship between firm value and 
the level of voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi listed banks at a value of (0.017). 
Therefore, this study’s hypothesis is accepted. The results are consistent with 
Botosan and Plumlee, (2002) who found that increased levels of disclosure have a 
positive economic consequence on profitability and value of the firm. Since, 
shareholders greatly value the information disclosed in annual reports because by 
obtaining such information they can make more valuable investment decisions. In 
addition, information can reduce asymmetric information and agency conflicts 
between managers and investors.  Hussainey and Walker, (2009) clearly stated that 
voluntary disclosure provides value relevant information for users. 
Also, this finding is in line with the limited empirical literature examining the 
relationship between firm value firm and voluntary disclosure, which documented a 
positive relationship between the two variables (Baek et al., 2004, Lim et al., 2007; 
Anam et al., 2011; Sheu et al., 2010; Gordon et al., 2010; Nekhili et al., 2012). This 
result also supports Gallego-Alvarez et al., (2010) who have reported in their study 
that disclosure has a positive consequence on shareholder value creation. As the 
directors of such entity report voluntary information in their annual reports to 
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communicate signals to investors, therefore such behaviour is likely to impact the 
stock market value and increase the valuation of a firm.   
This study’s findings based on the accounting measure is consistent with the 
signalling theory, which indicates that when a firm’s performance is good, directors 
will signal their firm’s performance to their investors and the rest of the market by 
reporting more information voluntarily. Signalling theory proposes that highly 
profitable companies will send signals of their quality to investors (Watson et al., 
2002). The purpose of such disclosure is to obtain a good market reputation, 
increase the trade of shares and thus increase firm value (Mohobbot, 2005; Linsley 
and Shrives, 2000; 2006; Hassan, 2009). Moreover, Gordon et al. (2010) asserted 
that voluntary disclosure in annual reports sends a clear signal to the capital market 
that is likely to increase a firm’s present net value and in turn its stock market value. 
This model’s finding is consistent with results of previous studies, which adopted 
signalling theory (Anam et al., 2011; Sheu et al., 2010; Curado et al., 2011). By 
reporting more complete and supplying accurate information, an annual report 
becomes more value relevant for investors. This positive association supports the 
traditional view that more information complements firms’ value. 
Table 18: Regression analysis 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
 
t 
 
Sig. 
  
VIF 
B Std. Error 
(Constant) -0.097 0.069 -1.405 0.168  
RISKD 0.049 0.020 2.490 0.017 3.144 
CHS 0.000 0.000 1.478 0.148 3.634 
NOCH -0.001 0.000 -1.981 0.055 6.699 
BOARDSIZE 0.002 0.002 0.797 0.431 5.436 
INDEP 0.001 0.001 0.756 0.455 3.535 
NON 0.000 0.001 -0.624 0.536 5.850 
ACINDEP -0.001 0.004 -0.328 0.745 4.822 
ACSIZE 0.000 0.001 0.105 0.917 2.570 
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ACMEET 0.000 0.001 -0.656 0.516 3.201 
GENDER -0.009 0.005 -1.699 0.098 3.524 
TENURE 0.002 0.002 1.021 0.314 1.828 
EDUCATION 0.003 0.003 1.030 0.310 2.546 
DIVERSITY 0.009 0.004 2.096 0.043 6.553 
SIZE 0.010 0.009 1.173 0.248 5.690 
LEV -0.001 0.000 -2.208 0.034 1.527 
LIQ 0.000 0.001 0.521 0.606 2.075 
DIVID 3.768 0.000 0.557 0.581 3.394 
ISLAMIC 0.007 0.006 1.188 0.243 7.759 
Model Summary  
Adjusted R Square: 0.518 
F value: 3.877 
Sig. :  0.000 
For variables explanations see table 14.  
 
The mixed results of this study are in line with Vafaei et al., (2011) and Ahmad, 
(2015) whom have reported significant and insignificant association between 
disclosure and firm value in one study. These results confirm the findings of previous 
studies such as Uyar and Kilic (2012) and Elzahar et al., (2015) who claimed that the 
association between voluntary disclosure and firm value varies according to the 
proxy employed for the market value of the firm. Where, this study found in the first 
model based on the market based measure (MTBV) an insignificant correlation 
between firm value and the levels of voluntary risk disclosure. While, in the second 
model which was based on an accounting based measure (ROA) found a positively 
significant association between the two variables. This variation in the result between 
the two models can be justified based on the adoption of different measures of firm 
value (MTBV and ROA). Overall, a healthy amount of disclosure could result in 
desirable economic consequences such as a decrease in the cost of capital of a 
company (Beyer et al., 2010) and an increase in the valuation of the firm (Leuz and 
Wysocki, 2008). 
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The results approved outcomes of Botosan and Plumlee (2002) who find that the 
impacts of disclosure are sensitive to the category of disclosure being made. In 
relation to the insignificant association in the MTBV model, which means that Saudi 
banks were not able to convey information in terms of the signals related to risk 
through their annual reports and financial statements, and those risk reports were 
not useful for stakeholders to evaluate the exact value of the firm. Also this could be 
justified by the lack of regulations governing risk disclosure for listed firm in the Saudi 
market. It also may be justified based on the culture of investors and other 
stakeholders in developing countries as well as GCC such as Saudi Arabia in this 
case who do not have an interested about the disclosure in general and risks 
information in particular.  Concerning the ROA model, the study’ results (the 
association was positively significant) approves that improved risk disclosure has 
positive consequences on investor through increasing the shares’ liquidity and 
improving FV as well.  
The results show that disclosure of risk practices can increase the valuation of the 
firm as exhibited in the ROA model. Investors prefer to buy shares from firms that 
are perceived to have superior risk management capabilities; because better risk 
management abilities are associated positively with stock returns (Sensarma & 
Jayadev, 2009). This is consistent with the findings of the current study. Amran et al., 
(2009) explain this relationship using stakeholder theory: that company report risk 
disclosure needs to satisfy relevant stakeholders’ expectations about company’s 
performance in order to increase its market valuation not to reduce information 
asymmetries. 
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6.7 Summary   
This study empirically examines the relationship between the levels of voluntary risk 
disclosure and firm value of all Saudi listed banks. The findings of the multivariate 
analysis demonstrated that there is no association between the levels of voluntary 
risk disclosure and firm value as measured by the market to book value at the end of 
the year (MTBV). But, the results generated from the accounting based measure 
(ROA) show that there is a positively significant association between the levels of 
risk disclosure and firm value. This view is in line with Gelb and Zarowin (2002) who 
have documented that companies with high disclosure levels are more likely to 
demonstrate stronger levels of firm value.  In terms of the control variable, the 
findings indicated that there is a positively significant relationship between firm value 
and board size, profitability and leverage. This research’s outcomes showed that 
there are negatively significant associations between firm value and education levels 
and liquidity in the all listed banks in the first model. For the second model control 
variables BSIZE reported a positively significant relationship with firm value. Where, 
NOCH and LEV reported a negatively significant link with firm value. However, the 
rest of the control variables are split between two groups, the first group being 
negatively insignificant and the second group being insignificantly associated with 
firm value for both models.   
Even though a large body of prior research existed on the economic consequences 
of general disclosure, no prior research had been conducted on the relationship 
between risk disclosure and firm value. Therefore, this study contributes to the 
literature by being the first study to examine the extent of voluntary risk disclosure 
and its economic consequences as evidenced in the annual reports of banks. It also 
contributes to the general accounting disclosure literature and in particular 
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contributes to the literature on risk disclosure in developing economies. In particular 
in the GCC states since no prior research has examined such relationships. In 
addition, it furthers the understanding of the role of accounting information in relation 
to market valuation of firms. Such studies about these markets are necessary and 
are fundamental in relation to ameliorating the weak transparency and disclosure 
situation by attracting the attention of regulatory institutions and corporation directors 
(Uyar and Kilic, 2012).   
This study has several important implications for banks’ investors, regulatory bodies 
and any other interested groups on the importance of corporate voluntary risk 
disclosure and its economic consequences and can be used to increase the value 
relevance in the banking sector. It also informs regulators about the current level of 
risk disclosure in all Saudi listed banks as well as informing them of the influence risk 
disclosure has on the value of the firm. These institutions are expected to guide firms 
toward the best practices of disclosures since firms look for such guidance by 
performing motivating role in this new era of information disclosure. It also calls on to 
managers who prefer to withhold from offering information to shareholder to be more 
transparent if they prefer to increase their banks market value and entice more 
investment. 
Chapter Seven provides the concluding remarks of this thesis. It provides a summary 
of this study’s overview. It also presents a summary of the key findings of the 
research and discusses their implications. It includes a summary of possible 
limitations of the study and highlights several avenues of potential future research. 
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7 Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 
The principal aim of this chapter is to highlight the main conclusion of this 
investigation. This chapter is divided into five sections: an overview of the study; a 
summary of the key findings; a description of the contributions of the research to 
knowledge and to the practice of risk disclosure; an explanation of some of the 
implications of the study; the limitations of the study; and finally, recommendations 
for further research in the field of risk disclosure. 
7.1 Overview 
This study has examined current corporate voluntary risk disclosure practices in all 
banks listed on the Saudi Exchange Stock Market (Tadawul) and attempted to 
ascertain whether the level of voluntary risk disclosure in the annual reports of Saudi 
listed banks changed over the five year period under investigation. Also, this study 
examined whether the Saudi banks showed any variations in attitude towards 
voluntary risk reporting or established any limitations on voluntary risk disclosure 
practices. This study examined risk disclosure over five years to investigate present 
practices and initiate trends in risk disclosure practices.  
The accounting regulations and rules for banks have developed rapidly over the past 
few years in relation to risk taking and uncertainty. Also, due to the global financial 
crises, a number of regulatory reforms have been introduced, for example the 
International Financial Reporting Standard 7 Financial Instruments and BASEL II, 
which includes greater measures on risk transparency and disclosure. It also 
underlines the significance of informative risk disclosure in the banking industry for 
the overall enhancement of market discipline. The disclosure of informative risk 
information in banks has been emphasized as being a successful instrument for 
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eluding banking catastrophes (Financial Stability Board, 2012). Also, constructive 
and lengthy discussions by the office of financial research (OFR) have taken place in 
order to enhance the quality of financial reporting and satisfy the information needs 
of investors. Further, accounting institutions have developed a number of measures 
and frameworks to encourage risk disclosure in the annual reports of institutions.  
Thus, there is a need for more risk disclosure investigations to fill the gap in the 
literature (ICAEW, 2002, 2003, 2004).  Furthermore, there has been an increased 
attention on financial reporting in the accounting literature, and accounting standard 
setters have called for improved financial reporting so as to satisfy the information 
demands of investors and other interested user groups. The latter value annual 
reports since they are a prime source of risk/financial information and a means of 
communication; however, there are still demands for more timely disclosure and, in 
particular, demands for more forward-looking information. Thus, there is a need to 
increase the level of understanding of risk disclosure and risk management among 
capital market participants particularly in Saudi Arabia.  
The current study has offered a clearer understanding of the levels of voluntary risk 
disclosure in Saudi Arabian banking industry by examining the levels of risk 
disclosure in both set of banking systems in the kingdom; namely Islamic and non-
Islamic. Secondly, this study links the levels of annual report voluntary risk disclosure 
with some corporate and demographic characteristics to investigate what 
encourages banks to go beyond disclosure requirements and release further 
information needed by all users of annual reports. 
Thirdly, this study also explored the economic consequences of increasing voluntary 
risk information in the annual reports by empirically examining the effect of voluntary 
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risk disclosure levels on banks’ firm value. Evidently, augmented disclosures 
improve stock market liquidity and decrease the cost of capital due to decreased 
transaction costs and increased demand for securities, hence enhancing firm value 
(Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Lambert et al., 2007). However, empirical evidence has 
yielded a mixture of results (Hassan et al., 2009; Sheu et al., 2010; Vafaei et al., 
2011; Nekhili et al., 2012; Uyar and Kilic, 2012). Thus, the present study strived to 
conduct a comprehensive investigation on the impact of voluntary risk disclosure on 
firm value in the Saudi banking system. This investigation strived to advance the 
knowledge in this area as well as contributes to the above three arguments.  
7.2 Contributions  
This study bridges a gap between the three broad strands related to existing body of 
literature on disclosure (measures the levels of voluntary risk disclosure; explores 
the determinants of risk disclosure and investigates the economic consequences of 
risk disclosure).  
To the first strand, to the best of the researcher knowledge, there is not a single 
study examining the levels of voluntary risk disclosure in the context of Saudi Arabia 
in general or in both type of banking systems namely Islamic and non-Islamic. This 
investigation employs two comprehensive risk disclosure indices which were 
developed solely for the purpose of measuring the level of voluntary risk disclosure 
in Saudi listed banks. The indices included between them a total of 67 items that 
were expected to be published in the annual reports of the sample banks. The non-
Islamic risk disclosure index included 54 items, which were divided across 8 
categories: accounting policies, financial and other risks, derivative hedging and 
general risks information, financial instruments, reserves, segment information, 
business risk and compliance with regulations. The Islamic risk disclosure index 
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included 67 items, which were distributed across 10 categories: accounting policies, 
financial and other risks, derivative hedging and general risks information, financial 
instruments, reserves, segment information, business risk, compliance with 
regulations, Islamic bank risk characteristics and Islamic standards. This 
categorization of the two crafted risk disclosure indexes is due to the nature of the 
listed Saudi banks, where listed banks represent two sets of banks, namely Islamic 
banks and conventional banks, which are vigorously offering banking services in 
Saudi Arabia. 
 Also, the current study is of major contribution since it differs from Mousa and Elamir 
(2013); Mokhtar and Mellett, (2013) and Abdallah, et al., (2015), who studied a single 
attribute of corporate governance characteristics. And differs from Amran, Bin and 
Hassan, (2009); Hassan, (2009); Abdallah and Hassan, (2013); Al-Shammari, (2014) 
who did not explore corporate governance nor demographic attributes by 
comprehensively examining corporate risk disclosure and exploring demographic 
characteristics. Moreover, not a single study has examined corporate governance as 
a determinant of risk disclosure in the Saudi context. Also, not a single study of the 
above-mentioned has investigated the demographic traits of the top team 
management in emerging markets. Also, this investigation differs from all of the 
above-mentioned studies by examining the demographic characteristics of the top 
board of directors as well as incorporating the upper echelon theory into the risk 
reporting practice in the banking industry. Furthermore, this research differs from 
(Amran, Bin and Hassan, 2009; Hassan, 2009; Abdallah and Hassan, 2013; Mousa 
and Elamir, 2013; Mokhtar and Mellett, (2013); Al-Shammari, 2014; Abdallah, et al., 
2015) by being the first study to examine risk disclosure over a period of five years in 
developing economies.  
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To the third strand, previous studies have focused on the impacts of increased 
disclosure on the cost of capital (Elzahar et al., 2015); analysts’ forecasts (Wang et 
al., 2013); financial performance (Wang et al., 2008); and share price anticipation of 
earnings (Hussainey and Walker, 2009). This stream of literature is focused mainly 
on the international firms and conventional banks in developed countries. There 
have been very few studies that measured the association between disclosure and 
FV (Uyar and Kilic, 2012). Risk disclosure investigations are still missing. However, 
exploring this form of economic consequences on risk disclosure has not yet been 
empirically examined in Saudi banks. According to Hassan et al., (2009) this 
association is still worthy of empirical examination.  
This study also differs from all previous risk disclosure studies (Cabedo and Tirado, 
2004; Deumes, 2008; Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Rajab and Schachler, 2009; Hill 
and Short, 2009; Taylor, Tower and Neilson, 2010; Elshandidy, Fraser and 
Hussainey, 2015; Abdallah, Hassan and McClelland, 2015; Hassan et al., 2009; 
Healy et al., 1999; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Baek, Kang and Park, 2004; Vafaei et 
al., 2011; Da Silva and Alves, 2004; Hassan et al., 2009; Uyar and Kilic, 2012; 
Elzahar et al., 2015; Mohobbot, 2005; Konishi and Ali, 2007;) by being the first study 
to examine the level of voluntary risk disclosure in relation to firm value. Also, the 
current research differs from all of the above-mentioned studies by being the first 
study to examine voluntary risk disclosure in relation to firm value in listed banks 
over a five-year period.  
 This study also contributes to the understanding of the nature of voluntary risk 
disclosures in both banking systems in Saudi Arabia. It contributes to the literature 
on the risk disclosure practices between Islamic and non-Islamic banks in the most 
rapidly developing emerging market. It also contributes to the existing risk reporting 
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literature by being the first to investigate the levels and a combination of 
determinants of voluntary risk disclosure practices in all Saudi listed banks. In 
particular it advances and contributes to the literature on voluntary risk disclosure in 
developing economies by empirically examining the link between voluntary risk 
disclosure levels and the market valuation of all listed banks in Saudi. This study 
contributes to risk disclosure theories by employing the upper echelon theory in 
examining the determinates and their effects on risk disclosure practices. Further, 
this is the only study that examines the demographic traits of the board of directors in 
developing countries. In particular, this study contributes to the board demography, 
corporate governance and risk disclosure literature by theoretically justifying and 
empirically investigating the implications of such determinants and theories in terms 
of risk disclosure in the banking industry. Furthermore, it contributes to 
understanding the role of the accounting information in relation to market valuation of 
the firm. Such studies about such markets are required and are fundamental in 
enhancing the weak transparency and disclosure situation by enticing the attention 
of regulatory institutions and corporate managers (Uyar and Kilic, 2012).   
In brevity, this investigation makes major contributions to the literature and increases 
the knowledge on risk disclosure and reporting practices in the annual reports of all 
listed Saudi banks, namely Islamic and non-Islamic banks. It also makes a healthy 
contribution to the discussion on the levels, type, determinants, economic 
consequences and risk disclosure in banks annual reports. Augmentations in risk 
reporting in the annual reports could be seen as evidence of the international effort 
to regulate risk reporting in banks. 
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7.3 Empirical Findings   
The outcomes of the research established that the amount of voluntary risk 
disclosure tended to increase over the period, reflecting the increasing pressure from 
regulators and users during this time. There were variations in the reporting practices 
across the sample banks in terms of the total voluntary risk disclosure scores. This 
could be attributed to the absence of any kind of comprehensive standards or 
particular regulations regarding risk reporting and management in Saudi Arabia. 
Some banks did not report risk information as such but rather reported it as a part of 
their regular financial disclosure requirement. They were thus not completely 
following appropriate risk reporting procedures. This research used a content 
analysis approach that incorporated a checklist of items as a means of capturing the 
level of voluntary risk disclosure. 
In particular, the empirical findings of this study show that Islamic banks report less 
risk information than non-Islamic banks. However, the analysis reveals that both 
types of banks report approximately the same amount of risk information regarding 
the banks’ non-Islamic risk related items. Further, the empirical analysis shows that 
Islamic banks report very little concerning Islamic risk related disclosure items. 
Based on this, the following conclusion can be made: Islamic banks disclose less 
risk information than their non-Islamic counterparties. This outcome could be a 
reflection of the inherently conservative nature of the principles that guide Islamic 
financial institutions, which provide financial products that aim to serve the interests 
of society more broadly than do non-Islamic banks, which are more likely to focus 
upon profit maximization.  
The empirical findings also show that banks of high outsider ownership, high 
profitability, high regularity of audit committee meetings and a mixture of gender on 
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the board are more likely to demonstrate higher levels of voluntary risk disclosure. 
Contrastingly, voluntary risk disclosure is negatively affected by the levels of 
education of board members. As can be seen from the empirical findings, external 
ownership, audit committee meetings, gender diversity, education levels, profitability 
are primary determinants of voluntary risk disclosure practices in Saudi listed banks, 
while the rest of the independent variables of both corporate governance 
mechanisms and demographic traits are insignificantly correlated with the levels of 
voluntary risk disclosure practices in Saudi.  
Additionally, the findings also show no association between voluntary risk disclosure 
levels and firm value as measured by the market to book value at the end of the year 
(MTBV). However, based on the accounting based measure (ROA) the findings 
demonstrated a positively significant association between the levels of voluntary risk 
disclosure and firm value.  
In terms of the control variable the MTBV, the findings indicate CHS, BSIZE, PROF 
and DIVID are statistically significant and positively associated to FV, while EDUC is 
statistically significant and negatively correlated to FV. While, the findings the second 
model control variables show that board independence, audit committee 
independence, diversity and type of bank (Islamic vs non-Islamic) have positively 
significant association with firm value. Where, outside ownership reported a 
negatively significant link with firm value. However, the rest of the control variables 
are split between two groups, the first group being negatively insignificant and the 
second group being insignificantly associated with firm value for both models.   
These findings indicate that the association between voluntary risk disclosure and all 
of the variables (governance characteristics, demographic traits and firm-specific 
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attributes as control variables) cannot be the same in all capital markets since it 
relies on a number of factors: first, theoretical justification, where different 
investigations use different theories and a set of different hypothesis; second, the 
measure, where some variables can be measured using different measures; third, 
sample size, for example, small vs. large; and fourth, sector, for example financial vs. 
non-financial. It can accordingly be concluded that the association between risk 
disclosure and all of the variables remains worthy of investigation. This conclusion is 
supported by the mixed outcomes of previous researches.    
7.4 Implications 
7.4.1 Theoretical Implications  
This study has pioneered a novel contribution to the field of disclosure by 
incorporating the upper echelons theory into investigating disclosure. Particularly in 
this study this theory is extended into exploring the determinants of voluntary risk 
disclosure in all Saudi banks. A theory which has only been employed in fields other 
than disclosure. For instance, Peterson et al. (2003) used the upper echelons theory 
when examining the determinants of organisational performance, while Tihanyi et al. 
(2000) used it when exploring the effects of firm international diversification and 
Mutuku et al. (2013) employed it when studying the quality of decisions and 
performance. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no prior research has 
investigated disclosure in relation to the upper echelons theory. Hence, this is the 
first study to extend the employment of the upper echelons theory into the area of 
disclosure.   Where, in this investigation a fourth dimension (disclosure) was added 
to the original framework of the upper echelons theory, which can be directly affected 
by the upper echelons theory characteristics or indirectly by the outcomes of the 
overall performance of the company, where in some cases risk disclosure would 
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mean survival for a bank. This model also plays a vital part in determining key 
institutional effects, such as the provision of risk disclosure. It also grants us the 
opportunity to investigate the core determinants of board demography in relation to 
risk disclosure.    
This study has also contributed to the wide literature and discussion on a number of 
theories. The outcomes of the undertaken studies have particularly contributed to 
corporate risk disclosure theories in the developing world by examining risk 
disclosure levels, determinants and economic consequences in Saudi listed banks. 
According to signalling theory, larger companies rely more on external finance. 
Hence, they are motivated to release more risk information in order to send a good 
signal to investors and creditors regarding their ability to manage risk. The results 
are in line with signalling theory, where this study found that larger banks tend to 
disclose more voluntary risk information than smaller banks, confirming the above 
argument. Also this thesis outcome is concurrent with signalling theory, whereby 
managers tend to provide more risk management information to send a good signal 
to debt holders regarding corporate ability to meet obligations (Oliveira et al., 2011b).   
Where, this study reported that the risk disclosure levels decreased in tandem with 
the leverage ratio year by year over the entire sample period.   
The influence of risk disclosure on firm value can also be explained based on 
signalling theory. Based on the MTBV model the results indicate that there is an 
insignificant relationship between firm value and the levels of voluntary risk 
disclosure in Saudi listed banks. This outcome is inconsistent with the signalling 
theory, which indicates that when a firm’s performance is good, directors will signal 
their firm’s performance to their investors and the rest of the market by reporting 
more information voluntarily, whilst directors of firms that are performing badly will 
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not do so. However, the finding based on the accounting measure is consistent with 
the signalling theory argument. Also, signalling theory proposes that highly profitable 
companies will send signals of their quality to investors; this has been confirmed by 
the results of the second model.  
Also, the current study contributed to the legitimacy theory literature where this 
theory is established upon the idea that all corporations have a social contact; with 
their community; where they come into an agreement to conduct their activities in a 
manner acceptable and desired by the larger community. Legitimacy has come to 
stress how firms will react to community expectations. Where, this study reported 
that Islamic banks’ report low levels of risk disclosure regarding Islamic values. The 
weaknesses of disclosure about such values effect the investors’ as well as 
stakeholders’ perceptions towards the differences between the two sets of banks. 
This outcome is inconsistent with the argument of legitimacy theory that expects 
banks’ to act in accordance with the values of the community. For example, 
stakeholders who choose to deal with Islamic banks expect banks to fully comply 
with the Islamic values, and disclosure information concerning such actions. 
Moreover, the current thesis findings contribute to both agency theory and 
information asymmetry theory, which both propose that directors are only motivated 
to provide higher levels of voluntary risk disclosure when there is a widely dispersed 
ownership structure to mitigate information asymmetries owing to external pressures. 
By reporting that ownership structure has a significant influence on the levels of 
voluntary risk disclosure, confirming the above argument. Also, this thesis 
contributes to the agency theory literature, by reporting that managers of banks with 
high profitability tend to provide more risk information in order to justify their present 
performance to the shareholders as well as to justify their compensations to the firm’ 
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owners. This justification is concurrent with agency theory which argues that 
corporate managers of profitable corporations are driven to report more information 
to increase their compensation. 
Furthermore, outsiders cannot observe internal control activity and conduct in some 
circumstances due to the lack of regulations and guidance on internal control activity 
and conduct. Therefore, shareholders tend not to have a full understanding of the 
nature and scope of internal control systems. This leads to shareholders having 
difficulty appreciating managers’ efforts to counter risks. However, the findings show 
that banks with high frequency of audit committee meetings are more motivated to 
disclose more voluntary risk information. This outcome is consistent with the agency 
theory, whereby internal and external monitoring practices complement each other in 
reducing agency conflicts and information asymmetry problem between different 
types of stockholders.  
This study contributes to the stakeholder theory, which states that banks always 
deals with many users as their stakeholders. Thus, banks must uphold good 
communication channel with their stakeholders by revealing their performance timely 
and transparently. The results show that disclosure of risk practices can increase the 
valuation of the firm as exhibited in the ROA model. Investors prefer to buy shares 
from firms that are perceived to have superior risk management capabilities; 
because better risk management abilities are associated positively with stock returns. 
This is consistent with the findings of the current study as this relationship can be 
explained using stakeholder theory where banks disclose risk disclosure information 
to satisfy relevant stakeholders’ expectations about a bank’s performance in order to 
increase its market valuation and not to reduce information asymmetries. 
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7.4.2 Practical implications  
Examining the current level of voluntary risk reporting in annual reports can help 
financial reporting experts determine whether risk disclosure in annual reports is an 
area of best practice for corporate risk communication. Therefore, this investigation 
could be of great help to banks, managers, investors, regulators and any interested 
user groups with a keen interest in corporate reporting. Also, all users of annual 
financial reports might wish to expand their examination and manually confirm 
disclosure exercises made by their banks by looking at the current investigation.  
Increasing demand from shareholders for applicable risk reporting exercises has 
confirmed the necessity for tighter risk reporting procedures and regulations to re-
establish confidence in capital markets and in corporate reporting in general. The 
findings of this examination lead to the conclusion that risk information requirements 
made by investors and all stakeholder groups are not fully satisfied at the current 
time in Saudi banks’ annual reports since the level of the reported voluntary risk 
disclosure is still below the level reported by other investigation done elsewhere 
(Amran et al., 2008).    
Hence, policy makers, accounting organisations, accounting institutes and the 
academic community are mindful of the importance of the provision of rules and 
guidance on how to enhance risk reporting practices. Policy makers should develop 
the means to improve banks’ participation in risk disclosure practices. For example, it 
would be wise to concentrate their efforts on developing a framework for risk 
reporting practices and guidelines for banks to follow in order to offer appropriate risk 
information that can be employed by shareholders when assessing the risk profile of 
the banks.  
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It also has been established that there is a need to push banks to offer more 
comprehensive statements on business risk factors since banks are by nature risk 
management entities, with emphasis on specific risks that are associated with a 
particular bank. Regulators have to ensure that they encourage banks to make an 
effort to provide better quality risk information in their annual statements. Banks 
should also report the potential impact, the details of risk management and the 
mitigation methods used.  Mandating risk reporting practices could however have 
limited influence on risk reporting quality and could impose adversarial disclosure 
motivations as well. 
This investigation results have a number of important implications for regulatory 
bodies in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as they attempt to ensure information 
adequacy and the increased efficiency of the most rapidly developing capital market. 
Particularly, the reported results should be useful to accounting and risk regulatory 
bodies by providing information about the inadequacies of risk reporting in Saudi 
banking sector. Regulatory institutions should be above all concerned about the 
disclosure needs of users. Therefore, SAMA, SOCOPA and CMA are called on to 
find solutions to improve the reporting of risk information in the Saudi banking 
industry. Specifically, this study is significant in that it sheds light on the voluntary 
risk-disclosing practices of banks that operate in an environment that is often 
considered to be opaque. Saudi Arabia scored zero on the secrecy vs. transparency 
measure in Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. Also, managers could use the results of 
this study to compare the amount of information reported in their annual reports with 
other banks to ensure financing. The study also provides information for managers to 
keep investors satisfied about the risk that their banks encounter. Investors may use 
the findings for understanding risk disclosure behaviour of listed banks on Tadawul. 
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It informs investors about the characteristics of risk information in their annual 
reports.  
Secondly, the findings of this study also provide important implications, by supplying 
banks’ stockholders, regulatory bodies and any other interested groups about the 
importance of corporate governance and demographic determinants, which can be 
used to augment voluntary risk reporting in the banking industry in an effort to ensure 
information adequacy and increased market efficiency. The reported findings should 
be useful to accounting and risk regulators by providing information about the 
inadequacies of risk disclosure in Saudi and a more complete picture of risk 
components and determinants in listed banks. Also such findings are useful for 
exploring corporate governance attributes and demographic traits which are likely to 
influence risk reporting levels. These implications could extend to the corporate 
governance, board demography and risk disclosure literature by theoretically 
justifying and empirically investigating the implications of such determinants and 
theories in regards to voluntary risk disclosure in the banking sector. This focus is 
significant because it provides insights into the determinants of voluntary risk 
disclosure in banks that operate in an environment regarded as being invariably 
opaque.  
Thirdly, this study has several important implications for banks’ investors, regulatory 
bodies and any other interested groups on the importance of corporate voluntary risk 
disclosure and its economic consequences and can be used to increase the value 
relevance in the banking sector. It also informs regulators about the current level of 
risk disclosure in all Saudi listed banks as well as informing them of the influence risk 
disclosure has on the value of the firm. These institutions are expected to guide firms 
toward the best practices of disclosures since firms look for such guidance by 
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performing motivating role in this new era of information disclosure. It also calls on to 
managers who prefer to withhold from offering information to shareholder to be more 
transparent if they prefer to increase their banks market value and entice more 
investment. This can be used to increase the value relevance in the banking sector.  
These conclusions imply that regulations should be improved so as to provide clear 
guidance on risk disclosure practices and risk management. Additionally, mandating 
risk disclosure could reduce the motivation for managers to improve disclosures; 
hence, when presenting rules on disclosure, regulators have to carefully weigh the 
costs and benefits of disclosure for the banks against the information needs of the 
investors and interested user groups so as to set effective rules for risk disclosures. 
A typical model would be the concept of “safe harbour” in the Company Act 2006 in 
the UK, which inspires companies to report more information details, specifically 
forward-looking and risk disclosure (ASB, 2007, p.3), without the risk of litigation 
costs arising.  
7.5 Limitations 
This research widens our knowledge on risk disclosure levels and practices and the 
empirical knowledge on disclosure in general and risk disclosure quantity in 
particular. Further, it increases the knowledge on the determinants and economic 
consequences of voluntary risk reporting practices, for instance demographic traits, 
corporate governance and firm value.  
However, there is no research without any limitations, and this investigation is no 
exception. First, this study used content analysis to measure the level of voluntary 
risk disclosure through creating risk disclosure indices by simply adding up the 
number of words, which have been predetermined in the risk disclosure checklists. 
The content analysis approach in that interpretation was potentially subjective. Such 
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subjectivity is inherent in any content analysis research and cannot be completely 
removed. However, the research attempted to minimise it by employing validity and 
reliability measures. An interrelated limitation is that the study explores disclosure 
quantity by counting the number of words reported in annual reports but does not 
investigate quality. The latter would be a fruitful area of research.  
Second, this study relied only on annual reports to measure voluntary risk disclosure 
levels. However, information about risk can be provided in means other than annual 
reports, such as interim reports, press-releases, conference calls, web sites or 
prospectuses. These means, which might be valuable for decision-making processes, 
were not reflected in this study. It is likely that banks offer additional risk disclosure 
via these platforms, which could impact upon the amount of risk information available 
in the annual reports. Hence, the data is to some degree incomplete and thus not 
definitive regarding the overall risk disclosure levels. However, these other sources 
of communications could therefore provide a source for significant data collection for 
future research on voluntary risk disclosure. Such results could determine similarities 
and differences across both types of data sources. 
Third, this study ignored the joint influence of corporate governance, board 
demography and corporate-specific characteristics on voluntary risk disclosure 
reporting by financial and non-financial institutions. Future studies may examine both 
financial and non-financial institutions to provide a bigger picture of the impact of 
corporate governance, board demography and firm specific characteristics on the 
levels of voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi Arabia.  This investigation only focused on 
a single setting, namely Saudi Arabia. Therefore, an extension of this investigation 
may be to compare risk disclosure practices between the emerging markets of the 
232 | P a g e  
Middle East and Saudi Arabia. Such investigation would offer valuable insights and 
add to the literature on disclosure.   
Fourth, the sample of this study consisted only of listed Saudi banks, and thus the 
results may not be valid for other sectors, such as manufacturing and merchandising. 
Also, the small sample size of this study may limit the generalisability of the study, 
despite the sample being all available banks on the Saudi stock market during the 
development of this study. Another related limitation could be the sample period, 
which was restricted to only five years in order to include all the available data and 
banks.  In spite of the noted limitations, the study did offer important insights into the 
levels of voluntary risk disclosure practices, determinants and consequences in 
Saudi Arabia. Also, in spite of the noted limitations, this study is hoped to inspire 
further investigations in this area of research, particularly in emerging markets. 
7.6 Suggestions for Further Research  
This study focused on the quantity of voluntary risk disclosure and ignored the 
quality of voluntary risk disclosure. Therefore, latter area could be the subject of 
further empirical research in emerging markets. Also, any further research could 
investigate the levels, determinants and economic consequences of risk disclosure 
practices in a cross country setting to better understand how disclosure practices in 
different regulatory settings could affect the extent of risk disclosure. This study only 
examined banks. Therefore, the non-financial sector and service industry could offer 
fruitful areas for further studies. 
This study also suggests a number of other openings for future research. In the field 
of corporate risk disclosure in the Middle East, research could extend this study over 
a longer period of time or alternatively involve comparative studies with other Arab 
countries, such as the Gulf Co-Operation Council (GCC) member states. Such 
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studies could investigate the changes in corporate risk disclosures across time and 
compare potential variations in nations with to a certain extent similar social, political 
and economic systems. This may also help researchers to understand why 
managers choose to disclose certain aspects of risk information and why they 
withhold other aspects. Additional research could also be undertaken to examine the 
economic consequences of risk reporting in annual reports (e.g. the effect on prices 
leading earnings, cost of capital, analyst following and characteristics of analysts' 
forecasts). Although a large body of prior research exists on the economic 
consequences of general disclosure, there is no prior research on the relationship 
between risk disclosure and firm value apart from this study. Therefore, this could be 
a fruitful area of research.  Also, the usefulness of risk disclosure could be further 
researched by investigating the cost of capital and annual reports’ risk disclosure 
and the impact of timely risk disclosure on stock market volatility and share price 
movement. 
It would be of great importance to investigate the determinants and economic 
consequences of risk disclosure within both types of banking systems in Saudi 
Arabia namely Islamic vs Non-Islamic to identify what drives risk disclosure levels 
and to see whether the levels of risk disclosure effect the market valuation or not in 
both sets of banks. This kind of investigations will allow annual reports users to 
identify the core determinates of Islamic banks risk disclosure  vs non-Islamic banks 
and at the same time will allow them to identify the potential economic 
consequences of such bank’s risk disclosure on an individual level rather than as a 
whole industry which this study has successfully accomplished. 
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Appendices 
 
Non-Islamic Risk-Related Disclosure Index 
Category and type of reported risks References  
Accounting Policies  
Risk Management 
 
Abdullah et al., 2015; Alfredson et al., 2007; Lopes and Rodrigues, 
2007; ICAEW, 1997, 2000;  
Objective of Holding Derivatives/ 
instruments  
Alfredson et al., 2007; Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; ICAEW, 1997, 
2000; Abdullah et al., 2015;  
Use of Estimates   Abdullah et al., 2015; Alfredson et al., 2007; ICAEW, 1997, 2000; 
Hassan, 2009 
Collateral Assets against Loans  Alfredson et al., 2007; Abdullah et al., 2015; Hassan, 2009 
Financial Assets Impairment Abdullah et al., 2015; Alfredson et al., 2007; Lopes and Rodrigues, 
2007; ICAEW, 1997, 2000; Hassan, 2009 
Other Assets Impairment Alfredson et al., 2007; Abdullah et al., 2015; Lopes and Rodrigues, 
2007; ICAEW, 1997, 2000; Hassan, 2009 
Contingent Liabilities Alfredson et al., 2007; ICAEW, 1997, 2000; Abdullah et al., 2015; 
Hassan, 2009  
Contingent Assets Alfredson et al., 2007; ICAEW, 1997, 2000; Abdullah et al., 2015; 
Hassan, 2009 
Detailed risk management  Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; Alfredson et al., 2007;  
Contingency  Abdullah et al., 2015; Hassan, 2009;  
Financial and other risks  
Pricing Risk ICAEW, 1997, 2000; Abdullah et al., 2015, Lipunga, 2014;  
Commodity risk  Abdullah et al., 2015;  
Liquidity risk Abdullah et al., 2015; Alfredson et al., 2007; ICAEW, 1997, 2000; 
Lipunga, 2014; Hassan, 2009 
Credit risk  Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; ICAEW, 1997, 2000; Lipunga, 2014  
Capital Adequacy Lipunga, 2014; Abdullah et al., 2015  
Changes in Interest Rates Abdullah et al., 2015 
Credit Risk Exposure  Abdullah et al., 2015 
Operational Risk Abdullah et al., 2015; ICAEW, 1997, 2000; Lipunga, 2014  
Insurance Risk Abdullah et al., 2015; ICAEW, 1997, 2000 
Market Risk Abdullah et al., 2015; Ahmed et al., 2004; Lipunga, 2014 
Interest Rate Lipunga, 2014; Abdullah et al., 2015; 
Currency risk Lipunga, 2014 
Exchange Rate Abdullah et al., 2015  
Sustainability Risk  
Sensitivity Analysis Abdullah et al., 2015; Ahmed et al., 2004  
Derivatives hedging and general risks   
Cash flow Hedge Alfredson et al., 2007; Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; Abdullah et al., 
2015 
Equity Risk Abdullah et al., 2015 
Customer Satisfaction Abdullah et al., 2015 
Competition (Service Market)  Abdullah et al., 2015; ICAEW, 1997, 2000 
Natural Disasters ICAEW, 1997, 2000; Abdullah et al., 2015; Lipunga, 2014  
Communications Abdullah et al., 2015 
Outsourcing Abdullah et al., 2015 
Reputation Abdullah et al., 2015; Lipunga, 2014 
Reputation risk  Abdullah et al., 2015; Lipunga, 2014 
Physical disasters (Explosions and Fire) Lipunga, 2014  
Changes in Technology Abdullah et al., 2015;  
Financial instruments  
Derivatives Hassan, 2009; Abdullah et al., 2015 
Cumulative Change in Fair value Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; Alfredson et al., 2007; Abdullah et al., 
2015;  
Reserves  
General Reserves Hassan, 2009; Abdullah et al., 2015 
Statutory Reserves Hassan, 2009; Abdullah et al., 2015 
Other Reserves Hassan, 2009; Abdullah et al., 2015 
Segment information  
Geographical Concentration  Alfredson et al., 2007; Abdullah et al., 2015; ICAEW, 1997, 2000;  
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Customer Concentration  Hassan, 2009; Abdullah et al., 2015; ICAEW, 1997, 2000  
Business risk   
General Financial Problems  Hassan, 2009 
Regional Financial Problems  Hassan, 2009  
Political risk  Abdullah et al., 2015  
Diversification   
Performance  Abdullah et al., 2015;  
Compliance     
Compliance with listing rules  Lipunga, 2014 
Compliance with financial regulations  Lipunga, 2014 
Compliance with companies act 
requirements  
Lipunga, 2014 
Compliance with other regulations and 
laws  
Lipunga, 2014 
Litigation risk  Lipunga, 2014 
Health and Safety  Lipunga, 2014 
 
Islamic Risk-Related Disclosure Index  
Category and type of reported risks References  
Accounting Policies  
Risk Management 
 
Abdullah et al., 2015; Alfredson et al., 2007; Lopes and Rodrigues, 
2007; ICAEW, 1997, 2000;  
Objective of Holding Derivatives/ instruments  Alfredson et al., 2007; Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; ICAEW, 1997, 
2000; Abdullah et al., 2015;  
Use of Estimates   Abdullah et al., 2015; Alfredson et al., 2007; ICAEW, 1997, 2000; 
Hassan, 2009 
Collateral Assets against Loans  Alfredson et al., 2007; Abdullah et al., 2015; Hassan, 2009 
Financial Assets Impairment Abdullah et al., 2015; Alfredson et al., 2007; Lopes and Rodrigues, 
2007; ICAEW, 1997, 2000; Hassan, 2009 
Other Assets Impairment Alfredson et al., 2007; Abdullah et al., 2015; Lopes and Rodrigues, 
2007; ICAEW, 1997, 2000; Hassan, 2009 
Contingent Liabilities Alfredson et al., 2007; ICAEW, 1997, 2000; Abdullah et al., 2015; 
Hassan, 2009  
Contingent Assets Alfredson et al., 2007; ICAEW, 1997, 2000; Abdullah et al., 2015; 
Hassan, 2009 
Detailed risk management  Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; Alfredson et al., 2007;  
Contingency  Abdullah et al., 2015; Hassan, 2009;  
Financial and other risks  
Pricing Risk ICAEW, 1997, 2000; Abdullah et al., 2015, Lipunga, 2014;  
Commodity risk  Abdullah et al., 2015;  
Liquidity risk Abdullah et al., 2015; Alfredson et al., 2007; ICAEW, 1997, 2000; 
Lipunga, 2014; Hassan, 2009 
Credit risk  Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; ICAEW, 1997, 2000; Lipunga, 2014  
Capital Adequacy Lipunga, 2014; Abdullah et al., 2015  
Changes in Interest Rates Abdullah et al., 2015 
Credit Risk Exposure  Abdullah et al., 2015 
Operational Risk Abdullah et al., 2015; ICAEW, 1997, 2000; Lipunga, 2014  
Insurance Risk Abdullah et al., 2015; ICAEW, 1997, 2000 
Market Risk Abdullah et al., 2015; Ahmed et al., 2004; Lipunga, 2014 
Interest Rate Lipunga, 2014; Abdullah et al., 2015; 
Currency risk Lipunga, 2014 
Exchange Rate Abdullah et al., 2015  
Sustainability Risk  
Sensitivity Analysis Abdullah et al., 2015; Ahmed et al., 2004  
Derivatives hedging and general risks   
Cash flow Hedge Alfredson et al., 2007; Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; Abdullah et al., 
2015 
Equity Risk Abdullah et al., 2015 
Customer Satisfaction Abdullah et al., 2015 
Competition (Service Market)  Abdullah et al., 2015; ICAEW, 1997, 2000 
Natural Disasters ICAEW, 1997, 2000; Abdullah et al., 2015; Lipunga, 2014  
Communications Abdullah et al., 2015 
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Category and type of reported risks References  
Outsourcing Abdullah et al., 2015 
Reputation Abdullah et al., 2015; Lipunga, 2014 
Reputation risk  Abdullah et al., 2015; Lipunga, 2014 
Physical disasters (Explosions and Fire) Lipunga, 2014  
Changes in Technology Abdullah et al., 2015;  
Financial instruments  
Derivatives Hassan, 2009; Abdullah et al., 2015 
Cumulative Change in Fair value Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; Alfredson et al., 2007; Abdullah et al., 
2015;  
Reserves  
General Reserves Hassan, 2009; Abdullah et al., 2015 
Statutory Reserves Hassan, 2009; Abdullah et al., 2015 
Other Reserves Hassan, 2009; Abdullah et al., 2015 
Segment information  
Geographical Concentration  Alfredson et al., 2007; Abdullah et al., 2015; ICAEW, 1997, 2000;  
Customer Concentration  Hassan, 2009; Abdullah et al., 2015; ICAEW, 1997, 2000  
Business risk   
General Financial Problems  Hassan, 2009 
Regional Financial Problems  Hassan, 2009  
Political risk  Abdullah et al., 2015  
Diversification  
Performance  Abdullah et al., 2015;  
Compliance     
Compliance with listing rules  Lipunga, 2014 
Compliance with financial regulations  Lipunga, 2014 
Compliance with companies act requirements  Lipunga, 2014 
Compliance with other regulations and laws  Lipunga, 2014 
Litigation risk  Lipunga, 2014 
Health and Safety  Lipunga, 2014 
Islamic Bank Risk characteristics  
Mudarabah risk  IFSB 2007 
Musharakah risk IFSB 2007  
Murabaha risk IFSB 2007 
Ijarah risk IFSB 2007 
Qard Hasan risk  IFSB 2007 
Al-Istisna risk IFSB 2007 
Salam risk  IFSB 2007 
Sukuk risk IFSB 2007 
Wakalah risk IFS B2007 
Islamic Standards  
Unusual supervisory restrictions AAIOFI 2014 
Earnings or expenditures prohibited by shari’a 
law 
AAIOFI 2014 
The method used by the Islamic bank to 
allocate investment profits (loss) between 
unrestricted investment account holders or 
their equivalent and the Islamic bank as a 
Mudarib or as an investment with its own 
funds 
AAIOFI 2014 
Statement of restricted investments AAIOFI 2014 
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A chorological summary of all empirical risk disclosure studies in the developed world 
Studies Period Country Method Sample 
Disclosure 
Items 
Dependent 
Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
Sector Findings Limitations 
ICAEW, 
1999 
1998 UK Content 
analysis, 
Benchmark 
study 
14 ----- --------- --------- -------- Companies provide some risk information 
voluntarily. Regulatory reform in the UK 
includes risk related requirements. Best 
practice would be achieved within the current 
reform. Companies need to explain risks, 
action and measurements applied.  
--------- 
Solomon, 
Solomon 
and 
Norton, 
2000 
1999 UK Questionnaire   Total 552 
(97 
satisfactorily 
completed)  
-------- Attitudes of 
the UK 
institutional 
investors 
towards risk 
disclosure 
 
Environment  
Level of risk 
disclosure  
Investor’s attitudes 
Location 
Form of risk 
disclosure  
Risk disclosure 
preference 
  
Financial  Conceptualization of a framework to report 
risk information. Risk disclosures were 
inadequate. Managers should provide detailed 
information about risk exposures and 
strategies to mitigate them. All types of risk 
should be disclosed equally. Increased risk 
disclosures help in portfolio investment 
decision.  Risk disclosure is an important 
issue within corporate governance.  Voluntary 
framework of disclosure should be maintained 
and include risk disclosure.  
Their methodology 
presents a static 
picture of the state 
of emerging issues 
in CG. Research 
may indicate more 
of the dynamic 
nature of the risk 
disclosure issue. 
Carlon, 
Loftus and 
Miller, 2003 
1998 Australia  00000000 54 -------- Risk related 
disclosure  
- Identification 
and 
management 
of risks  
Nature of operations  
Risk concentrations  
Estimates used in 
financial statements  
Insurance and 
uninsured risks  
Treasury Risks  
Nonfinancial  Diverse application of risk reporting 
requirements related to financial instruments.  
Significant variation in the content and level of 
detail in the disclosures on the identification 
and management of risks. 
 
This study is limited 
by the reliance on 
public disclosures 
for information 
about risks known 
to management 
and, consequently, 
ignorance of 
undisclosed risks. 
Linsley and 
Shrives, 
2003  
2000 UK, 
Germany 
Content 
analysis,  
Regression 
analysis 
 
 
11 --------- Risk related 
disclosure 
Leverage  
Size  
Book to market value 
of equity  
--------- German and UK companies disclose similar 
levels of risk information. There are few 
quantitative disclosures. The most disclosed 
category is “non-monetary/future” 
explanations of the company’s general risk 
management and internal control systems. 
Size: Positive 
Book-to-market values of equity: Not 
association  
Leverage: Not association 
--------- 
Beretta and 
Bozzolan,  
2004  
2001  Italy  Content 
analysis,  
Disclosure 
Index, 
Regression 
analysis  
85  75  Amount of 
risk 
disclosure  
Size  
Industry  
Nonfinancial  Risk disclosure is mostly qualitative, with few 
disclosures of interrelations between risk 
factors and their potential impact. Risk 
disclosure is not significantly associated with 
size and Industry 
 
---------- 
Cabedo 
and Tirado, 
1991-2001 Spain Regression 
analysis  
1000 10000 Risk related 
disclosure  
Financial risks  
 
Mixed   Value At Risk is a suitable method for 
quantifying most of a firm’s risks  
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Studies Period Country Method Sample 
Disclosure 
Items 
Dependent 
Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
Sector Findings Limitations 
2004  -Bootstrap 
techniques  
Business risks 
 
Strategic risks  
The measure of risks would enhance the 
users estimations of ‘expected return and risk’ 
when used in the investment decision-making.  
Linsley and 
Shrives, 
2005 
2001 UK Content 
analysis,  
Disclosure 
Index,  
Regression 
analysis  
79 -------- Risk related 
disclosure 
Size 
Gearing ratio 
Beta factor 
Book-to-market value 
of equity 
Quiscore 
Asset cover ratio 
Leverage 
 
Nonfinancial  Most disclosed risk categories were strategic, 
financial, and integrity risk. 
There is minimal disclosure of quantified risk 
information and a significant proportion of risk 
disclosures consist of generalized statements 
of risk policy.  
The principal driver affecting levels of risk 
disclosure is company size and not company 
risk level.  
Forward-looking risk information is 
significantly higher than in the past.  
Dearth of monetary disclosure.  
Lack of research in 
different areas of 
RD e.g. RD studies 
within specific 
industry sectors 
and cross-country 
investigations. The 
sentence-based 
methodology does 
not measure the 
quality of risk 
disclosure. 
Korosec 
and Horvat, 
2005 
 
2003 Slovenia  Content 
analysis,  
Disclosure 
Index,  
Regression 
analysis  
36 ---------- Risk related 
disclosure  
--------- Mixed   Partial compliance with institutionalized 
requirements. Disclosure of general definitions 
of risks was mostly financial. Little information 
about how risk management is organised 
within a company. Tendency to hide 
information about certain risks.  
The banking sector reports in more detail 
about risk management activities or about 
ensuring safety. Disclosure of credit ratings 
awarded by international rating agencies and 
reporting of operational risk is neglected. 
--------- 
Lajili and 
Zeghal, 
2005  
1999 Canada  Content 
analysis  
300 -------- Risk related 
disclosure  
---------- Mixed   Large variation, in particular in voluntary risk 
reporting. Risk reporting mostly qualitative. 
Few disclosures of risk assessment, risk 
analysis is limited and lacks valuable. Few risk 
forecasts. 
--------- 
Mohobbot, 
2005 
2003 Japan  Content 
analysis,  
Disclosure 
Index,  
Regression 
analysis  
90 ------- Risk related 
disclosure 
Size 
Profitability 
Leverage 
Ownership structure 
 
Nonfinancial 
 
 
 
 
 
Large variation in risk reporting  
Risk disclosures are descriptive and little 
quantitative. Larger firms report more risk 
information than smaller firms.  
Little forward-looking risks  
Firm size: Positive  
Level of risk: Not significant  
Profitability: Not significant  
Ownership distribution: Not significant  
-------- 
Linsley and 
Shrives, 
2006 
2000 UK Content 
analysis,  
Disclosure 
Index,  
Regression 
analysis  
79 ------- Number of 
risk 
disclosures 
 
Level of 
environmental 
Size 
Gearing ratio 
Beta factor 
Book-to-market value 
of equity 
Quiscore 
Nonfinancial Large variation in risk disclosure  
Few quantitative disclosures  
Size: Positive  
Level of environmental risk:  Positive  
Level of risk mixed results   
 
Lack of research is 
in many different 
areas of RD. It’s 
also beneficial to 
adopt multi-
disciplinary 
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Studies Period Country Method Sample 
Disclosure 
Items 
Dependent 
Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
Sector Findings Limitations 
risk 
 
Asset cover ratio 
Leverage 
Environmental risk 
 
Overall the dominance of statements of 
general risk management policy and a lack of 
coherence in the risk narratives implies that a 
risk information gap exists and consequently 
stakeholders are unable to adequately assess 
the risk profile of a company.  
 
approaches as 
insights drawn from 
areas such as 
sociology may 
present alternative 
methodological 
approaches to 
assist future RD 
research. 
Linsley, 
Shrives 
and 
Crumpton, 
2006 
2002 UK, 
Canada  
Content 
analysis, 
Regression 
analysis 
18 ------- Risk related 
disclosure 
Risk Definitions Size 
Profitability Leverage  
Financial  Disclosures are forward-looking, qualitative 
and neutral. The most frequent risks disclosed 
are credit risk, capital structure and adequacy 
risk, and market risk. Similar levels of 
disclosure between Canadian banks and UK 
banks. Risk disclosures are correlated 
positively with size and the number of risk 
definitions. 
Little quantitative 
risk information is 
disclosed. There is 
a very strong bias 
to disclosing past 
rather than future 
risk-related 
information. Risk 
disclosure is still 
evolving within the 
academic literature 
and therefore 
suggestions are 
made for further 
empirical research. 
Combes-
Thuélin, 
Henneron 
and 
Touron, 
2006  
2002 France  Qualitative 
analysis 
based on 
Huberman 
and Miles, 
1994  
 
 
3 --------- Risk related 
disclosure  
------------ Nonfinancial  Lack of harmonization between different 
companies, institutional context and company 
practice.  No consensus between the different 
pieces of legislation, the terminology referred 
to by companies tends to differ from one to 
another. The reporting of risk related 
information favours risk management over risk 
description. 
 
This research 
focused on risk 
disclosure within 
annual reports of 
listed companies 
and on risk 
reporting within 
mandatory 
provisions. 
Konishi 
and Ali, 
2007 
2003 Japan  Content 
analysis,  
Disclosure 
Index,  
Regression 
analysis  
100 --------- Risk related 
disclosure 
Size 
Level of risk 
Profitability 
Cross corporate 
shareholding pattern 
Ownership structure 
 
---------- Risk reporting varies across industry. 
Companies are reluctant to quantify risk. They 
disclose more good news than bad/neutral 
news.  
Size: Positive  
Level of risk:  Insignificant  
Profitability:  Insignificant  
Ownership distribution: Insignificant.  
Cross-firm shareholding: Insignificant  
Industry type: Insignificant  
--------- 
Abraham 
and Cox, 
2007 
2002 UK Content 
analysis, 
Disclosure 
71 ------- Risk related 
disclosure  
Ownership structure  
Executive directors  
Independent non-
Nonfinancial Only 40% of sample firms publish information 
about business risk.  Limited variation in firms’ 
reporting of internal control. Size, risk and 
Examined one 
dimension of risk 
disclosure by only 
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Studies Period Country Method Sample 
Disclosure 
Items 
Dependent 
Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
Sector Findings Limitations 
index, 
Regression 
analysis  
executive directors  
Dependent non-
executive directors 
Leverage  
Size  
Level of risk  
Industry  
US dual listing 
independent non-executive directors were 
associated positively with risk reporting. 
Ownership by long-term stakeholders is linked 
negatively with risk reporting. Short-term is 
positively linked to financial risk reporting. The 
number of dependent nonexecutive directors 
is not related to the level of risk reporting UK 
firms with a US stock exchange listing do 
disclose more risk information within the UK 
annual report than non-US-listed UK firms. 
counting the words 
in sentences. Also 
this study is 
missing the 
relationship 
between RD and 
ownership and 
governance 
variables 
Deumes, 
2008 
1997-2000 Netherland Content 
analysis 
Disclosure 
index  
90 ------ Risk related 
disclosure  
Size  
Industry type   
Type of offering  
Cross listing at foreign 
exchange  
Nonfinancial  Positive association with firm size, type of 
industry, type of offering, cross-listing at a 
foreign exchange, and the language in which 
the prospectus was written. The results further 
showed that when it comes to predicting future 
risk, the information extracted from the texts is 
more successful than market information on 
past risk. 
One of the 
limitations of the 
research is that it 
entirely focuses on 
what the risk 
sections contain 
rather than how 
risks are reported 
and why? 
Deumes 
and 
Knechel, 
2008 
1997-1999 Netherland Content 
analysis,  
Disclosure 
index 
Regression 
analysis  
192 6 Risk related 
disclosure 
Firm Size 
Foreign operations  
Profitability  
Sales Growth 
Inventory  
Industry classification  
Cross-listing of shares  
Audit Quality 
Independent outside 
directors 
Leverage  
Managerial ownership  
Ownership structure  
 
Nonfinancial  
 
 
Negative relationship between the extent of 
risk disclosure and block holder ownership 
and managerial ownership.  
Positive relationship between the extent of 
disclosure and financial leverage.  
Company size and profitability were positively 
associated with risk disclosure.  
Industry classification was positive and 
significant indicating that companies from the 
trade sector were significantly more 
transparent about risk disclosure.  
Proxy for ownership 
concentration 
reflects agency 
issues among 
managers and 
investors. 
Blockholder 
monitoring reduces 
blockholders and 
small investor may 
increase at the 
same time, 
affecting 
management’s 
incentive to 
disclose. 
Rajab and 
Schachler, 
2009 
1998,2001, 
2004 
UK Content 
Analysis, 
Regression 
analysis   
52 --------- Non-financial 
risk 
disclosures 
Size 
Leverage 
Industry 
Listing status 
 
 
Nonfinancial 
There is an increasing risk disclosure trend in 
the annual report over the six-year period in 
response to accounting regulation and 
accounting institutes’ recommendations. 
Qualitative, non-time and good news risk 
disclosures dominate. US dual-listing and 
industry are significantly and positively related 
to risk disclosure. Size and leverage were not 
associated with risk disclosure. 
 
 
Disregarded 
medium-sized and 
smaller companies. 
Their analysis was 
restricted to 
disclosure available 
only on the annual 
report. Yet, it is 
know that 
companies 
communicate with 
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Studies Period Country Method Sample 
Disclosure 
Items 
Dependent 
Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
Sector Findings Limitations 
 
 
investors through 
other channels, like 
internet 
Hill and 
Short, 2009 
1991-2003 UK Content 
analysis, 
Regression 
analysis  
420 ---------- Risk related 
disclosure  
Ownership structure  
Managerial structure  
Leverage  
Industry type  
Age of the company  
Nonfinancial  Deficient in the provision of information in 
relation to internal controls and risk 
management. High proportion of forward-
looking information. Low proportion of 
information on internal controls and risk 
management. Disclosure has increased 
across time. Managerial ownership is 
associated negatively with risk disclosure. 
Risk disclosure is not preferred by all firms as 
a means of reducing information asymmetry. 
-------- 
Taylor, 
Tower and 
Neilson, 
2010 
2002-2006 Australia Disclosure 
Index,  
Regression 
analysis  
111 27 Financial risk 
management 
categories 
 
Corporate 
governance 
strength 
Capital raising events 
Size 
Leverage 
Overseas listings 
Profitability 
Ownership structure 
Auditor type 
Book value of tangible 
fixed assets 
Quality advisors  
Nonfinancial Demonstrates that corporate governance and 
capital raisings of firms are significant and 
positively associated with FRMD patterns. The 
findings show that the introduction of IFRS 
changes corporation’s willingness to 
communicate risk information. 
Adoption of IFRS: Positive  
Strength of Corporate governance: Positive  
Capital raising: Positive  
Overseas listing: Negative  
Firm size: Positive  
Leverage: Positive  
Sub-industry: Not significant  
ROA: Not significant  
---------- 
Oliveira, 
Rodrigues 
and Craig, 
2011a 
2006 Portugal  Content 
analysis,  
Disclosure 
Index 
Regression 
analysis 
190 --------- Risk 
disclosure  
Risk management  
Credit risk 
Market risk  
Liquidity risk  
Operational risk  
Capital structure and 
Adequacy  
Financial  The adoption of IAS/IFRS has brought a 
greater flow of risk-related information, but has 
not assured increased transparency across 
the Portuguese banking sector, consistent 
with previous studies.  The Portuguese 
banking system has prominent visibility as a 
consequence of the greater (relative) number 
of branches. The two commercial banks with 
the best risk reporting performance had the 
highest number of branches, and are listed on 
a regulated market (Euronext Lisbon) and on 
a foreign stock exchange market. However, 
among the PCIs with a lower number of 
branches (CFIs and other entities), 
transparency flaws were more intense 
compared to commercial banks, and previous 
findings.  
----------- 
Oliveira, 
Rodrigues 
2005 Portugal  Content 
analysis,  
42   ----------- Risk 
disclosure 
Ownership structure  
Indep’ Non-executive 
Nonfinancial  Implementation of IAS/IFRS and the European 
Union’s Modernisation Directive in 2005 did 
---------- 
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Studies Period Country Method Sample 
Disclosure 
Items 
Dependent 
Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
Sector Findings Limitations 
and Craig, 
2011b 
Disclosure 
index 
Regression 
analysis 
quantity directors  
External auditor 
quality  
Audit committee  
Independence  
Leverage  
Size  
Company listing 
status  
Accounting standards  
not affect the quantity and quality of RRD 
positively. Disclosures are generic, qualitative 
and backward-looking. Public visibility (as 
assessed by size and environmental 
sensitivity) is a crucial influence in explaining 
RRD: companies appear to manage their 
reputation through disclosure of risk-related 
information. Agency costs associated with 
leverage are important influences also. In 
listed companies, the presence of 
independent directors improves the level of 
RRD. 
Dobler, 
Lajili and 
Zeghal, 
2011 
2005 UK, 
Germany, 
US, 
Canada 
Content 
analysis, 
Regression 
analysis  
160 --------- Risk 
disclosure 
quantity  
 
 
 
Size 
Systematic risk 
Leverage 
Degree of operating 
leverage 
Share of foreign 
revenue 
Major customer 
 
Nonfinancial There is a consistent pattern where risk 
disclosure is most prevalent in management 
reports, concentrates on financial risk 
categories, and comprises little quantitative 
and forward looking disclosure. Firms from US 
disclose more risk information, followed by 
German firms. Cross-country variation in risk 
disclosure attributes can only be partly linked 
to domestic regulation. Disclosure incentives 
play a vital part. Riskier firms from US disclose 
more risk information. The opposite 
relationship was found among German firms. 
Risk disclosure quantity appears to be 
positively associated with proxies of firm risk 
in the North American settings. Where there is 
a negative relation with leverage for Germany.  
The focus was on 
quantity of risk 
disclosure 
disregarding the 
quality of risk 
disclosure. 
 
The study did not 
analyse risk 
disclosure over 
time. Thus, the 
development or 
harmonization of 
risk disclosure 
cannot be 
assessed. 
Elzahar 
and 
Hussainey, 
2012 
2009-2010 UK Content 
analysis, 
Regression 
analysis  
72 ---------- Risk related 
disclosure   
- Total 
number of 
risk related 
sentences  
Industry type  
Firm size  
Profitability  
Gearing  
Liquidity  
Cross listing  
Institutional ownership  
Duality  
Size of the board  
Board composition  
Size of AC 
 
 
 
Nonfnancial Company size and industry were positively 
associated with risk disclosure. However, 
leverage, liquidity, profitability and cross-listing 
were not significant in explaining variations in 
risk disclosure.  
Industrial companies report more risk 
information than service companies 
 
It simply adds up 
risk-related scores 
by adding the 
number of R-R 
sentences. This 
ignores the fact that 
the usefulness 
varies from 
sentence to 
sentence. Small 
sample size, 
therefore the 
findings might not 
be generalized. 
Elshandidy, 
Fraser and 
Hussainey, 
2015 
2005-2010 UK, 
Germany, 
USA 
Computirsed  
Textual 
analysis, 
Regression 
339, 219, 
320 
--------- Risk related 
disclosure  
 
-Mandatory 
Firm characteristics:  
Total risk  
Systematic risk  
Unsystematic risk 
Nonfinancial Significant variations in MRR and VRR 
between firms across the three countries. 
 
German firms tend to disclose significantly 
--------- 
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Studies Period Country Method Sample 
Disclosure 
Items 
Dependent 
Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
Sector Findings Limitations 
analysis  risk reporting  
 
-Voluntary 
risk reporting 
 
Financing risk  
Liquidity risk  
Size  
Profitability  
Growth   
Dividends  
The length of the 
annual report 
Industry Classification  
Country 
characteristics: 
Legal system  
Power distance  
Uncertainty avoidance  
Individualism  
Masculinity  
Long-term orientation  
higher levels of risk information mandatorily 
than UK (US) firms. German firms also tend to 
reveal considerably higher levels of VRR than 
US (UK) firms.  
MRR and VRR variations are significantly 
influenced by systematic risk, the legal system 
and cultural values. Country and firm 
characteristics have higher explanatory power 
over the observed variations in MRR than over 
those in VRR.  
 
Maffei et 
al., 2014  
2011 Italy   Content 
analysis,  
Disclosure 
index 
Regression 
analysis 
66 --------- Risk 
disclosure 
quantity 
Credit risk  
Exchange Risk 
Interest rate and price 
risk  
Liquidity risk  
Operational risk  
Securitization  
Financial  Italian banks formally comply with the Bank of 
Italy’s instructions, but there is discretion to 
choose the characteristics of the information 
provided. Despite different risk categories to 
disclose in each report, disclosure is quite 
uniform, although banks tend to provide 
denser information in the notes to the financial 
statements and the difference in the economic 
signs between the two reports decreases as 
the level of risk increases 
--------- 
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A chorological summary of all empirical risk disclosure studies in the developing world 
Studies  
 
 
Period  Country  Method  Sample  Disclosure 
Items  
Dependent  
Variables  
Independent  
Variables 
Sector Findings  Limitations 
Amran, Bin 
and Hassan, 
2009 
2005 Malaysian  Content 
analysis,  
Disclosure 
Index,  
Regression 
100 -------- Risk related 
disclosure 
Size  
Industry type  
Product 
diversification  
Leverage  
Market 
diversification  
Mixed  The total number of sentences dedicated for 
discussion of risk information by the sampled 
Malaysian companies is very low when 
compared to a 2006 study done by Linsley 
and Shrives in the UK.  
Size: Positive  
Industry: Positive  
Leverage: Not significant  
Product diversifications: Not significant  
Market diversifications: Not significant 
This study is purely based 
on the Linsley and Shrives 
(2006) checklist as it may 
not reflect local 
stakeholders demand. The 
development of a local risk 
measurement checklist will 
help researchers to better 
reflect on the findings in 
the local context. 
Hassan, 
2009 
2005 UAE Content 
analysis,  
Disclosure 
index,  
Regression 
analysis  
41 45  Risk related 
disclosure  
Size  
Reserves  
Industry type  
Leverage   
 
Mixed Size is not significantly related with risk 
disclosure. Leverage and industry type are 
positive and significant in explaining the 
variation of risk disclosure. Reserve is not 
significant and negatively related with risk 
disclosure. 
 
The risk disclosure index 
items reflect their 
existence in annual 
reports rather than their 
level of importance. 
Results could have 
changed if number and 
importance of the 
disclosure items are 
changed. 
Abdullah and 
Hassan, 
2013 
2008 GCC 
Countries  
Content 
analysis 
Disclosure 
index  
Regression 
analysis 
424 45 Risk related 
disclosure 
Size  
Leverage  
Basic  
No. of years 
using IFRS 
Financial/ 
Nonfinancial 
Sharia 
compliance/ Non 
Sharia 
compliance 
Reserves  
Mixed A positive relation between CRD and the 
firm’s size, leverage, and number of years 
using IFRS. We also find that financial and 
non-Islamic financial institutions disclose 
more risks than other firms in the same 
sample. 
Using the BASIC score, a corporate 
governance index developed by the Institution 
of Corporate Governance (HAWKAMA) in 
Dubai-UAE. There is a positive link between 
the firm’s level of corporate governance and 
CRD. Also a positive and significant link 
between the level of CRD and a corporation’s 
communication and disclosure.  
However, the link weakens after controlling 
the country’s characteristics, which suggests 
that the effect of the country is more important 
than the corporation’s own practice. 
 
Mousa and 
Elmir2013 
2011 Bahrain Content 
analysis, 
Regression 
analysis  
46 ---------- Systematic 
risk 
disclosure  
Unsystematic 
risk 
Size  
Beta of the firm  
Profitability  
Issuance of 
shares  
Nonfinancial  Corporate risk disclosures are very limited in 
annual reports of the companies sampled. 
Also company size, company listing, issuance 
of shares, and profitability are significantly 
associated with risk disclosure.  
The findings of this study 
cannot be generalised to 
other countries due to 
industrial composition, 
regulations, CG rules and 
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Studies  
 
 
Period  Country  Method  Sample  Disclosure 
Items  
Dependent  
Variables  
Independent  
Variables 
Sector Findings  Limitations 
disclosure  
Total risk 
disclosures  
 
Percentage of 
free float  
Leverage  
Listing  
Percentage of 
foreign ownership  
Industry  
Liquidity  
However, leverage, Beta of the company, 
liquidity, foreign ownership, percentage of free 
float and industry were insignificant. 
economic status 
Al-
Shammeri, 
2014 
2012 Kuwait  Content 
analysis,  
Regression 
analysis, 
Disclosure 
index  
109 ---------- All categories 
risk related 
disclosure  
Size  
Profitability  
Leverage  
Liquidity  
Audit type  
Complexity 
Industry type  
Nonfinancial  Corporate risk disclosure is associated 
positively with size, liquidity, and complexity 
and auditor type.  
The association between CRD and other 
corporate-specific characteristics (leverage 
and profitability) is insignificant 
Only 30% of the variation 
of risk disclosure   was 
explained. The impact of 
corporate governance on 
CRD was not considered 
Abdullah, 
Hassan and 
McClelland 
, 2015 
2009 GCC 
Countries  
Content 
analysis,  
Disclosure 
index 
Regression 
analysis,  
424 
 
45  Risk related 
disclosure 
Size  
Leverage  
Basic No. Of 
years using IFRS 
Islamic/Non-
Islamic  
Financial/ 
Nonfinancial 
Sharia 
compliance/ Non 
Sharia 
compliance 
Reserves 
Country Dummies  
Mixed   Islamic financial institutions disclose less 
corporate risk than do their non-Islamic peers. 
Also, found that the risk disclosure practices 
of GCC firms vary by country 
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A chorological summary of all empirical studies on the economic consequences of disclosure 
Studies  Research Issue Sample Size  Disclosure Proxy Country  Findings 
Baek, Kang and Park, 
2004  
Importance of corporate 
governance measures in 
determining firm value during 
a crisis  
644 nonfinancial firms  ------------ Korea  The economic crisis in Korea has a significant and negative effect on the market 
value of firms, but with large cross sectional variations. Firms with larger equity 
ownership by foreign investors experience a smaller drop in share value. Firms 
with higher disclosure quality and those with access to alternative sources of 
external financing also suffer less from the shock.  
Ball and Shivakumar, 
2004  
Timeliness in financial 
statement recognition of 
economic losses  
54, 778 (1475) firms 
and 141,649 (6,208) 
firm years for private 
(public) companies.   
 
This study employed 
Basu’s (1997) time 
series measures of 
timely loss recognition 
and a new accruals-
based method.  
UK Average earnings quality is measurably lower in UK private companies than in 
public companies, though their financial statements are audited and certified as 
complying with the same accounting standards.  Accounting standards are not 
absolute givens, and their effect on actual financial reporting is subject to market 
demand.  
Francis, Khurana and 
Pereira, 2005  
Examines disclosure 
incentives and 
consequences on the cost of 
capital outside USA 
672 firm-years  Self-constructed index  Different 
Countries  
The results showed that voluntary disclosure incentives appear to operate 
independently of country level factors, which suggest the effectiveness of 
voluntary disclosure gaining access to lower cost of external financing around the 
world  
Gietzmann and Ireland, 
2005  
The relationship between 
timely strategic disclosures 
and the expected cost of 
capital  
164 firms, 1,640 
observations  
Self-constructed 
measure of timely 
disclosure  
 
UK Showed that the effect of disclosure on cost of capital is only significant for those 
firms that make aggressive accounting choices.  
Xi Li, 2005  The persistence of relative 
performance in stock 
recommendations of sell-
side analysts  
341 buy-side and 226 
sell-side brokerage 
houses  
Risk-adjusted returns USA Indicated significant persistence in relative performance differences among 
individual analysts. Also the evidences are consistent with the hypothesis that 1- 
past winners’ recommendations are more informative and 2- investors underreact 
to past winners’ recommendations and overreact to past losers’ 
recommendations.  
Lopes and Rodrigues 
2007  
 
The determinants of 
disclosure level in the 
accounting for financial 
instruments of Portuguese 
listed companies. 
55 firms Self-constructed index  Portugal  The results could not find any significant influence of corporate governance 
structure or of financing structure.  They concluded that the disclosure degree is 
significantly related to size, type of auditor, listing status and economic sector.  
Hassan et al., 2009  The association between 
mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures and firm vale for 
Egyptian listed companies  
80 nonfinancial listed 
firms  
Self-constructed 
disclosure index  
Egypt  Showed a highly significant negative association between mandatory disclosure 
and firm value. Also showed a weaker positive relationship between voluntary 
disclosure and firm value 
Kothari et al., 2009  The effect of disclosures by 
management, analysts, and 
business press on cost of 
capital, return volatility, and 
analyst forecasts  
100,000 firm-year 
observations   
 
------------- USA Found that when content analysis indicates favorable disclosures, the firm’s risk, 
as proxied by the cost of capital, stock return volatility, and analyst forecast 
dispersion, declines significantly. In contrast, unfavorable disclosures are 
accompanied by significant increases in risk measures.  
Heitzman et al., 2010 The joint effects of 
materiality thresholds and 
voluntary disclosure 
incentives on firms’ 
disclosure decisions 
 1184 firms 
observations  
Herfindahl index USA The empirical tests isolating the impact of materiality on firms’ disclosures have 
greater explanatory power over empirical tests that do not. Voluntary disclosure 
incentives better explain disclosure when the information is less likely to be 
material. Tests of voluntary disclosure theories ignoring materiality likely lead to 
incorrect inferences 
Armstrong et al., 2011  
 
When Does Information 
Asymmetry Affect the Cost 
-------------------- Fama–French model USA Information asymmetry has a positive relation with firms’ cost of capital in excess 
of standard risk factors when markets are imperfect and no relation when 
274 | P a g e  
Studies  Research Issue Sample Size  Disclosure Proxy Country  Findings 
of Capital? markets approximate perfect competition. Also showed that the degree of market 
competition is an important conditioning variable to consider when examining the 
relation between information asymmetry and cost of capital. 
Uyar and Kilic, 2012  
 
Value relevance of voluntary 
disclosure: evidence from 
Turkish firms 
 
129 firms  Self-constructed index  Turkey  Showed that voluntary disclosure is value-relevant; i.e. impacts firm value. This 
implies that market participants value voluntary disclosure. The more information 
firms disclose voluntarily, the higher value they have in the eyes of investors. 
Therefore, this finding might be accepted as a signal to corporations to disclose 
more information to the stakeholders. However, the finding varied based on the 
dependent variable used; hence, the result was not supported by all models. 
Hwang et al., 2013  
 
Does information risk affect 
the implied cost of equity 
capital? An analysis of PIN 
and adjusted PIN 
791 firm-year 
observations 
ICOE Korea  Found a positive cross sectional relation between the implied cost of equity 
capital and bias-free AdjPIN, even after controlling for a liquidity-related 
component (PSOS). Their finding suggests that information risk derived from 
trades affect stock investors’ expected returns. 
Miihkinen, 2013  The usefulness of firm risk 
disclosures under different 
firm riskiness, investor-
interest, and market 
conditions: New evidence 
from Finland 
386 firm-year 
observations 
 
----------- Finland  Demonstrated that the quality of risk disclosure has a direct negative influence on 
information asymmetry. Also documented that risk disclosures are more useful if 
they are provided by small firms, high tech firms, and firms with low analyst 
coverage. Also found that momentum in stock markets affects the relevance of 
firms' risk reports 
Kravet and Muslu, 2013 The association between 
changes in companies’ 
textual risk disclosures in 10-
K filings and changes in 
stock market and analyst 
activity around the filings 
28,110 firm-year 
observations, 4,315 
firms 
----------- USA Annual increases in risk disclosures are associated with increased stock return 
volatility and trading volume around and after the filings. Increases in risk 
disclosures are also associated with more dispersed forecast revisions around 
the filings. Our findings suggest that textual risk disclosures increase investors’ 
risk perceptions. These results support arguments that firm-level risk disclosures 
are more likely to be boilerplate. 
Campbell et al., 2014  
 
The information content of 
mandatory risk factor 
disclosures in corporate 
filings 
9,076 firm-year 
observations  
 
------------ USA Firms facing greater risk disclose more risk factors, and that the type of risk the 
firm faces determines whether it devotes a greater portion of its disclosures 
towards describing that risk type. That is, managers provide risk factor 
disclosures that meaningfully reflect the risks they face. Secondly, find that the 
information conveyed by risk factor disclosures is reflected in systematic risk, 
idiosyncratic risk, information asymmetry, and firm value.  
Moumen et al., 2015  
 
The Value Relevance of Risk 
Disclosure in Annual 
Reports: Evidence from 
MENA Emerging Markets 
 
809 firm-year 
observations 
 
Disclosure Index  MENA 
countries  
Found a positive relationship between voluntary risk information and the market’s 
ability to anticipate two-year ahead future earnings change. The positive 
association provides us with the first empirical evidence of the usefulness of risk 
disclosure in annual reports. Second, found that the level of proprietary costs 
tends to moderate the perceived relevance of risk information, thereby making 
investors rely on another source of information in forecasting future earnings 
change. 
Volkov and Smith, 2015 Corporate diversification and 
firm value during economic 
downturns 
 
113,888 firm quarters, 
4583 firms 
---------- USA Found that the improvement in relative valuation of diversified firms during 
economic downturns is attributed to the ability of diversified firms to utilize 
broader external capital markets. Demonstrated that the improvement in relative 
valuation is largely driven by diversified firms that are financially constrained, 
and, therefore, attribute the observed improvement to more efficient internal 
capital allocation during recessions. 
Elzahar et al., 2015  Economic consequences of 
Key Performance 
Indicators’ disclosure quality 
448 firm-year 
observations. 
 
---------- UK Found a significantly negative (weakly positive) relationship between disclosure 
quality of financial KPIs and the implied cost of capital (firm value). These results 
inform regulatory bodies as well as the academic literature about the potential 
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economic consequences of this type of disclosure. 
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Saudi Arabian Disclosure act  
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Additional Tests  
One-Sample Test 
In order to identify any differences in the levels of risk disclosure of the sample banks 
over the examined period, levels of risk disclosure between the years will be 
examined using the one sample t-test. The criteria is significant value or the value 
probability is less than 0.05, it means data derived from a different variance of 
population, while if the probability value significant more than 0.05 it means data 
derived from a same variance of population. 
Although a statistically significant difference was found between the examined years 
of the levels of risk disclosure against the normal level of risk disclosure, it does not 
necessarily mean that the difference encountered is enough to be practically 
significant. Indeed, the researcher might accept that although the difference is 
statistically significant. However, the differences are not large enough to be 
practically significant (the levels of risk disclosure can be treated as normal).  
One-Sample Test  
 Test Value = 60                                        
 
t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
 
 Lower Upper  
ALJAZIRA 4.975 4 .008 6.60000 2.9166 10.2834 Accept  
ALRAJHI 2.128 4 .100 7.60000 -2.3178- 17.5178 Reject  
ALINMA -6.128- 4 .004 -6.60000- -9.5903- -3.6097- Accept 
ALBILAD -1.095- 4 .335 -2.80000- -9.9003- 4.3003 Reject 
Saudi Hollandi Bank 11.159 4 .000 8.20000 6.1597 10.2403 Accept 
SAAB 8.573 4 .001 8.40000 5.6797 11.1203 Accept 
Riyad Bank 15.501 4 .000 5.80000 4.7611 6.8389 Accept 
Saudi Investment 
Bank 
7.779 4 .001 9.40000 6.0452 12.7548 
Accept 
Arab National Bank 6.080 4 .004 12.40000 6.7371 18.0629 Accept 
278 | P a g e  
National Commercial 
Bank 
58.788 4 .000 14.40000 13.7199 15.0801 
Accept 
Banque Saudi Fransi 3.536 4 .024 10.00000 2.1470 17.8530 Accept 
 
Normality Test of the Levels of Risk Disclosure 
The result of the normality test can be detected by Kolmogorov-Smirnov and 
Shapiro-Wilk tests. If the p-value or the the sig value is more than 0.05 it shows that 
the data is normal and if it is less than 0.05 the assumption of normality is rejected. 
Thus, the p or the Sig values for Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk in this study 
are found to be more than 0.05, which mean the hypothesis of normality is accepted 
at 95% level of significance  
Tests of Normalityb 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
ALJAZIRA .210 5 .200* .897 5 .391 
ALRAJHI .270 5 .200* .880 5 .307 
ALINMA .319 5 .105 .793 5 .071 
ALBILAD .312 5 .125 .816 5 .108 
Saudi Hollandi Bank .367 5 .026 .684 5 .006 
SAAB .372 5 .022 .828 5 .135 
Riyad Bank .231 5 .200* .881 5 .314 
Saudi Investment Bank .359 5 .034 .820 5 .117 
Arab National Bank .243 5 .200* .884 5 .329 
National Commercial Bank .367 5 .026 .684 5 .006 
Banque Saudi Fransi .136 5 .200* .987 5 .967 
Heteroscedasticity/Homoscedasticity Tests  
Heteroscedasticity test is used to assure whether there is an indifference variance in the 
regression model between a residual and other residuals. The variance of the residual terms 
should be constant. This means that the residuals at each level of the predictor should have 
the same variance (homoscedasticity) (Field, 2009). A variable is free from 
heteroscedasticity problems when the significant number is more than 0.05. All variables 
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have a significant number which is more than 0.05, which indicates that all variables for 
Model 1, 2 and Model 3 are free from heteroscedasticity  
 
 
 
Normality Tests  
The result of the normality test can be detected by Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk 
tests. If the p-value or the the sig value is more than 0.05 it shows that the data is normal 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .000 19 .000 .847 .643a 
Residual .000 40 .000   
Total .000 59    
a. Predictors: (Constant), ISLAMIC, Y2013, ACSIZE, NOSH, Y2012, BOARDSIZE, TENURE, 
Y2009, EDUCATION, GENDER, INDEP, ROA, Y2011, ACINDEP, ACMEET, CHS, NON, 
DIVERSITY, SIZE 
b. Dependent Variable: RES2     
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .000 22 .000 1.131 .361a 
Residual .000 37 .000   
Total .000 59    
a. Predictors: (Constant), ISLAMIC, Y2013, ACSIZE, LEV, NOSH, LIQ, Y2010, BOARDSIZE, 
TENURE, Y2012, EDUCATION, GENDER, INDEP, DIVID, Y2011, ACMEET, ACINDEP, RISKD, 
CHS, NON, DIVERSITY, SIZE 
b. Dependent Variable: RES12     
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .000 23 .000 1.131 .370a 
Residual .000 31 .000   
Total .001 54    
a. Predictors: (Constant), ROA, LIQ, Y2011, DIVERSITY, ACMEET, EDUCATION, Y2013, 
ACSIZE, LEV, Y2010, GENDER, INDEP, DIVID, Y2012, ACINDEP, TENURE, RISKD, 
BOARDSIZE, CHS, NON, SIZE, NOSH, ISLAMIC 
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and if it is less than 0.05 the assumption of normality is rejected. All variables have a 
significant number which is more than 0.05, which indicates that all variables for Model 1, 2 
and Model 3 follow a normal distribution pattern as the p-value in Kolmogorov-Smirnov and 
Shapiro-Wilk tests are more than 0.05  
Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Unstandardized Residual .120 60 .052 .971 60 .160 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction     
 
Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Unstandardized Residual .066 55 .200* .985 55 .740 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction     
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance.    
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Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Unstandardized Residual .063 55 .200* .954 55 .053 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction     
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance.    
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